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قوة الصواريخ الاستراتيجية السعودية
- بادئ الموضوع النمر العربي
- تاريخ البدء
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- إنضم
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Henderson on Saudi-China-Pakistan Missile Ties
April 23, 2006 :: Analysis
Simon Henderson, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, recently commented on missile ties between Saudi Arabia, China, and Pakistan. The Saudis currently possess an arsenal of aging Chinese-designed CSS-2 missiles, purchased from China in the 1980s. Riyadh hopes to upgrade this arsenal with modern Chinese-designed missiles and perhaps nuclear warheads to create a deterrent against Iran. Henderson speculates that the Saudis will attempt to acquire from Pakistan both Chinese-designed missiles and dual-key Pakistani nuclear warheads. Under such a system, Saudi Arabia would have the key that controls the missiles, while Pakistan would have the key that controls the warheads. The result would technically not breach the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and perhaps evade Chinese international obligations against the transfer of ballistic missiles. However, a nuclear-armed Saudi Arabia would severely undermine U.S. diplomatic efforts to block Iran’s nuclear weapons program, and dramatically alter the regional balance of power.
Henderson notes that Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah visited Pakistan in February 2006, on his way back from China. In addition, Crown Prince Sultan, the Saudi defense minister, was in Pakistan in April. On Sultan’s previous trip to Pakistan in 1999, he toured Pakistan’s Kahuta uranium enrichment and missile production center, where he was escorted by the then director, the nuclear proliferator A.Q. Khan.
ننتظر صبي قحطان ولا تايفون للترجمه الحرفية
والمقالة تتكلم عن التعاون السعودي الصيني الباكستاني
ونية السعودية تحديث ترسانتها الصاروخية
Henderson on Saudi-China-Pakistan Missile Ties
April 23, 2006 :: Analysis
Simon Henderson, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, recently commented on missile ties between Saudi Arabia, China, and Pakistan. The Saudis currently possess an arsenal of aging Chinese-designed CSS-2 missiles, purchased from China in the 1980s. Riyadh hopes to upgrade this arsenal with modern Chinese-designed missiles and perhaps nuclear warheads to create a deterrent against Iran. Henderson speculates that the Saudis will attempt to acquire from Pakistan both Chinese-designed missiles and dual-key Pakistani nuclear warheads. Under such a system, Saudi Arabia would have the key that controls the missiles, while Pakistan would have the key that controls the warheads. The result would technically not breach the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and perhaps evade Chinese international obligations against the transfer of ballistic missiles. However, a nuclear-armed Saudi Arabia would severely undermine U.S. diplomatic efforts to block Iran’s nuclear weapons program, and dramatically alter the regional balance of power.
Henderson notes that Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah visited Pakistan in February 2006, on his way back from China. In addition, Crown Prince Sultan, the Saudi defense minister, was in Pakistan in April. On Sultan’s previous trip to Pakistan in 1999, he toured Pakistan’s Kahuta uranium enrichment and missile production center, where he was escorted by the then director, the nuclear proliferator A.Q. Khan.
ننتظر صبي قحطان ولا تايفون للترجمه الحرفية
والمقالة تتكلم عن التعاون السعودي الصيني الباكستاني
ونية السعودية تحديث ترسانتها الصاروخية
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هنا المقالة تتكلم هن الخيار النووي السعودي
ونوايا السعودية نحو التكنولوجيا النووية
التي من الممكن الحصول عليها من باكستان
لكن شدتني هذه النقاط:
• In the late 1980s, China reportedly gave Pakistan a nuclear weapon design and enough highly enriched (i.e., weapons-grade) uranium for two bombs in return for Pakistan's own enrichment secrets, which were derived from European designs.
• In the mid-1990s, UN weapons inspectors in Iraq unearthed evidence that a Pakistani had offered to sell nuclear technology to Saddam Husayn.
• In the late 1990s, Pakistan reportedly traded uranium enrichment technology to North Korea in exchange for Nodong missile technology.
• In 2001, Washington insisted that Pakistan detain two retired nuclear scientists who had been in contact with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
• In summer 2003, when the International Atomic Energy Agency found traces of weapons-grade uranium in Iran, Tehran told the agency that the substance must have come from Pakistani enrichment equipment (equipment obtained from private dealers, not from the Pakistani government). That claim is disturbing whether true (which would suggest that Pakistan is not carefully controlling such dangerous technology) or false (which would indicate that Iran may have produced highly enriched uranium on its own).
هنا المقالة تتكلم هن الخيار النووي السعودي
ونوايا السعودية نحو التكنولوجيا النووية
التي من الممكن الحصول عليها من باكستان
لكن شدتني هذه النقاط:
• In the late 1980s, China reportedly gave Pakistan a nuclear weapon design and enough highly enriched (i.e., weapons-grade) uranium for two bombs in return for Pakistan's own enrichment secrets, which were derived from European designs.
• In the mid-1990s, UN weapons inspectors in Iraq unearthed evidence that a Pakistani had offered to sell nuclear technology to Saddam Husayn.
• In the late 1990s, Pakistan reportedly traded uranium enrichment technology to North Korea in exchange for Nodong missile technology.
• In 2001, Washington insisted that Pakistan detain two retired nuclear scientists who had been in contact with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
• In summer 2003, when the International Atomic Energy Agency found traces of weapons-grade uranium in Iran, Tehran told the agency that the substance must have come from Pakistani enrichment equipment (equipment obtained from private dealers, not from the Pakistani government). That claim is disturbing whether true (which would suggest that Pakistan is not carefully controlling such dangerous technology) or false (which would indicate that Iran may have produced highly enriched uranium on its own).
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Prince Hints Saudi Arabia May Join Nuclear Arms Race
UBAI, United Arab Emirates (AP) — A Saudi prince, in a remark designed to send chills through the Obama administration and its allies, suggested that the kingdom might consider producing nuclear weapons if it found itself between atomic arsenals in Iran and Israel.
The prince, Turki al-Faisal, who has served as the Saudi intelligence chief and as
ambassador to the United States, made the comment on Monday at a Persian Gulf security forum in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The remark confirmed Western fears about the potential for an arms race in the Middle East if Iran moves to produce a nuclear weapon.
But it also reflected the hardening views among the Persian Gulf’s Arab states that they must rely on themselves — and not just on Western protection — as tensions with Iran grow worse.
Kuwaiti authorities are pressing ahead with several prosecutions against people accused of being Iranian spies, and Bahrain’s rulers contend that a cell linked to Iran sought to attack the Saudi Embassy.
Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates is close to finishing a pipeline that would carry oil directly to Indian Ocean shipping lanes, bypassing the choke point at the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has at times threatened to shut off to shipping.
In meetings last week, Arab envoys from the gulf agreed to study proposals to pool their military forces into a regional command, in an apparent reply to Iran’s expanding land and sea powers.
Prince Turki said at the forum on Monday that an Iranian quest for nuclear weapons and Israel’s presumed nuclear arsenal might force Saudi Arabia to follow suit. Most defense analysts believe that Israel has nuclear weapons, but it has refused to confirm or deny their existence.
“It is our duty toward our nation and people to consider all possible options, including the possession of these weapons,” Prince Turki was quoted as saying.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/07/w...bia-may-seek-nuclear-weapons-prince-says.html
Prince Hints Saudi Arabia May Join Nuclear Arms Race
UBAI, United Arab Emirates (AP) — A Saudi prince, in a remark designed to send chills through the Obama administration and its allies, suggested that the kingdom might consider producing nuclear weapons if it found itself between atomic arsenals in Iran and Israel.
The prince, Turki al-Faisal, who has served as the Saudi intelligence chief and as
ambassador to the United States, made the comment on Monday at a Persian Gulf security forum in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The remark confirmed Western fears about the potential for an arms race in the Middle East if Iran moves to produce a nuclear weapon.
But it also reflected the hardening views among the Persian Gulf’s Arab states that they must rely on themselves — and not just on Western protection — as tensions with Iran grow worse.
Kuwaiti authorities are pressing ahead with several prosecutions against people accused of being Iranian spies, and Bahrain’s rulers contend that a cell linked to Iran sought to attack the Saudi Embassy.
Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates is close to finishing a pipeline that would carry oil directly to Indian Ocean shipping lanes, bypassing the choke point at the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has at times threatened to shut off to shipping.
In meetings last week, Arab envoys from the gulf agreed to study proposals to pool their military forces into a regional command, in an apparent reply to Iran’s expanding land and sea powers.
Prince Turki said at the forum on Monday that an Iranian quest for nuclear weapons and Israel’s presumed nuclear arsenal might force Saudi Arabia to follow suit. Most defense analysts believe that Israel has nuclear weapons, but it has refused to confirm or deny their existence.
“It is our duty toward our nation and people to consider all possible options, including the possession of these weapons,” Prince Turki was quoted as saying.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/07/w...bia-may-seek-nuclear-weapons-prince-says.html
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رد: الترسانة النووية والصاروخية السعودية
- إنضم
- 2 يونيو 2011
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مقطع رائع اذا ما كان عندنا نووي![:walw[1]:](/vb/data/assets/smilies/c39c84e393dbca960a05b9f45e20e07203df7b3c.gif "-- :walw[1]:")
تستاهل تقييم
مقطع رائع اذا ما كان عندنا نووي
تستاهل تقييم
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رابط ايضا يحتاج الى الترجمة ملاحظة الموقع محجوب عندي لكني دخلت علية :7[1]: http://geimint.blogspot.com/2009/02/saudi-arabias-ballistic-missile-force.html#
رابط ايضا يحتاج الى الترجمة ملاحظة الموقع محجوب عندي لكني دخلت علية :7[1]: http://geimint.blogspot.com/2009/02/saudi-arabias-ballistic-missile-force.html#
- إنضم
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رد: الترسانة النووية والصاروخية السعودية
Saudi Arabia's Ballistic Missile Force
INTRODUCTION
One of the most overlooked military arsenals in the Middle East is the Saudi Arabian ballistic missile force. The presence of this capability, in context with the specific weapon system employed, raises a number of significant questions about the potential nuclear ambitions of Saudi Arabia. Analysis of currently available imagery also suggests that ballistic missiles are not a capability which Saudi Arabia will be seeking to divest itself of at any point in the near future.
THE SAUDI MISSILE FORCE
At some point in the mid 1980's, Saudi Arabia chose to pursue a ballistic missile force. Friendly Islamic nations such as Pakistan did not possess a significant ballistic missile program at this time, nor did North Korea. The only other nation producing ballistic missiles which would have been amenable to an export was China. Towards the end of the 1980's China agreed to develop a conventionally-armed ballistic missile for export to the Saudis. The weapon chosen for modification was the DF-3A (CSS-2) IRBM, a nuclear-tipped weapon already in service with the Chinese military for well over a decade.
The first weapons were delivered to Saudi Arabia in 1988, and it is not known precisely how many were purchased. Sources provide varying estimates, ranging from between 30 missiles and 9 launchers to 120 missiles and 12 launchers. Identified DF-3A associated facilities inside of Saudi Arabia suggest that the number may well be far closer to the latter estimate; two facilities have been positively identified, each housing two garrisons and various support and storage facilities. These facilities are Al Joffer and Al Sulayyil, approximately 90 and 450 km southwest of Riyadh, respectively. The locations of these facilities, as well as two other facilities which may be related to the Saudi Arabian ballistic missile force and will be described later, can be seen in the image below:
THE DF-3A
The DF-3A is a single stage IRBM initially developed for the PLA's 2nd Artillery Division. Entering service in 1971, the initial DF-3 variant was a nuclear-tipped weapon, representing the first Chinese-developed ballistic missile. An improved propulsion system and other refinements were introduced in the 1980's with the DF-3A variant. The initial DF-3 had a range of 2,500 km, increased to 2,800 km in the DF-3A. Maximum range capability with a reduced payload is 4,000 km, and the weapon is credited with the ability to fly a depressed-angle profile to a range of 1,550 km, providing a limited degree of anti-missile defense. The DF-3 series weapons are road mobile, but employ prepared launch sites, allowing them to be dispersed from a garrison. Preparation time for erecting and fueling the missile is approximately two hours, and the storable liquid fuel propellant allows the missile to remain ready to fire for a short period of time.
The weapon is erected on a circular pad approximately 100 meters in diameter. A reinforced pad in the center serves as the panch point for the missile, with the support vehicles being positioned around the launcher on the pad. An example of a Saudi Arabian DF-3A launch pad can be seen in the image below:
http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_0HCJq6B1wZA/SZEcYZ7MIXI/AAAAAAAAB9w/28A2vsIk4CM/s400/ALSULAYYILPAD.jpg
AL SULAYYIL
The first identified DF-3A facility in Saudi Arabia is at Al Sulayyil, near the southern end of the Jabal Tuwayq escarpment. This geological feature, running approximately 800 kilometers roughly south from a location north of Riyadh, provides a natural method of concealing and protecting Saudi Arabia's ballistic missile infrastructure. The complex consists of an administrative and support facility, and a large missile base contained within a secure perimeter. The Al Sulayyil facility was first described in detail by Ronen Bergman, writing for the Israeli publication Yediot Ahronot in March of 2002.
An overview of the Al Sulayyil DF-3A complex can be seen in the image below:
The missile compound itself is divided into three main areas: two missile garrisons with associated support facilities, and a central compound. Both garrison areas differ in their layout due to terrain constraints, but are nearly identical in terms of the facilities they possess. Each garrison area, accessed by separate entry control points within the overall complex itself, contain a garrison compound for missile launchers and support equipment, three separate bunkers ostensibly for missile and/or warhead storage, a missile handling facility for warhead mating, and a high bay garage where missiles and launchers are joined and erected for calibration before deployment.
An image of the northern missile garrison area can be seen below:
The southern missile garrison is located in close proximity to the compound's central area. The central area contains a former support area likely associated with the construction of the missile complexes, a possible launch control facility, and two bunkers.
An image of the central area and the southern missile garrison area can be seen below:
The missile garrison itself is not as expansive in the southern facility as it is in the northern facility. The reasoning behind this is not clear. Both facilities contain four identical equipment and vehicle garages and a drive through garage likely maintaining the launchers themselves. The northern garrison possesses two additional garages and a high bay garage. As high bay garages are typically employed for launcher or missile support functions, it is possible that the northern facility provides training or maintenance support for the DF-3A unit.
An image depicting the two DF-3A garrisons can be seen in the image below:
Despite reporting to the contrary which suggests that there are numerous launch pads contained within the complex, only two prepared launch sites have been identified within Al Sulayyil. It is possible that weapons may be erected from the reinforced pads or roadways surrounding many of the facilities, but this cannot be confirmed using the available imagery.
AL JOFFER
The second identified DF-3A facility in Saudi Arabia is the Al Joffer facility. As with the Al Sulayyil facility, it is located within the Jabal Tuwayq escarpment. The Al Joffer facility is located closer to the northern end of the escarpment, near Riyadh. The facilities found inside of the Al Joffer facility are virtually identical to those found at the Al Sulayyil facility, consisting of an administrative and support facility, and a secure missile complex consisting of two garrison areas and a central support area. Even the missile garrisons themselves depict the same differences as those described above in the Al Sulayyil facility. Different terrain considerations than those found at the Al Sulayyil facility result in the Al Joffer facility being more expansive, with the two missile garrisons being separated by a greater distance.
An overview of the Al Joffer DF-3A complex can be seen in the image below:
Apart from the distances involved, there are two major differences between the Al Joffer and Al Sulayyil facilities. First, Al Joffer only contains a single fixed launch pad, whereas Al Sulayyil contains two. Secondly, Al Joffer still contains an active support facility inside of the main complex in the central area. Given that the imagery was captured in 2004, this suggests that the Al Joffer facility was not fully operational before that date, providing a potential explanation for the lack of a second prepared launch pad.
In contrast, the Al Sulayyil facility, particularly the northern garrison area, has remained unchanged in imagery between 2003 and 2007, suggesting that it was the first facility to become operational with the DF-3A.
An image comparing the Al Sulayyil northern garrison's appearance in 2003 (top) and 2007 (bottom) can be seen below:
POSSIBLE FACILITIES
There are two potential facilities in Saudi Arabia that may serve the DF-3A force. One is located approximately 280 km west of Al Sulayyil near the settlement of Rawdah, while the other is located in Saudi Arabia's northwestern desert region. As with the previous two facilities, both of these locations are strategically placed inside of terrain features for protection.
Rawdah
The Rawdah complex is a massive facility consisting of numerous underground facilities (UGFs) and hardened bunkers. While the true purpose of this facility is not known, there is evidence to suggest that it supports DF-3A operations in some capacity. The complex is divided into two main areas, an support area and a separate area containing the aforementioned hardened facilities.
An overview of the Rawdah complex can be seen in the iamge below:
http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_0HCJq6B1wZA/SZEcXmkqy5I/AAAAAAAAB9Q/29zhiPGA-jc/s400/RAWDAHOVERVIEW.jpg
The support area consists of an administrative compound with support facilities, an underground drive-through complex, and two potential missile launch pads. The administrative compound is relatively nondescript, but the other facilities are worthy of further inspection. The underground drive-through facility is nearly 600 meters long. In most cases it could be viewed as simply a pass through the terrain allowing for easier travel, but the support area is connected by a two lane paved road with the outside area. The purpose of this large UGF may be for storage or for command functions. The latter is unlikely given the lack of any visible communications-related infrastructure atop the terrain under which the drive-through facility passes. The most logical assumption therefore is that the facility is designed for a storage purpose. The two possible launch pads are the most significant evidence suggesting that the Rawdah facility does support the DF-3A. One pad can be seen with six 20 meter long objects which match the dimensions of DF-3A towed transporter-erectors. This pad is of a circular configuration 90 meters across, matching those found at the Al Sulayyil and Al Joffer DF-3A facilities. The reinforced launch pad in the center is missing, suggesting that this may be a training site. The second possible launch area consists of a concrete pad enclosed by a fence. While this potential launch site differs in configuration from those positively identified at Al Sulayyil and Al Joffer, its dimensions would allow a DF-3A to be erected and fired.
The support area of the Rawdah complex can be seen in the image below:
The remaining facilities at Rawdah are concentrated to the northwest of the support area. This area contains numerous bunkers and UGFs, as well as two potential launch areas. The launch areas consist of a hardened pad and an extension of a roadway, locations similar if not to the circular launch pads favored by the operational garrisons, then certainly to those employed by the Chinese 2nd Artillery Division in association with certain missile types. As Chinese technicians are reported to have aided in the construction of Saudi Arabia's DF-3A facilities, it is possible that various launch pads were incorporated for evaluation. The numerous underground facilities suggest that while Rawdah may have a DF-3A support function, it likely serves other purposes as well. Precisely what is contained inside of the facilities is again not conclusively known, but some educated guesses may be made. As with the drive-through UGF to the southeast, no evidence of significant air circulation or ventilation is visible, suggesting that the various bunkers and UGFs are not intended for continued occupation. This suggests that the facilities are primarily intended for storage.
An image of the storage complex at Rawdah can be seen below:
What precisely is stored in such an isolated and expansive facility is a matter of speculation. The answer may be tied to the location itself. The Rawdah complex is located in the southwestern quadrant of Saudi Arabia, the furthest distance from past and present potential aggressors such as Iran, Iraq, and Israel. This would make the Rawdah complex ideally suited to serve as a large-scale ammunition storage facility. Dispersal of the ammunition would likely be performed by air out of the Bisha airport 120 km to the south. Transportation via road is also possible, but unlikely given the distances involved and potential security concerns. It is likely that DF-3A components stored in the facility have already been dispersed. The facility was imaged in 2004, when the Al Joffer facility may not have been fully operational as described above. The Rawdah facility's DF-3A support function may have already been terminated with the dispersal of components to Al Joffer. It is possible that DF-3A missiles may still be stored at Rawdah, and that the launch facilities may serve as the training complex for Saudi Arabian missile crews.
Western Garrison
One final location has been identified that may potentially house DF-3A related facilities. This location is only visible in low resolution imagery but does share two of the identifiable characteristics of Al Sulayyil and Al Joffer: it is contained within significant terrain, and it is isolated from major population centers. This facility is also located much closer to Israel, a potential target for the Saudi DF-3A force.
The possible western DF-3A garrison can be seen in the image below:
TARGETING OPTIONS
From their garrisons at Al Sulayyil and Al Joffer, Saudi Arabian DF-3As can range targets as far away as India and western Europe when employed to their maximum range of 4000 km. Much of Africa falls within range as well.
The image below depicts the coverage of the DF-3A ballistic missile when fired from Saudi Arabian garrisons to a range of 4000 km:
Despite the extended range capability it is likely that the weapons are only employed to their typical range of 2800 km. Extending the range requires a reduction in payload and also results in decreased accuracy. Given that the DF-3A is already a relatively inaccurate weapon, decreasing the payload would only serve to seriously diminish the combat potential of the weapon system. As seen in the image below, the Middle East, portions of Africa and eastern Europe, and western India are still within range at the standard range of 2800 km:
The most likely potential target for the Saudi Arabian DF-3A force is Iran. Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi'a Iran are not the closest of nations due to religious differences and the Saudi's close relationship with the United States, to cite a few brief reasons. Saudi Arabian DF-3As are believed to be targeted on Iranian cities due to their inaccuracy and therefore their inherent unsuitability for strikes on military facilities or strategic targets.
Israel is also a potential target for Saudi Arabian ballistic missiles. The likely scenario for a launch against Israel would be to employ the DF-3A in its depressed-angle launch mode, which confers a range of 1550 km. Targeting of Israel may be the reason behind the presence of the potential launch facility in western Saudi Arabia. As seen in the image below, launching from this facility allows the DF-3A to reach Israel with ease, even when fired using a depressed angle trajectory, a likely scenario given that this would increase the chances that the weapons would be able to avoid intercept by Israeli anti-missile defenses.
NUCLEAR POTENTIAL
The inaccuracy of the DF-3A, combined with its 2,000 kg throw weight, has raised speculation as to the true Saudi Arabian intentions for the missile. Saudi Arabia is well aware of the inaccuracy of the weapon, claiming that they were not fired at Iraq in 1990/1991 to avoid civillian casualties. "King Fahd ruled out that option because of the fact that you cannot control it accurately. Our problem is that our war was not with the Iraqi people, it was with Saddam Hussein and his clique," stated Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan. This is in contrast to the alleged targeting of Iranian population centers.
Saudi Arabia has been known to have had an interest in nuclear weapons for some time, dating back to the construction of a potential nuclear research center in 1975. Evidence suggests that Saudi Arabia was financially and perhaps technologically involved in the nuclear weapons programs of both Iraq and Pakistan. The Iraqi capability to develop nuclear weapons was removed in the 1980s during the Iranian and Israeli air raids on the Tammuz reactor complex southeast of Baghdad. Pakistan presents an interesting option. It has been suggested that Saudi Arabia would be provided with Pakistani nuclear weapons should Iran achieve the capability to produce nuclear weapons of its own. Pakistani warheads on Saudi Arabian weapons would not only represent a significant threat to Iran, but also to India. Saudi Arabian DF-3A garrisons are well defended and would be much more difficult for India to strike during a time of conflict, potentially providing Pakistan with an added nuclear deterrent capability due to close relations with the Kingdom.
At the end of the day, Saudi Arabia does not currently possess a nuclear warhead for the DF-3A. The nation signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1988, and has stated that it would not arm the DF-3A with either nuclear or chemical warheads. Evidence of Saudi Arabia's nuclear ambitions cannot be ignored, however, and a nuclear-armed Iran could be the impetus needed for Saudi Arabia to finally acquire a nuclear capability for its ballistic missile force. It should be noted, however, that past Saudi Arabian assurances that chemical or nuclear warheads would not be acquired are ominously significant. Saudi Arabia did not unequivocally state that weapons of mass destruction would not be used to arm the DF-3A, raising significant questions.
If the Kingdom, being aware of the DF-3As inaccuracy, is not pursuing a nuclear or chemical warhead capability, is there a covert biological warfare program underway in Saudi Arabia? Moreover, given that Saudi Arabia is reportedly not concerned with firing the weapons at Iranian civillians, has such a program existed since before 1990? This would potentially explain the Kingdom's real reasons for not wishing to fire their weapons into Iraq, unless they view Iraqi civillians with more regard than those of Iran, reasons reinforced by the alleged nuclear partnership between Iraq and Saudi Arabia.
CONCLUSION
The Saudi Arabian ballistic missile arsenal is one of the most interesting and important military aspects of the developing Middle Eastern political and military landscape. As Iran moves forward towards its alleged nuclear weapons program, Saudi Arabia may well attempt to acquire a similar capability for its missiles to serve as a deterrent. The potentially destabilizing effects of such a move, given the Kingdom's position regarding Israel, could ignite a new arms race, and even military conflict. The fact that this significant development may be related to a military capability that few individuals realize exists highlights the need for closer military analysis of potential adversarial situations worldwide.
انتهى بحمدالله
Saudi Arabia's Ballistic Missile Force
INTRODUCTION
One of the most overlooked military arsenals in the Middle East is the Saudi Arabian ballistic missile force. The presence of this capability, in context with the specific weapon system employed, raises a number of significant questions about the potential nuclear ambitions of Saudi Arabia. Analysis of currently available imagery also suggests that ballistic missiles are not a capability which Saudi Arabia will be seeking to divest itself of at any point in the near future.
THE SAUDI MISSILE FORCE
At some point in the mid 1980's, Saudi Arabia chose to pursue a ballistic missile force. Friendly Islamic nations such as Pakistan did not possess a significant ballistic missile program at this time, nor did North Korea. The only other nation producing ballistic missiles which would have been amenable to an export was China. Towards the end of the 1980's China agreed to develop a conventionally-armed ballistic missile for export to the Saudis. The weapon chosen for modification was the DF-3A (CSS-2) IRBM, a nuclear-tipped weapon already in service with the Chinese military for well over a decade.
The first weapons were delivered to Saudi Arabia in 1988, and it is not known precisely how many were purchased. Sources provide varying estimates, ranging from between 30 missiles and 9 launchers to 120 missiles and 12 launchers. Identified DF-3A associated facilities inside of Saudi Arabia suggest that the number may well be far closer to the latter estimate; two facilities have been positively identified, each housing two garrisons and various support and storage facilities. These facilities are Al Joffer and Al Sulayyil, approximately 90 and 450 km southwest of Riyadh, respectively. The locations of these facilities, as well as two other facilities which may be related to the Saudi Arabian ballistic missile force and will be described later, can be seen in the image below:
THE DF-3A
The DF-3A is a single stage IRBM initially developed for the PLA's 2nd Artillery Division. Entering service in 1971, the initial DF-3 variant was a nuclear-tipped weapon, representing the first Chinese-developed ballistic missile. An improved propulsion system and other refinements were introduced in the 1980's with the DF-3A variant. The initial DF-3 had a range of 2,500 km, increased to 2,800 km in the DF-3A. Maximum range capability with a reduced payload is 4,000 km, and the weapon is credited with the ability to fly a depressed-angle profile to a range of 1,550 km, providing a limited degree of anti-missile defense. The DF-3 series weapons are road mobile, but employ prepared launch sites, allowing them to be dispersed from a garrison. Preparation time for erecting and fueling the missile is approximately two hours, and the storable liquid fuel propellant allows the missile to remain ready to fire for a short period of time.
The weapon is erected on a circular pad approximately 100 meters in diameter. A reinforced pad in the center serves as the panch point for the missile, with the support vehicles being positioned around the launcher on the pad. An example of a Saudi Arabian DF-3A launch pad can be seen in the image below:
http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_0HCJq6B1wZA/SZEcYZ7MIXI/AAAAAAAAB9w/28A2vsIk4CM/s400/ALSULAYYILPAD.jpg
AL SULAYYIL
The first identified DF-3A facility in Saudi Arabia is at Al Sulayyil, near the southern end of the Jabal Tuwayq escarpment. This geological feature, running approximately 800 kilometers roughly south from a location north of Riyadh, provides a natural method of concealing and protecting Saudi Arabia's ballistic missile infrastructure. The complex consists of an administrative and support facility, and a large missile base contained within a secure perimeter. The Al Sulayyil facility was first described in detail by Ronen Bergman, writing for the Israeli publication Yediot Ahronot in March of 2002.
An overview of the Al Sulayyil DF-3A complex can be seen in the image below:
The missile compound itself is divided into three main areas: two missile garrisons with associated support facilities, and a central compound. Both garrison areas differ in their layout due to terrain constraints, but are nearly identical in terms of the facilities they possess. Each garrison area, accessed by separate entry control points within the overall complex itself, contain a garrison compound for missile launchers and support equipment, three separate bunkers ostensibly for missile and/or warhead storage, a missile handling facility for warhead mating, and a high bay garage where missiles and launchers are joined and erected for calibration before deployment.
An image of the northern missile garrison area can be seen below:
The southern missile garrison is located in close proximity to the compound's central area. The central area contains a former support area likely associated with the construction of the missile complexes, a possible launch control facility, and two bunkers.
An image of the central area and the southern missile garrison area can be seen below:
The missile garrison itself is not as expansive in the southern facility as it is in the northern facility. The reasoning behind this is not clear. Both facilities contain four identical equipment and vehicle garages and a drive through garage likely maintaining the launchers themselves. The northern garrison possesses two additional garages and a high bay garage. As high bay garages are typically employed for launcher or missile support functions, it is possible that the northern facility provides training or maintenance support for the DF-3A unit.
An image depicting the two DF-3A garrisons can be seen in the image below:
Despite reporting to the contrary which suggests that there are numerous launch pads contained within the complex, only two prepared launch sites have been identified within Al Sulayyil. It is possible that weapons may be erected from the reinforced pads or roadways surrounding many of the facilities, but this cannot be confirmed using the available imagery.
AL JOFFER
The second identified DF-3A facility in Saudi Arabia is the Al Joffer facility. As with the Al Sulayyil facility, it is located within the Jabal Tuwayq escarpment. The Al Joffer facility is located closer to the northern end of the escarpment, near Riyadh. The facilities found inside of the Al Joffer facility are virtually identical to those found at the Al Sulayyil facility, consisting of an administrative and support facility, and a secure missile complex consisting of two garrison areas and a central support area. Even the missile garrisons themselves depict the same differences as those described above in the Al Sulayyil facility. Different terrain considerations than those found at the Al Sulayyil facility result in the Al Joffer facility being more expansive, with the two missile garrisons being separated by a greater distance.
An overview of the Al Joffer DF-3A complex can be seen in the image below:
Apart from the distances involved, there are two major differences between the Al Joffer and Al Sulayyil facilities. First, Al Joffer only contains a single fixed launch pad, whereas Al Sulayyil contains two. Secondly, Al Joffer still contains an active support facility inside of the main complex in the central area. Given that the imagery was captured in 2004, this suggests that the Al Joffer facility was not fully operational before that date, providing a potential explanation for the lack of a second prepared launch pad.
In contrast, the Al Sulayyil facility, particularly the northern garrison area, has remained unchanged in imagery between 2003 and 2007, suggesting that it was the first facility to become operational with the DF-3A.
An image comparing the Al Sulayyil northern garrison's appearance in 2003 (top) and 2007 (bottom) can be seen below:
POSSIBLE FACILITIES
There are two potential facilities in Saudi Arabia that may serve the DF-3A force. One is located approximately 280 km west of Al Sulayyil near the settlement of Rawdah, while the other is located in Saudi Arabia's northwestern desert region. As with the previous two facilities, both of these locations are strategically placed inside of terrain features for protection.
Rawdah
The Rawdah complex is a massive facility consisting of numerous underground facilities (UGFs) and hardened bunkers. While the true purpose of this facility is not known, there is evidence to suggest that it supports DF-3A operations in some capacity. The complex is divided into two main areas, an support area and a separate area containing the aforementioned hardened facilities.
An overview of the Rawdah complex can be seen in the iamge below:
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The support area consists of an administrative compound with support facilities, an underground drive-through complex, and two potential missile launch pads. The administrative compound is relatively nondescript, but the other facilities are worthy of further inspection. The underground drive-through facility is nearly 600 meters long. In most cases it could be viewed as simply a pass through the terrain allowing for easier travel, but the support area is connected by a two lane paved road with the outside area. The purpose of this large UGF may be for storage or for command functions. The latter is unlikely given the lack of any visible communications-related infrastructure atop the terrain under which the drive-through facility passes. The most logical assumption therefore is that the facility is designed for a storage purpose. The two possible launch pads are the most significant evidence suggesting that the Rawdah facility does support the DF-3A. One pad can be seen with six 20 meter long objects which match the dimensions of DF-3A towed transporter-erectors. This pad is of a circular configuration 90 meters across, matching those found at the Al Sulayyil and Al Joffer DF-3A facilities. The reinforced launch pad in the center is missing, suggesting that this may be a training site. The second possible launch area consists of a concrete pad enclosed by a fence. While this potential launch site differs in configuration from those positively identified at Al Sulayyil and Al Joffer, its dimensions would allow a DF-3A to be erected and fired.
The support area of the Rawdah complex can be seen in the image below:
The remaining facilities at Rawdah are concentrated to the northwest of the support area. This area contains numerous bunkers and UGFs, as well as two potential launch areas. The launch areas consist of a hardened pad and an extension of a roadway, locations similar if not to the circular launch pads favored by the operational garrisons, then certainly to those employed by the Chinese 2nd Artillery Division in association with certain missile types. As Chinese technicians are reported to have aided in the construction of Saudi Arabia's DF-3A facilities, it is possible that various launch pads were incorporated for evaluation. The numerous underground facilities suggest that while Rawdah may have a DF-3A support function, it likely serves other purposes as well. Precisely what is contained inside of the facilities is again not conclusively known, but some educated guesses may be made. As with the drive-through UGF to the southeast, no evidence of significant air circulation or ventilation is visible, suggesting that the various bunkers and UGFs are not intended for continued occupation. This suggests that the facilities are primarily intended for storage.
An image of the storage complex at Rawdah can be seen below:
What precisely is stored in such an isolated and expansive facility is a matter of speculation. The answer may be tied to the location itself. The Rawdah complex is located in the southwestern quadrant of Saudi Arabia, the furthest distance from past and present potential aggressors such as Iran, Iraq, and Israel. This would make the Rawdah complex ideally suited to serve as a large-scale ammunition storage facility. Dispersal of the ammunition would likely be performed by air out of the Bisha airport 120 km to the south. Transportation via road is also possible, but unlikely given the distances involved and potential security concerns. It is likely that DF-3A components stored in the facility have already been dispersed. The facility was imaged in 2004, when the Al Joffer facility may not have been fully operational as described above. The Rawdah facility's DF-3A support function may have already been terminated with the dispersal of components to Al Joffer. It is possible that DF-3A missiles may still be stored at Rawdah, and that the launch facilities may serve as the training complex for Saudi Arabian missile crews.
Western Garrison
One final location has been identified that may potentially house DF-3A related facilities. This location is only visible in low resolution imagery but does share two of the identifiable characteristics of Al Sulayyil and Al Joffer: it is contained within significant terrain, and it is isolated from major population centers. This facility is also located much closer to Israel, a potential target for the Saudi DF-3A force.
The possible western DF-3A garrison can be seen in the image below:
TARGETING OPTIONS
From their garrisons at Al Sulayyil and Al Joffer, Saudi Arabian DF-3As can range targets as far away as India and western Europe when employed to their maximum range of 4000 km. Much of Africa falls within range as well.
The image below depicts the coverage of the DF-3A ballistic missile when fired from Saudi Arabian garrisons to a range of 4000 km:
Despite the extended range capability it is likely that the weapons are only employed to their typical range of 2800 km. Extending the range requires a reduction in payload and also results in decreased accuracy. Given that the DF-3A is already a relatively inaccurate weapon, decreasing the payload would only serve to seriously diminish the combat potential of the weapon system. As seen in the image below, the Middle East, portions of Africa and eastern Europe, and western India are still within range at the standard range of 2800 km:
The most likely potential target for the Saudi Arabian DF-3A force is Iran. Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi'a Iran are not the closest of nations due to religious differences and the Saudi's close relationship with the United States, to cite a few brief reasons. Saudi Arabian DF-3As are believed to be targeted on Iranian cities due to their inaccuracy and therefore their inherent unsuitability for strikes on military facilities or strategic targets.
Israel is also a potential target for Saudi Arabian ballistic missiles. The likely scenario for a launch against Israel would be to employ the DF-3A in its depressed-angle launch mode, which confers a range of 1550 km. Targeting of Israel may be the reason behind the presence of the potential launch facility in western Saudi Arabia. As seen in the image below, launching from this facility allows the DF-3A to reach Israel with ease, even when fired using a depressed angle trajectory, a likely scenario given that this would increase the chances that the weapons would be able to avoid intercept by Israeli anti-missile defenses.
NUCLEAR POTENTIAL
The inaccuracy of the DF-3A, combined with its 2,000 kg throw weight, has raised speculation as to the true Saudi Arabian intentions for the missile. Saudi Arabia is well aware of the inaccuracy of the weapon, claiming that they were not fired at Iraq in 1990/1991 to avoid civillian casualties. "King Fahd ruled out that option because of the fact that you cannot control it accurately. Our problem is that our war was not with the Iraqi people, it was with Saddam Hussein and his clique," stated Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan. This is in contrast to the alleged targeting of Iranian population centers.
Saudi Arabia has been known to have had an interest in nuclear weapons for some time, dating back to the construction of a potential nuclear research center in 1975. Evidence suggests that Saudi Arabia was financially and perhaps technologically involved in the nuclear weapons programs of both Iraq and Pakistan. The Iraqi capability to develop nuclear weapons was removed in the 1980s during the Iranian and Israeli air raids on the Tammuz reactor complex southeast of Baghdad. Pakistan presents an interesting option. It has been suggested that Saudi Arabia would be provided with Pakistani nuclear weapons should Iran achieve the capability to produce nuclear weapons of its own. Pakistani warheads on Saudi Arabian weapons would not only represent a significant threat to Iran, but also to India. Saudi Arabian DF-3A garrisons are well defended and would be much more difficult for India to strike during a time of conflict, potentially providing Pakistan with an added nuclear deterrent capability due to close relations with the Kingdom.
At the end of the day, Saudi Arabia does not currently possess a nuclear warhead for the DF-3A. The nation signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1988, and has stated that it would not arm the DF-3A with either nuclear or chemical warheads. Evidence of Saudi Arabia's nuclear ambitions cannot be ignored, however, and a nuclear-armed Iran could be the impetus needed for Saudi Arabia to finally acquire a nuclear capability for its ballistic missile force. It should be noted, however, that past Saudi Arabian assurances that chemical or nuclear warheads would not be acquired are ominously significant. Saudi Arabia did not unequivocally state that weapons of mass destruction would not be used to arm the DF-3A, raising significant questions.
If the Kingdom, being aware of the DF-3As inaccuracy, is not pursuing a nuclear or chemical warhead capability, is there a covert biological warfare program underway in Saudi Arabia? Moreover, given that Saudi Arabia is reportedly not concerned with firing the weapons at Iranian civillians, has such a program existed since before 1990? This would potentially explain the Kingdom's real reasons for not wishing to fire their weapons into Iraq, unless they view Iraqi civillians with more regard than those of Iran, reasons reinforced by the alleged nuclear partnership between Iraq and Saudi Arabia.
CONCLUSION
The Saudi Arabian ballistic missile arsenal is one of the most interesting and important military aspects of the developing Middle Eastern political and military landscape. As Iran moves forward towards its alleged nuclear weapons program, Saudi Arabia may well attempt to acquire a similar capability for its missiles to serve as a deterrent. The potentially destabilizing effects of such a move, given the Kingdom's position regarding Israel, could ignite a new arms race, and even military conflict. The fact that this significant development may be related to a military capability that few individuals realize exists highlights the need for closer military analysis of potential adversarial situations worldwide.
انتهى بحمدالله
- إنضم
- 20 أكتوبر 2010
- المشاركات
- 1,732
- التفاعل
- الدولة
رد: الترسانة النووية والصاروخية السعودية
Saudi Arabia Special Weapons
Saudi Arabia does not have weapons of mass destruction. It did, however, buy long-range CSS-2 ballistic missiles from China in 1988. More recently, Saudi officials have discussed the procurement of new Pakistani intermediate-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Some concern remains that Saudi Arabia, like its neighbors, may be seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, apparently by purchase rather than indigenous development. While there is no direct evidence that Saudi Arabia has chosen a nuclear option, the Saudis have in place a foundation for building a nuclear deterrent.
Saudi Arabia first opened a nuclear research center in the desert military complex at Al-Suleiyel, near Al-Kharj, in 1975. Saudi Arabia reportedly offered to pay for reconstruction of the Osirak-reactor, destructed by Israel on 06 June 1981. By at least 1985 Iraqi and Saudi military and nuclear experts were co-operating closely. Saudi nuclear scientists were sent to Baghdad for months of training.
In late June 1994 Muhammad Khilewi, the second-in-command of the Saudi mission to the United Nations, abandoned his UN post to join the opposition. After defecting, Mr. Khilewi, who was denied federal protection, went into hiding, fearing for his life. He has tried to distribute more than 10,000 documents he obtained from the Saudi Arabian Embassy.
Khilewi produced documents for the London Sunday Times that supported his charge that the Saudi government had paid up to five billion dollars from the Saudi treasury for Saddam Hussein to build a nuclear weapon. Between 1985 and 1990, up to the time Saddam invaded Kuwait, the payments were made on condition that some of the bombs, should the project succeed, be transferred to the Saudi arsenal. Khilewi cache included transcripts of a secret desert meeting between Saudi and Iraqi military teams a year before the invasion of Kuwait. The transcrips depicts the Saudis funding the nuclear program and handing over specialised equipment that Iraq could not have obtained elsewhere.
What Khilewi did not know was that the Fahd-Saddam nuclear project was also a closely held secret in Washington. According to a former high-ranking American diplomat, the CIA was fully apprised. The funding stopped only at the outbreak of the Gulf War in 1991.
The defector's documents also showed that Riyadh had paid for Pakistan's bomb project and signed a pact that if Saudi Arabia were attacked with nuclear weapons, Pakistan would respond against the aggressor with its own nuclear arsenal.
Khilewi's claims of possessing damning evidence against Saudi Arabia were met with some skepticism in the US Congress.
During Mr Nawaz Sharif's tenure as prime minister, Saudi Arabia appears to have begun funding Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs. The North Korean missiles ("red missiles painted green") traded for Pakistani nuclear know-how in the late 1990s took place at a time when the Pakistani economy was in shambles. Saudi Arabia appears to have bailed Pakistan out of this financial crisis.
Following Pakistan's nuclear weapons tests in May 1999, Saudi authorities denied the speculation about any possible cooperation between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in the nuclear field. Saudi Arabia's second deputy prime minister, defense and aviation minister and inspector general, Prince Sultan Bin Abd al-Alziz, denied reports of Saudi attempts to acquire nuclear arms from Pakistan. Concerns about Saudi plans to buy nuclear weapons were raised after Prince Sultan toured Pakistan's secret nuclear facilities in May 1999. The prince toured the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant and an adjacent factory where the Ghauri missile is assembled with Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif and was briefed by A.Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan's atom bomb. The site is so secret that former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto said she was not allowed to go to there during her tenure in office.
In August 1999 Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz denied viewing secret sites within the plant and insisted that Saudi Arabia, as a signatory of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, is seeking a region free of nuclear weapons.
Officials from the UAE had also visited Kahuta during the summer of 1999. Prince Sultan's visit to Kahuta was thought to be related to possible purchase of Pakistan's new medium-range Ghauri missile.
The Islamabad-Riyadh close cooperation was evident shortly after Pakistan's nuclear tests , when Saudi Prince Sultan visited Pakistan and toured the uranium-enrichment plant and missile-production facilities at Kahuta.
Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, the mastermind behind the nuclear explosions in Pakistan, visited Riyadh to attend the November 1999 symposium on Information Sources on the Islamic World at King Faisal Hall. Dr Saleh Al-Athel, president of King Abdul Aziz City for Science and Technology (KACST), visited Pakistan in the second week of November 1999 to work out the details for cooperation in the fields of engineering, electronics and computer sciences. The two sides explored possibilities of mutual cooperation for peaceful use of nuclear energy applications in the field of agriculture and genetic engineering.
After Gen. Pervez Musharraf ousted Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in a bloodless coup on 12 October 1999, his first foreign tour was to Saudi Arabia. Nawaz Sharif, his younger brother and their families are living in Saudi Arabia after a deal between General Musharraf and Mr Sharif in which Riyadh had played a key role.
Press reports have speculated that China has approached the Saudis with offers to sell modern missile systems. The 600-km range CSS-6 and 1800-km range CSS-5 solid-fueled missiles have been mentioned.
Saudi Arabia is examining the prospect of raising the level of its strategic relations with Pakistan. The Saudis have accelerated talks with Islamabad for the purchase of Pakistani weapons as well as joint military and strategic projects. Riyad also seeks to exploit Pakistani's expertise in missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have already developed an array of defense and military relations. But the discussions in Riyad to expand strategic ties reflect the kingdom's concerns over its deteriorating relations with the United States.
It was reported in mid-September 2003 that Saudi Arabia had launched a strategic review that includes acquiring nuclear weapons. A strategy paper being considered at the highest levels in Riyadh sets out three options:
To acquire a nuclear capability as a deterrent;
To maintain or enter into an alliance with an existing nuclear power that would offer protection;
To try to reach a regional agreement on having a nuclear-free Middle East.
"The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is not considering acquiring a nuclear bomb or nuclear weapons of any kind," the Saudi Embassy in London said in a statement issued on 19 September 2003. "There is no atomic energy programme in any part of the kingdom and neither is one being considered," the statement said.
On 19 October 2003 Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz and an entourage of 200, including Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal and several Cabinet ministers, met with senior officials in Pakistan. Pakistan's Premier, Mir Zafrullah Jamali, received Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, Deputy Premier and Commander of the National Guard, at his palace. During the meeting, they discussed recent developments in Islamic and international arenas, and reviewed bilateral relations between the two countries and means of enhancing them. At the close of the meeting, Crown Prince Abdullah received a memorial gift from Pakistan's Prime Minister. The meeting was attended by Prince Saud Al-Faisal, the Foreign Minister, and his Pakistani counterpart, Khurshid Kasuri. After the meeting, Jamali hosted a luncheon in honor of the Crown Prince. The luncheon was attended by Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, the official delegation accompanying the Crown Prince, and Pakistani ministers and senior officials. The Foreign Minister, Prince Saud Al-Faisal, said in a news conference that Israeli-Indian defence cooperation would inflame the region, escalate the arms race, and damage the region's interests by triggering instability.
"Saudi Arabian officials went to Pakistan and are negotiating the purchase of nuclear warheads for their land-based missiles," head of Israel Defense Forces' Military Intelligence Maj.-Gen. Aharon Ze'evi reportedly told the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on 21 October 2003. Committee chairman MK Yuval Shteinitz said this was the first time he had heard a report about Saudi Arabia's nuclear plans. "There is an assumption that Saudi Arabia financed the Pakistan nuclear plant and that there is a tacit understanding between the two countries that, if Iran becomes nuclear, Saudi Arabia will be provided with some nuclear warheads from Pakistan," Shteinitz said.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/saudi/index.html
Saudi Arabia Special Weapons
Saudi Arabia does not have weapons of mass destruction. It did, however, buy long-range CSS-2 ballistic missiles from China in 1988. More recently, Saudi officials have discussed the procurement of new Pakistani intermediate-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Some concern remains that Saudi Arabia, like its neighbors, may be seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, apparently by purchase rather than indigenous development. While there is no direct evidence that Saudi Arabia has chosen a nuclear option, the Saudis have in place a foundation for building a nuclear deterrent.
Saudi Arabia first opened a nuclear research center in the desert military complex at Al-Suleiyel, near Al-Kharj, in 1975. Saudi Arabia reportedly offered to pay for reconstruction of the Osirak-reactor, destructed by Israel on 06 June 1981. By at least 1985 Iraqi and Saudi military and nuclear experts were co-operating closely. Saudi nuclear scientists were sent to Baghdad for months of training.
In late June 1994 Muhammad Khilewi, the second-in-command of the Saudi mission to the United Nations, abandoned his UN post to join the opposition. After defecting, Mr. Khilewi, who was denied federal protection, went into hiding, fearing for his life. He has tried to distribute more than 10,000 documents he obtained from the Saudi Arabian Embassy.
Khilewi produced documents for the London Sunday Times that supported his charge that the Saudi government had paid up to five billion dollars from the Saudi treasury for Saddam Hussein to build a nuclear weapon. Between 1985 and 1990, up to the time Saddam invaded Kuwait, the payments were made on condition that some of the bombs, should the project succeed, be transferred to the Saudi arsenal. Khilewi cache included transcripts of a secret desert meeting between Saudi and Iraqi military teams a year before the invasion of Kuwait. The transcrips depicts the Saudis funding the nuclear program and handing over specialised equipment that Iraq could not have obtained elsewhere.
What Khilewi did not know was that the Fahd-Saddam nuclear project was also a closely held secret in Washington. According to a former high-ranking American diplomat, the CIA was fully apprised. The funding stopped only at the outbreak of the Gulf War in 1991.
The defector's documents also showed that Riyadh had paid for Pakistan's bomb project and signed a pact that if Saudi Arabia were attacked with nuclear weapons, Pakistan would respond against the aggressor with its own nuclear arsenal.
Khilewi's claims of possessing damning evidence against Saudi Arabia were met with some skepticism in the US Congress.
During Mr Nawaz Sharif's tenure as prime minister, Saudi Arabia appears to have begun funding Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs. The North Korean missiles ("red missiles painted green") traded for Pakistani nuclear know-how in the late 1990s took place at a time when the Pakistani economy was in shambles. Saudi Arabia appears to have bailed Pakistan out of this financial crisis.
Following Pakistan's nuclear weapons tests in May 1999, Saudi authorities denied the speculation about any possible cooperation between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in the nuclear field. Saudi Arabia's second deputy prime minister, defense and aviation minister and inspector general, Prince Sultan Bin Abd al-Alziz, denied reports of Saudi attempts to acquire nuclear arms from Pakistan. Concerns about Saudi plans to buy nuclear weapons were raised after Prince Sultan toured Pakistan's secret nuclear facilities in May 1999. The prince toured the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant and an adjacent factory where the Ghauri missile is assembled with Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif and was briefed by A.Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan's atom bomb. The site is so secret that former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto said she was not allowed to go to there during her tenure in office.
In August 1999 Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz denied viewing secret sites within the plant and insisted that Saudi Arabia, as a signatory of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, is seeking a region free of nuclear weapons.
Officials from the UAE had also visited Kahuta during the summer of 1999. Prince Sultan's visit to Kahuta was thought to be related to possible purchase of Pakistan's new medium-range Ghauri missile.
The Islamabad-Riyadh close cooperation was evident shortly after Pakistan's nuclear tests , when Saudi Prince Sultan visited Pakistan and toured the uranium-enrichment plant and missile-production facilities at Kahuta.
Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, the mastermind behind the nuclear explosions in Pakistan, visited Riyadh to attend the November 1999 symposium on Information Sources on the Islamic World at King Faisal Hall. Dr Saleh Al-Athel, president of King Abdul Aziz City for Science and Technology (KACST), visited Pakistan in the second week of November 1999 to work out the details for cooperation in the fields of engineering, electronics and computer sciences. The two sides explored possibilities of mutual cooperation for peaceful use of nuclear energy applications in the field of agriculture and genetic engineering.
After Gen. Pervez Musharraf ousted Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in a bloodless coup on 12 October 1999, his first foreign tour was to Saudi Arabia. Nawaz Sharif, his younger brother and their families are living in Saudi Arabia after a deal between General Musharraf and Mr Sharif in which Riyadh had played a key role.
Press reports have speculated that China has approached the Saudis with offers to sell modern missile systems. The 600-km range CSS-6 and 1800-km range CSS-5 solid-fueled missiles have been mentioned.
Saudi Arabia is examining the prospect of raising the level of its strategic relations with Pakistan. The Saudis have accelerated talks with Islamabad for the purchase of Pakistani weapons as well as joint military and strategic projects. Riyad also seeks to exploit Pakistani's expertise in missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have already developed an array of defense and military relations. But the discussions in Riyad to expand strategic ties reflect the kingdom's concerns over its deteriorating relations with the United States.
It was reported in mid-September 2003 that Saudi Arabia had launched a strategic review that includes acquiring nuclear weapons. A strategy paper being considered at the highest levels in Riyadh sets out three options:
To acquire a nuclear capability as a deterrent;
To maintain or enter into an alliance with an existing nuclear power that would offer protection;
To try to reach a regional agreement on having a nuclear-free Middle East.
"The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is not considering acquiring a nuclear bomb or nuclear weapons of any kind," the Saudi Embassy in London said in a statement issued on 19 September 2003. "There is no atomic energy programme in any part of the kingdom and neither is one being considered," the statement said.
On 19 October 2003 Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz and an entourage of 200, including Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal and several Cabinet ministers, met with senior officials in Pakistan. Pakistan's Premier, Mir Zafrullah Jamali, received Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, Deputy Premier and Commander of the National Guard, at his palace. During the meeting, they discussed recent developments in Islamic and international arenas, and reviewed bilateral relations between the two countries and means of enhancing them. At the close of the meeting, Crown Prince Abdullah received a memorial gift from Pakistan's Prime Minister. The meeting was attended by Prince Saud Al-Faisal, the Foreign Minister, and his Pakistani counterpart, Khurshid Kasuri. After the meeting, Jamali hosted a luncheon in honor of the Crown Prince. The luncheon was attended by Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, the official delegation accompanying the Crown Prince, and Pakistani ministers and senior officials. The Foreign Minister, Prince Saud Al-Faisal, said in a news conference that Israeli-Indian defence cooperation would inflame the region, escalate the arms race, and damage the region's interests by triggering instability.
"Saudi Arabian officials went to Pakistan and are negotiating the purchase of nuclear warheads for their land-based missiles," head of Israel Defense Forces' Military Intelligence Maj.-Gen. Aharon Ze'evi reportedly told the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on 21 October 2003. Committee chairman MK Yuval Shteinitz said this was the first time he had heard a report about Saudi Arabia's nuclear plans. "There is an assumption that Saudi Arabia financed the Pakistan nuclear plant and that there is a tacit understanding between the two countries that, if Iran becomes nuclear, Saudi Arabia will be provided with some nuclear warheads from Pakistan," Shteinitz said.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/saudi/index.html
- إنضم
- 20 أكتوبر 2010
- المشاركات
- 1,732
- التفاعل
- الدولة
رد: الترسانة النووية والصاروخية السعودية
There is no publicly available evidence that Saudi Arabia intends to develop nuclear weapons, nor that the Saudis have sought to develop such weapons in the past. However, the kingdom has been periodically suspected of seeking nuclear armaments, mostly based on statements made by Mohammed Khilewi. A former Saudi diplomat, Khilewi has declared that Saudi Arabia started a nuclear weapons program in 1975; he also alleged that Saudi Arabia supported both the Pakistani and Iraqi nuclear weapons programs in the past. However, Saudi Arabia is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), has signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and vocally supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is threatened by the nuclear activities in Iran and Israel, but has not demonstrated an intention to develop nuclear weapons. Furthermore, it lacks the physical and scientific resources necessary to build an advanced nuclear weapons program. Saudi Arabia engages in some domestic research related to nuclear energy, and is a part of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative to develop a multilateral nuclear power program.
History
Media reports alleging that Saudi Arabia once tried to develop nuclear weapons are generally based on allegations made by Mohammed Khilewi, a Saudi diplomat who worked on nonproliferation issues at the Saudi mission to the United Nations in New York. After Khilewi defected to the United States in 1994, he provided the U.S. government and media sources with accounts and documents alleging that Saudi Arabia had started a nuclear weapons research program in 1975. According to the former diplomat, the Saudis were motivated to start a weapons program soon after Israel won the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Reportedly, the Saudis hoped that by building a nuclear weapon they could match Israeli capabilities and stave off potential aggression from Israel.
[1] This early program was apparently under the command of Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz al Saud, the Saudi Minister of Defense, and was run from the Al-Khari nuclear research center, at a military base south of Riyadh.[2] As part of their efforts, Saudi scientists allegedly received training on how to build weapons in Iraq and Pakistan, and worked to amass a "nuclear library" with detailed scientific literature on the nuclear weapons programs of other countries.[3] Khilewi also contended that Saudi officials attempted to buy a miniature neutron source nuclear reactor from China in 1989, although the deal was not finalized.[4]
Saudi Arabia is also alleged to have provided funding for nuclear weapons programs in Iraq and Pakistan. According to Khilewi's account, Saudi Arabia gave $5 billion to the Iraqi nuclear research program between 1985 and the start of the first Gulf war. [5] This funding was provided as part of a broader Saudi effort to aid Iraq in its war against Iran.[6] Khilewi maintained that the Saudi funds were provided with the understanding that Saudi Arabia would gain control of several Iraqi nuclear weapons if the armaments were ever built.[7] It is also rumored that Saudi Arabia gave financial support to Pakistani's nuclear weapons program, while the program was in beginning around 1975, since Riyadh viewed the Pakistani "Islamic bomb" as something that would contribute to Saudi Arabia's own security.[8] Robert Baer, a former U.S. Central Intelligence Agency analyst, confirmed that Saudi Arabia spent $2 billion dollars helping Pakistan develop an "Islamic bomb" in the 1970s and 1980s.[9] This assistance is rumored to have continued even after 1998, when Pakistan first tested its nuclear weapons. For instance, Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz, the Saudi Minister of Defense, allegedly traveled to two facilities related to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program - a missile assembly plant and uranium enrichment facility - during a visit to Pakistan in 1999.[10] Similar allegations of Saudi-Pakistani nuclear relations surfaced in media reports in 2003 and 2006.[11] However, as analyst Sammy Salama has pointed out, these allegations are fueled by visits between defense officials in the two countries, and remain unsubstantiated through publicly available evidence.[12]
Saudi Arabia signed the NPT in 1988. This occurred shortly after the government bought approximately 36 CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. At the time, Western officials worried that Saudi Arabia would use the missiles to deliver unconventional warheads. Thus, nonproliferation experts have argued that Saudi Arabia was compelled to join the NPT after being pressured by the United States. Beyond joining the NPT, Saudi diplomats have supported the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East since 1999.[13] Saudi officials cite Israel, an unofficial nuclear weapons state outside of the NPT regime, as the main impediment to the establishment of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons.[14] Saudi officials are also wary of Tehran's expanded nuclear activities, and have chastised Iran for its nuclear efforts. However, Saudi officials have expressed reluctance to confront Iran over its nuclear program.[15]
Saudi Arabia has historically pursued the development of civilian nuclear energy for scientific and commercial purposes. Its national Atomic Energy Research Institute (AERI) was established in 1988, and aims to "adapt the nuclear sciences and technologies and utilize them in support of the economic, industrial, and agricultural plans of the Kingdom."[16] Since the 1970s, Saudi scientists have also expressed interest in using nuclear power to desalinate drinking water.[17] Since Saudi Arabia desalinates 70% of its drinking water,[18] and nuclear-powered desalination plants are cheaper to run than plants powered by fossil fuels,[19] using nuclear energy to power desalination plants is attractive in Saudi Arabia.
Current Status
No convincing evidence exists to prove that Saudi Arabia is attempting to develop, or has the motivation to develop, a nuclear weapons program. Recent media allegations asserting Saudi interest in nuclear weapons stem from a 2003 article printed in The Guardian, a British newspaper, which stated that the Saudi government had published a military strategy paper advocating the procurement of nuclear weapons. According to the article, Saudi defense officials supported the acquisition of nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes, to secure security guarantees from its great power allies, and as a bargaining chip to press for the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East.[20] The existence of such a strategy paper has not been corroborated by any official sources. After the article was published in The Guardian, the Saudi government denied that such a report had been written, and reconfirmed its support for a Middle East NWFZ.[21]
Saudi Arabia signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 2005, but the agreement has not entered into force.[22] Riyadh added an IAEA Small Quantities Protocol to its safeguards agreement. Countries that do not possess large quantities of nuclear materials, and do not possess nuclear materials in nuclear facilities, can annex such a measure to their safeguards agreement. States that conclude a small quantities protocol include information regarding their nuclear activities in the safeguards agreement. In exchange for this initial declaration, the country is exempted from regular IAEA inspections. This limits the IAEA's ability to verify that Saudi Arabia's nuclear activities are limited and non-military in nature.
Analysts generally conclude that Saudi Arabia lacks the natural resources, technological capability, and scientific community necessary to develop an advanced nuclear weapons program.[23] Saudi scientists do not have experience in many integral facets of the nuclear fuel cycle that must be mastered to develop nuclear weapons. For example, Saudi Arabia does not have uranium deposits on its territory, so it lacks experience in uranium mining. Since the country does not have nuclear power facilities, its scientists also lack experience in enriching uranium for reactor fuel, nuclear fuel conversion, nuclear fuel fabrication, and operating nuclear reactors.[24] Saudi Arabia does not operate any research reactors. However, Saudi scientists do have some experience with scientific experiments involving nuclear energy such as work on the production of uranium isotopes and managing spent fuel.[25] Saudi Arabia does operate a Tandetron accelerator, used in nuclear physics experiments, at the King Fadh University of Petroleum and Minerals, and a cyclotron, used for the production of medial isotope, at the King Faisal Specialist Hospital in Riyadh. These activities could give Saudi Arabia experience in nuclear energy issues, although they would not directly train Saudi scientists to design and build nuclear weapons.
Some experts worry that Saudi Arabia could overcome its domestic resource inadequacies by developing nuclear weapons with outside assistance - perhaps from Pakistan. This could include securing a foreign source of highly enriched uranium or plutonium, gaining training from Pakistani nuclear scientists, or even jointly developing weapons with Pakistan.[26] The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is thought to possess enough funds to carry out such a project. However, although this cooperation is possible and has been the source of periodic rumors in the international media, it is not probable. Saudi leaders would be reticent to invite the degree of international isolation - and harm to U.S.-Saudi relations - that would result from such an act.[27]
Saudi Arabia is involved in the recent Gulf Cooperation Council initiative to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Announced in December 2006, the program remains in the early planning stages, as the GCC members have commissioned a study to assess the feasibility of developing a joint nuclear energy program. IAEA officials have been involved with the feasibility study, and GCC members would like the agency to have continued involvement in and regulation over the project.[28] Richard Weitz of the Hudson Institute has argued that the recent surge in interest regarding the development nuclear energy in the Middle East represents a reaction by the countries involved to Iran's development of a nuclear program that includes uranium enrichment and questionable activities that could be related to a weapons program.[29] Yet Saudi Arabian officials have stressed that the GCC project would be designed exclusively for peaceful purposes, would be fully transparent, and would be under IAEA safeguards.[30] After the GCC program was announced, Prince Saud Al-Faisal, the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia, told reporters, "We want no bombs....Our policy is to have a region free of nuclear weapons."[31] As of mid-2008, Saudi Arabia has not taken concrete steps towards the domestic development of nuclear power at this time. However, in May 2008, the United States and Saudi Arabia did sign a Memorandum of Understanding on civil nuclear energy cooperation.[32] France has also discussed the development of a civil nuclear energy program in Saudi Arabia.[33]
http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/saudi-arabia/nuclear/
There is no publicly available evidence that Saudi Arabia intends to develop nuclear weapons, nor that the Saudis have sought to develop such weapons in the past. However, the kingdom has been periodically suspected of seeking nuclear armaments, mostly based on statements made by Mohammed Khilewi. A former Saudi diplomat, Khilewi has declared that Saudi Arabia started a nuclear weapons program in 1975; he also alleged that Saudi Arabia supported both the Pakistani and Iraqi nuclear weapons programs in the past. However, Saudi Arabia is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), has signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and vocally supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is threatened by the nuclear activities in Iran and Israel, but has not demonstrated an intention to develop nuclear weapons. Furthermore, it lacks the physical and scientific resources necessary to build an advanced nuclear weapons program. Saudi Arabia engages in some domestic research related to nuclear energy, and is a part of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative to develop a multilateral nuclear power program.
History
Media reports alleging that Saudi Arabia once tried to develop nuclear weapons are generally based on allegations made by Mohammed Khilewi, a Saudi diplomat who worked on nonproliferation issues at the Saudi mission to the United Nations in New York. After Khilewi defected to the United States in 1994, he provided the U.S. government and media sources with accounts and documents alleging that Saudi Arabia had started a nuclear weapons research program in 1975. According to the former diplomat, the Saudis were motivated to start a weapons program soon after Israel won the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Reportedly, the Saudis hoped that by building a nuclear weapon they could match Israeli capabilities and stave off potential aggression from Israel.
[1] This early program was apparently under the command of Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz al Saud, the Saudi Minister of Defense, and was run from the Al-Khari nuclear research center, at a military base south of Riyadh.[2] As part of their efforts, Saudi scientists allegedly received training on how to build weapons in Iraq and Pakistan, and worked to amass a "nuclear library" with detailed scientific literature on the nuclear weapons programs of other countries.[3] Khilewi also contended that Saudi officials attempted to buy a miniature neutron source nuclear reactor from China in 1989, although the deal was not finalized.[4]
Saudi Arabia is also alleged to have provided funding for nuclear weapons programs in Iraq and Pakistan. According to Khilewi's account, Saudi Arabia gave $5 billion to the Iraqi nuclear research program between 1985 and the start of the first Gulf war. [5] This funding was provided as part of a broader Saudi effort to aid Iraq in its war against Iran.[6] Khilewi maintained that the Saudi funds were provided with the understanding that Saudi Arabia would gain control of several Iraqi nuclear weapons if the armaments were ever built.[7] It is also rumored that Saudi Arabia gave financial support to Pakistani's nuclear weapons program, while the program was in beginning around 1975, since Riyadh viewed the Pakistani "Islamic bomb" as something that would contribute to Saudi Arabia's own security.[8] Robert Baer, a former U.S. Central Intelligence Agency analyst, confirmed that Saudi Arabia spent $2 billion dollars helping Pakistan develop an "Islamic bomb" in the 1970s and 1980s.[9] This assistance is rumored to have continued even after 1998, when Pakistan first tested its nuclear weapons. For instance, Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz, the Saudi Minister of Defense, allegedly traveled to two facilities related to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program - a missile assembly plant and uranium enrichment facility - during a visit to Pakistan in 1999.[10] Similar allegations of Saudi-Pakistani nuclear relations surfaced in media reports in 2003 and 2006.[11] However, as analyst Sammy Salama has pointed out, these allegations are fueled by visits between defense officials in the two countries, and remain unsubstantiated through publicly available evidence.[12]
Saudi Arabia signed the NPT in 1988. This occurred shortly after the government bought approximately 36 CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. At the time, Western officials worried that Saudi Arabia would use the missiles to deliver unconventional warheads. Thus, nonproliferation experts have argued that Saudi Arabia was compelled to join the NPT after being pressured by the United States. Beyond joining the NPT, Saudi diplomats have supported the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East since 1999.[13] Saudi officials cite Israel, an unofficial nuclear weapons state outside of the NPT regime, as the main impediment to the establishment of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons.[14] Saudi officials are also wary of Tehran's expanded nuclear activities, and have chastised Iran for its nuclear efforts. However, Saudi officials have expressed reluctance to confront Iran over its nuclear program.[15]
Saudi Arabia has historically pursued the development of civilian nuclear energy for scientific and commercial purposes. Its national Atomic Energy Research Institute (AERI) was established in 1988, and aims to "adapt the nuclear sciences and technologies and utilize them in support of the economic, industrial, and agricultural plans of the Kingdom."[16] Since the 1970s, Saudi scientists have also expressed interest in using nuclear power to desalinate drinking water.[17] Since Saudi Arabia desalinates 70% of its drinking water,[18] and nuclear-powered desalination plants are cheaper to run than plants powered by fossil fuels,[19] using nuclear energy to power desalination plants is attractive in Saudi Arabia.
Current Status
No convincing evidence exists to prove that Saudi Arabia is attempting to develop, or has the motivation to develop, a nuclear weapons program. Recent media allegations asserting Saudi interest in nuclear weapons stem from a 2003 article printed in The Guardian, a British newspaper, which stated that the Saudi government had published a military strategy paper advocating the procurement of nuclear weapons. According to the article, Saudi defense officials supported the acquisition of nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes, to secure security guarantees from its great power allies, and as a bargaining chip to press for the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East.[20] The existence of such a strategy paper has not been corroborated by any official sources. After the article was published in The Guardian, the Saudi government denied that such a report had been written, and reconfirmed its support for a Middle East NWFZ.[21]
Saudi Arabia signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 2005, but the agreement has not entered into force.[22] Riyadh added an IAEA Small Quantities Protocol to its safeguards agreement. Countries that do not possess large quantities of nuclear materials, and do not possess nuclear materials in nuclear facilities, can annex such a measure to their safeguards agreement. States that conclude a small quantities protocol include information regarding their nuclear activities in the safeguards agreement. In exchange for this initial declaration, the country is exempted from regular IAEA inspections. This limits the IAEA's ability to verify that Saudi Arabia's nuclear activities are limited and non-military in nature.
Analysts generally conclude that Saudi Arabia lacks the natural resources, technological capability, and scientific community necessary to develop an advanced nuclear weapons program.[23] Saudi scientists do not have experience in many integral facets of the nuclear fuel cycle that must be mastered to develop nuclear weapons. For example, Saudi Arabia does not have uranium deposits on its territory, so it lacks experience in uranium mining. Since the country does not have nuclear power facilities, its scientists also lack experience in enriching uranium for reactor fuel, nuclear fuel conversion, nuclear fuel fabrication, and operating nuclear reactors.[24] Saudi Arabia does not operate any research reactors. However, Saudi scientists do have some experience with scientific experiments involving nuclear energy such as work on the production of uranium isotopes and managing spent fuel.[25] Saudi Arabia does operate a Tandetron accelerator, used in nuclear physics experiments, at the King Fadh University of Petroleum and Minerals, and a cyclotron, used for the production of medial isotope, at the King Faisal Specialist Hospital in Riyadh. These activities could give Saudi Arabia experience in nuclear energy issues, although they would not directly train Saudi scientists to design and build nuclear weapons.
Some experts worry that Saudi Arabia could overcome its domestic resource inadequacies by developing nuclear weapons with outside assistance - perhaps from Pakistan. This could include securing a foreign source of highly enriched uranium or plutonium, gaining training from Pakistani nuclear scientists, or even jointly developing weapons with Pakistan.[26] The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is thought to possess enough funds to carry out such a project. However, although this cooperation is possible and has been the source of periodic rumors in the international media, it is not probable. Saudi leaders would be reticent to invite the degree of international isolation - and harm to U.S.-Saudi relations - that would result from such an act.[27]
Saudi Arabia is involved in the recent Gulf Cooperation Council initiative to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Announced in December 2006, the program remains in the early planning stages, as the GCC members have commissioned a study to assess the feasibility of developing a joint nuclear energy program. IAEA officials have been involved with the feasibility study, and GCC members would like the agency to have continued involvement in and regulation over the project.[28] Richard Weitz of the Hudson Institute has argued that the recent surge in interest regarding the development nuclear energy in the Middle East represents a reaction by the countries involved to Iran's development of a nuclear program that includes uranium enrichment and questionable activities that could be related to a weapons program.[29] Yet Saudi Arabian officials have stressed that the GCC project would be designed exclusively for peaceful purposes, would be fully transparent, and would be under IAEA safeguards.[30] After the GCC program was announced, Prince Saud Al-Faisal, the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia, told reporters, "We want no bombs....Our policy is to have a region free of nuclear weapons."[31] As of mid-2008, Saudi Arabia has not taken concrete steps towards the domestic development of nuclear power at this time. However, in May 2008, the United States and Saudi Arabia did sign a Memorandum of Understanding on civil nuclear energy cooperation.[32] France has also discussed the development of a civil nuclear energy program in Saudi Arabia.[33]
http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/saudi-arabia/nuclear/
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رد: الترسانة النووية والصاروخية السعودية
في التقرير مكتوب ان السعودية اجرت اول بحث نووي عام 1975
في التقرير مكتوب ان السعودية اجرت اول بحث نووي عام 1975
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رد: الترسانة النووية والصاروخية السعودية
30[1]: الدليل على امتلاكنا صواريخ ccs_5
http://www.mediafire.com/?uuez4dxxuygbtlc
30[1]: الدليل على امتلاكنا صواريخ ccs_5 http://www.mediafire.com/?uuez4dxxuygbtlc
- إنضم
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رد: الترسانة النووية والصاروخية السعودية
css-2
css-5
css-6
غوري
صواريخ سعودية ............................
css-2
css-5
css-6
غوري
- إنضم
- 13 مارس 2012
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رد: الترسانة النووية والصاروخية السعودية
صور جديدة للصاروخ css-2
صور جديدة للصاروخ css-2
- إنضم
- 13 مارس 2012
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رد: الترسانة النووية والصاروخية السعودية
[FONT=宋体]
[FONT=宋体]PROGRAMME[/FONT]
[FONT=宋体]Following the success in the DF-1 short-range and DF-2 medium-range surface-to-surface ballistic missile, China began to develop a brand new design with intermediate-range in the early 1960s. Unlike the DF-1 and DF-2, which were both developed from the Soviet R-2 ballistic missile, the new intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) is a totally new design. Several design proposals were compared before the storable liquid fuel rocket with a cascade compensation inertial guidance design was finally chosen in early 1964. Three flying tests were carried out between December 1966 and May 1967, and the missile entered operational service in 1970 as DF-3.[/FONT]
[FONT=宋体]The 2,500km-range DF-3 was designed to over the U.S. bases in Eastern Asia. The missile has a payload of 2,000kg, which was expected to be the weight of the hydrogen bomb under development in China at that time. By the late 1970s, around 100~150 missiles are believed to have been deployed in PLA Second Artillery Corps bases in Jilin, Jiangxi, Yunnan and Qinghai. Depending on their deployment locations, these missiles can reach Japan, Philippine, South and Central Asia respectively.[/FONT]
[FONT=宋体]In 1981 China began to develop the DF-3A with an extended range of 2,800km as well as improved accuracy. The flying tests took place successfully in December 1985 and January 1986. Unconfirmed reports suggest that China may have tried to develop a multiple re-entry vehicle (MRV) type for the DF-3 but this was unsuccessful. A conventional high-explosive warhead variant of the DF-3A was developed for an export order to Saudi Arabia in 1987. Since the late 1990s, the PLA began to gradually phase out the early variant DF-3 missiles and replace them with the more capable DF-21.[/FONT]
[FONT=宋体]OPERATIONAL STATUS[/FONT]
[FONT=宋体]The DF-3 entered operational service in 1970, with about 150~200 missiles reported to have been deployed. A further 50~100 DF-3A missiles have been deployed since the late 1980s. China also exported 60~120 conventional warhead DF-3 missiles to Saudi Arabia, though no known test launch has been made in the country.[/FONT]
[FONT=宋体]The DF-3 is launched from fixed launch pad, and is road-mobile on a four-wheel carriage towed by 8X8 heavylift truck. Possible launch bases of the DF-3 include Dalong, Datong, Dengshahe, Dienwei, Fungrun, Jianshui, Kunming, Lianxiwang, Liujikou, Tonghua, Wuwei, Xian and Yidu. The DF-3 training facility is located in Wuwei, Gansu Province.[/FONT]
[FONT=宋体]MISSILE DESIGNS[/FONT]
[FONT=宋体]The DF-3 is a single-stage, single-warhead intermediate-range ballistic missile system. The maximum range is 2,500km (2,800km for DF-3A). It uses storable liquid propellants and a cluster of four engines. The pre-launch preparation time is reported to be between 2 and 3 hours. However, if the payload were reduced, then the DF-3A version would have the capability to achieve a range of about 4,000km.[/FONT]
[FONT=宋体]The DF-3 uses vanes in the efflux nozzles for control during the boost phase of flight. The motor consists of a cluster of four YF-2 engines which use storable liquids, Unsymmetrical Dimethyl Hydrazine (UDMH) fuel and AK-27 oxidiser (nitric acid with 27% nitrogen tetroxide), and provide a total thrust of 96 tonnes. The motors have a burn time of around 140 seconds. This gives the DF-3 missile a minimum range of 750km and a maximum range of 2,650km. At maximum range, the peak velocity of DF-3 will be 4.7km/s. DF-3 has a separating warhead assembly, weighing 2,150kg[/FONT]
[FONT=宋体]WARHEAD[/FONT]
[FONT=宋体]The missile uses an inertial guidance, with an estimated CEP of 1,000~4,000m. The missile carries a 2,000~3,000kT yield nuclear warhead, but can also configured to carry a conventional HE warhead. The improved DF-3A version has an accuracy improved to 1,000m CEP.[/FONT]
[FONT=宋体]SPECIFICATIONS[/FONT]
[FONT=宋体]Configuration: Single stage liquid
Length: 21.2m
Diameter: 2.25m
Launch Weight: 64,000kg
Propellant: Liquid fuel (Unsymmetrical Dimethylhydrazine/Nitrogen Tetroxide mix [UDMH/N2H4])
Guidance: Inertial
Range: 2,500km (DF-3); 2,800km (DF-3A)
Deployment: Launch pad + road mobile
Re-entry Vehicle Mass: 2,150kg
Warhead: Single 1,000~3,000kT
CEP: 2,000~3,000m (DF-3); 1,000m (DF-3A)
[/FONT]http://www.armsky.com/yuanchuangzhuangao/seechina/China2ndArtillery/200507/2177.html
[FONT=宋体]
F-3 INTERMEDIATE-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE
[/FONT][FONT=宋体]The DongFeng-3 (DF-3, NATO designation: CSS-2) is a single-warhead, single-stage, liquid-propellant, intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). Developed in the 1960, it is China's first independently developed ballistic missile. The DF-3A is the improved variant with extended range developed in the early 1980s. A total of 150~200 DF-3/3A missiles are believed to have been deployed, with 30~40 remaining in service today.[/FONT][FONT=宋体]PROGRAMME[/FONT]
[FONT=宋体]Following the success in the DF-1 short-range and DF-2 medium-range surface-to-surface ballistic missile, China began to develop a brand new design with intermediate-range in the early 1960s. Unlike the DF-1 and DF-2, which were both developed from the Soviet R-2 ballistic missile, the new intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) is a totally new design. Several design proposals were compared before the storable liquid fuel rocket with a cascade compensation inertial guidance design was finally chosen in early 1964. Three flying tests were carried out between December 1966 and May 1967, and the missile entered operational service in 1970 as DF-3.[/FONT]
[FONT=宋体]The 2,500km-range DF-3 was designed to over the U.S. bases in Eastern Asia. The missile has a payload of 2,000kg, which was expected to be the weight of the hydrogen bomb under development in China at that time. By the late 1970s, around 100~150 missiles are believed to have been deployed in PLA Second Artillery Corps bases in Jilin, Jiangxi, Yunnan and Qinghai. Depending on their deployment locations, these missiles can reach Japan, Philippine, South and Central Asia respectively.[/FONT]
[FONT=宋体]In 1981 China began to develop the DF-3A with an extended range of 2,800km as well as improved accuracy. The flying tests took place successfully in December 1985 and January 1986. Unconfirmed reports suggest that China may have tried to develop a multiple re-entry vehicle (MRV) type for the DF-3 but this was unsuccessful. A conventional high-explosive warhead variant of the DF-3A was developed for an export order to Saudi Arabia in 1987. Since the late 1990s, the PLA began to gradually phase out the early variant DF-3 missiles and replace them with the more capable DF-21.[/FONT]
[FONT=宋体]OPERATIONAL STATUS[/FONT]
[FONT=宋体]The DF-3 entered operational service in 1970, with about 150~200 missiles reported to have been deployed. A further 50~100 DF-3A missiles have been deployed since the late 1980s. China also exported 60~120 conventional warhead DF-3 missiles to Saudi Arabia, though no known test launch has been made in the country.[/FONT]
[FONT=宋体]The DF-3 is launched from fixed launch pad, and is road-mobile on a four-wheel carriage towed by 8X8 heavylift truck. Possible launch bases of the DF-3 include Dalong, Datong, Dengshahe, Dienwei, Fungrun, Jianshui, Kunming, Lianxiwang, Liujikou, Tonghua, Wuwei, Xian and Yidu. The DF-3 training facility is located in Wuwei, Gansu Province.[/FONT]
[FONT=宋体]MISSILE DESIGNS[/FONT]
[FONT=宋体]The DF-3 is a single-stage, single-warhead intermediate-range ballistic missile system. The maximum range is 2,500km (2,800km for DF-3A). It uses storable liquid propellants and a cluster of four engines. The pre-launch preparation time is reported to be between 2 and 3 hours. However, if the payload were reduced, then the DF-3A version would have the capability to achieve a range of about 4,000km.[/FONT]
[FONT=宋体]The DF-3 uses vanes in the efflux nozzles for control during the boost phase of flight. The motor consists of a cluster of four YF-2 engines which use storable liquids, Unsymmetrical Dimethyl Hydrazine (UDMH) fuel and AK-27 oxidiser (nitric acid with 27% nitrogen tetroxide), and provide a total thrust of 96 tonnes. The motors have a burn time of around 140 seconds. This gives the DF-3 missile a minimum range of 750km and a maximum range of 2,650km. At maximum range, the peak velocity of DF-3 will be 4.7km/s. DF-3 has a separating warhead assembly, weighing 2,150kg[/FONT]
[FONT=宋体]WARHEAD[/FONT]
[FONT=宋体]The missile uses an inertial guidance, with an estimated CEP of 1,000~4,000m. The missile carries a 2,000~3,000kT yield nuclear warhead, but can also configured to carry a conventional HE warhead. The improved DF-3A version has an accuracy improved to 1,000m CEP.[/FONT]
[FONT=宋体]SPECIFICATIONS[/FONT]
[FONT=宋体]Configuration: Single stage liquid
Length: 21.2m
Diameter: 2.25m
Launch Weight: 64,000kg
Propellant: Liquid fuel (Unsymmetrical Dimethylhydrazine/Nitrogen Tetroxide mix [UDMH/N2H4])
Guidance: Inertial
Range: 2,500km (DF-3); 2,800km (DF-3A)
Deployment: Launch pad + road mobile
Re-entry Vehicle Mass: 2,150kg
Warhead: Single 1,000~3,000kT
CEP: 2,000~3,000m (DF-3); 1,000m (DF-3A)
[/FONT]http://www.armsky.com/yuanchuangzhuangao/seechina/China2ndArtillery/200507/2177.html
- إنضم
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رد: الترسانة النووية والصاروخية السعودية
沙特笑了美国哭了：中国出售最先进导弹给沙特
الصين تبيع الصواريخ الأكثر تطورا إلى السعودية
وزيارة الامير سلطان للمجمعات النووية الباكستانية
وان باكستان كانت همزة الوصل بين باكستان والصين
وان الوزير رامسفيلد والحكومة الامريكية تتحفظ على هذا التعاون النووي بين الدولتين
وارتياب الحكومة الامريكية من المياركة السعودية وتقديم العون لباكستان
والتعاون الخفي مع ايران
ززضع السعودية والصين عسكريا وصاروخيا
وان الصين تريد ان تكون هي صاحبة اليد في الخليج العربي
http://www.ymqlover.com/thread-9566-1-1.html
沙特笑了美国哭了：中国出售最先进导弹给沙特
الصين تبيع الصواريخ الأكثر تطورا إلى السعودية
最可能在将来卖导弹给沙特阿拉伯的是巴基斯坦。据许多媒体报道，沙特阿拉伯一直资助巴基斯坦向中国购买导弹和核技术；有关 1994年一个叛逃的沙特外交官的报道也提到过这一点。巴基斯坦的财政多年来入不敷出，而中国又不容拖欠，所以这笔钱一定别有来处。1999年5月巴基斯坦进行核试验之后，苏尔坦亲王参观了卡胡塔的浓缩铀工厂和生产导弹的设施。2002年5月巴基斯坦试射可携带核弹头的加乌里导弹时，苏尔坦可能也在场。如果这些报道是真实的，那就是沙特阿拉伯付钱给中国，让巴基斯坦向中国购买导弹和核技术。如果是这样的话，沙特阿拉伯可能是通过代理人向中国购买核技术，而巴基斯坦充当的就是这个角色。如果利雅得对巴基斯坦的核计划也能施加影响，沙特阿拉伯只要有运来的一批导弹和弹头，就可以马上成为名副其实的核国家。
يتكلم عن التعاون النووي السعودي الباكستاني بمساعدة صينية وزيارة الامير سلطان للمجمعات النووية الباكستانية
وان باكستان كانت همزة الوصل بين باكستان والصين
最近的说法是，从1997年以来，巴基斯坦一直同北朝鲜在进行以货易货的交易：前者以中国的核武器技术换取后者的导弹。这样一来，事情就更复杂了。据国防部长拉姆斯菲尔德说，北朝鲜秘密发展核武器的地下设施，集中在金昌里附近，它这样做，是违反平壤在1994年做出的承诺的。在巴基斯坦的核设施和导弹设施工作的中国技术人员肯定知道这些交易，而北京却故意向华盛顿隐瞒消息。这些事件说明，美国历来对中国扩散导弹和核技术的行为采取睁一眼闭一眼的态度，而今却轮到它来自食其果了。
يتكلم التقرير عن تعاون ياكستاني كوري شمالي باكستاني بمباركة سعوديةوان الوزير رامسفيلد والحكومة الامريكية تتحفظ على هذا التعاون النووي بين الدولتين
وارتياب الحكومة الامريكية من المياركة السعودية وتقديم العون لباكستان
中国与沙特阿拉伯有许多共同之处，但是，在近期中国还不至于取代美国来保障波斯湾的安全。有人猜测沙特王室中的苏尔坦支系如果掌了权，就会转而投靠北京。这种猜测不合逻辑，因为美国在海湾地区有强大的军事和经济实力。苏尔坦家族的人同北京搞导弹交易并非想密切沙特阿拉伯与中国的关系。他们是为了钱，也可能是为了得到一枚原子弹。但是，利雅得的政局如果生变，也可能导致战略上的重新组合。以前不是没有发生过意想不到的事件：沙特阿拉伯的邻国伊朗的亲美国王突然之间就倒台了。万一沙特王室在继承问题上突然出现危机，中国可能伺机而动。可以确定的是：由于中国的石油需求量越来越大，它会千方百计扩大目前在波斯湾地区的小小影响，而与沙特阿拉伯的关系则是这一战略重要一环。
وهنا يتكلم التقرير عن اللعبة الامريكية في الخليج العربي والتعاون الخفي مع ايران
ززضع السعودية والصين عسكريا وصاروخيا
وان الصين تريد ان تكون هي صاحبة اليد في الخليج العربي
http://www.ymqlover.com/thread-9566-1-1.html
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- 13 مارس 2012
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رد: الترسانة النووية والصاروخية السعودية
n 2003, reports emerged about a secret nuclear cooperation agreement between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
n 2003, reports emerged about a secret nuclear cooperation agreement between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
في عام 2003،ظهرتتقاريرعناتفاق تعاون نوويسريبينباكستانوالمملكة العربية السعودية
In 1986, Saudi Arabia acquired 36 CSS-2 intermediate range ballistic missiles from China, which could be used for delivering nuclear weaponsوفي عام 1986استحوذتالمملكة العربية السعودية على 36CSS-2صاروج متوسطة المدىالصواريخ
الباليستيةمنالصين، والتييمكن استخدامها لحمل أسلحة نووية
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/article2082235.eceالباليستيةمنالصين، والتييمكن استخدامها لحمل أسلحة نووية
- إنضم
- 13 مارس 2012
- المشاركات
- 1,268
- التفاعل
رد: الترسانة النووية والصاروخية السعودية
مفاجأة من العيار الثقيل
تقرير يتكلم عن الاسلحة الكيميائية والبيولوجية السعودية
http://www.mediafire.com/?3t08jad8wr0ttih
مفاجأة من العيار الثقيل
تقرير يتكلم عن الاسلحة الكيميائية والبيولوجية السعودية
http://www.mediafire.com/?3t08jad8wr0ttih
المواضيع المشابهة
