كلام حضرتك اللي هبد الصراحة سندات مصر كانت بقيمة ٣ مليار دولار فقط
أظهرت وثيقة مصرفية أن مصر باعت سندات على ثلاث شرائح بثلاثة مليارات دولار اليوم الخميس، وأنها قلصت العائد على جميع الشرائح بعد أن استقطبت طلبات بأكثر من
www.alarabiya.net
و ليست اعلي فائدة 7% هناك دول اعلي فائدة من مصر.
لكن مصر هي اعلي فائدة حقيقة يعني طرح الفائدة من التضخم ، بسبب ان التضخم في مصر كان منخفض و دة شي حلو مش وحش.
الدين ليس اكبر من الناتج المحلي ب اربع اصعاف
الدين الخارجي يمثل 33.9% من الناتج الإجمالي
Egypt External Debt accounted for 39.8 % of the country's Nominal GDP in 2024, compared with the ratio of 43.0 % in the previous quarter.
www.ceicdata.com
اجمالي الدين بيمثل ٩٠٪ من الناتج الاجمالي
و قولنا ديون مصر المحلية و الفائدة المرتفعة هي اللي مرهقة الموزنة
و أقرا من مصادر محترمة بدل جمال سلطان
Macro, Fiscal Resilience: Economic growth and a modest coronavirus support package allowed for only a modest widening in the general government overall deficit to an estimated 7.5% of GDP in the fiscal year ending June 2021 (FY21), from 7.0% in FY20 and 7.9% in FY19. We expect a slightly lower FY22 deficit on the back of revenue measures, in line with a government target to increase tax revenue/GDP by 2pp over the next four years. The government targets a primary surplus of 2% of GDP over the medium term (FY19-FY21 average: 1.8% of GDP). Debt Reduction Will Resume: The coronavirus pandemic interrupted Egypt’s two-year debt-reduction trend, and public finances remain a core weakness of the rating. However, we expect government debt/GDP to resume a downward path from FY22, and Egypt has significant financing flexibility. Consolidated general government debt/GDP hit an estimated 88% in FY20 and FY21, up from 84% in FY19. We expect faster growth and ongoing primary surpluses to reduce government debt/GDP to 86% in FY22. Rising External Vulnerabilities: Global monetary conditions are becoming less favourable for Egypt, endangering the positive trends in its public finance and macro fundamentals, in our view. Since mid-2020, there has been a mutually reinforcing dynamic between exchange rate stability and non-resident inflows into the Egyptian pound-denominated government bond market, against the backdrop of high real rates in Egypt and easy global monetary conditions and “risk on” sentiment globally. These flows could quickly reverse, although this is not our base case.