يا صديقي انت لن تواجه جيش مثل الجيش الليبي ....ألجيش الليبي جزر القمر تستطيع هزيمته
اذا تجاوزت مشاكل الرافال فعلا ووصلت الى ف4 سيكون امر جيدا
هذه المصادر ومن اعلى المناصب في فرنسا----------هذه ليست كل المصادر ...هناك اكثر عن مشاكل الحرارة والتصميم واليزر الخ ...........لكن اقرا جيدا عن المشاكل الرئيسية وهي المحرك -الرادر -السعر وغيرها
Awaiting the UAE
DSI special edition , August 2010
With the general Alain SILVY
Deputy Chief Plans within the Staff of the Air Force.
The french government took the pledge with the Rafale manufacturer to ensure, whatever happens, a minimum annual rate of 11 aircrafts. A rate estimated by the manufacturer as the floor below which it would not be possible to go without calling into question the economy of the program, including the unit cost of these aircrafts. The LPM (Law of Military Planning) not providing matching funds for the purchase of these machines for the years 2013 and 2014, either export allow very opportunely to keep the commitment to the industry, or export is lacking and the french state must find the necessary budgets by reducing or eliminating other programs. Is this commitment based on obtaining export orders a dangerous bet?
Alain Silvy: Let's be honest. This "bet", to use your word, on short-term obtaining of export orders for the Rafale, has nevertheless allowed to complete the LPM allowing the planning of a big hole in the shipment for the Air Force and the Navy without questioning the production rate, already reduced to the minimum industrially acceptable by Dassault Aviation. Deliveries to the French armies should be reduced to only 2 or 3 machines per year for a time, the export bringing the complement to reach the threshold of 11 Rafale produced per year. In case of absence of export order, the situation would become obviously complicated.[…] We would have to find a substantial funding of several hundred million euros. […]
But how to find the hundreds of millions euros in question?
The 3 armies have all benefited from the choice made by the planners of the LPM to reduce to a very low level the Rafale deliveries. The amount saved have been reallocated to the 3 armies. I think nobody questions it. We should have to find the funds by making new balancing within the LPM […] we must now hope that will come very quickly a first export order. […] But export is not neutral. Potential customers, including UAE, have specific requirements with developments leaving the French standards - and therefore with budget not taken into account by the LPM - they want cofinanced by the French state. That could require for France to find further funding for the Rafale program […]
What would be the cost for France of these additional co-development to fund with a potential UAE customer?
One hears everything and its opposite. Everything depends on what one includes. Personally, I do not give precise figures. But this is obviously something like several hundreds of millions of euros paid by the french state.
Is the Air force interested by some of the UAE requirements ?
From my point of view, it depends where. We could be potentially interested by the M88-X with 9 tons of thrust because it would be, in the circumstances, an open field. But, on the other hand, we have not yet reached the stage of maturity - which requires about 150,000 flight hours – with the current M88 with 7.5 tonnes thrust. This means that with the M88-X, even if it should presumptively enjoy a good community with the existing M88, we would have to accumulate even more hours to reach the stage of maturity of the engine.
Very clearly, in my opinion, the M88-X is not for the Air force an immediate need. In order to sell the Rafale to the UAE, the Defense may ultimately be asked to acquire the M88-X in a quantity and on terms still to define. And we'll maybe even happy to use it. But today we have no technical or operational reasons to make it available for us.The gain expected from the arrival of a more powerful engine is lower than the risks we would go with the technical immaturity of new modules and the management in parallel - so complicated in terms of logistics and operational employment of aircraft with different performances –of two relatively different parks of M88. All this must be thorough.
Would it be possible to see Safran manufacturing M88-X for UAE and continue to deliver “classic” M88 for the french Rafale? And this notwithstanding that the french government would have co-funded the development of the M88-X
It is not forbidden to imagine it. On condition, however, that to maintain the parallel production of two versions of M88 does not cost more than producing a single model. The support costs must not explode. Safran must tell us very quickly and very frankly what it would be. And again, nothing force us to equip the whole fleet of Rafale, Air and/or Marine.
And about the UAE demand to have a more powerful RBE2 radar, could it answer to some expectations for the Air force?
The Air Force is interested in having a RBE2 with an active antenna. It is now established with the powerful AESA antenna which will equip our tranche 4 Rafale. What the Emirians are calling for is much more complex. They want, in addition to the AESA, to have new functionalities on their Rafale, such as GMTT / GMTI (detection and tracking of moving ground target), interlacing between air/air and air/ground modes, etc.. Even if this is not for us an urgent need, the operational 'plus' obtained could nonetheless eventually interest us. However, the key Emirian demand is about the range of the RBE2. And, with the same antenna diameter, the only way to achieve the 10% range increase (compared with the Basic AESA F3 "roadmap") that wish to obtain the Emirians, is a big boost to the power of the radar.
But more power to the RBE2, could it be a risk to generate serious electromagnetic interference (EMI) with the SPECTRA receptors ?
There is indeed a very real EMI risk to treat. This is the case whenever we want to change aircraft emission systems. There are solutions, obviously, but this will require to reexamine SPECTRA. But the biggest problem we have identified is about electric generation, which could be insufficient. To increase the maximum range of a few nautical miles, we would have to deeply review the electrical generation system of the aircraft.
In short, to conceive what it could be a Rafale-9, that is to say a new aircraft moving away from the similarity you want with french Rafale. The Emirati experts participating in negotiations are well aware of the problem. But they are also used to have very high quality weapons systems. They want to avoid any regression with the Rafale, at least on the radar range, compared to the F-16 Block 60, the Rafale having also many other qualities. The Emirians don’t have AWACS and therefore want - it is a fundamental requirement - that the Rafale can see very far. Beyond the radar, they are showing fairly strong requirements into SPECTRA development with, for example, the expansion of some frequency bands, an increased sensitivity, adding functionalities; in short, they want we push up the current technologies. Of course, to improve the electronic warfare of our Rafale faster than originally planned could be an additional operational advantage for the Air force. However, our current approach is to consolidate the features implemented in SPECTRA, to make them more robust and make it easier for operators and programmers before wanting to go further into addition of new capabilities. The current SPECTRA is working well and even very good. In sum, what separates us, about Spectra, is a matter of timing and calendar […]. In a more general way, we share the same wishes about capabilities, but with very different maturities calendar sometimes. Budgetary constraints remain a dimensioning factor.
The Emirians want a viewfinder-HMD ...
It's true. And ourselves, one way or another, we will. For various reasons, we agreed in the past to not use it initially, but this equipment is now an almost indispensable element for modern combat aircraft. Besides various prospects of the Rafale - the UAE, Brazil and Switzerland – also want it, confirming this analysis.
In the end, what about the eventuality of a Rafale order by the UAE?
Very sincerely, and seen from my place, I think we're really not very far from being able to reach a common ground with our UAE friends. The only pertinent question to be asked is whether the will of similarity expressed by the Emirians will prevail over their performance requirement If performance is what counts, in fact we’ll get two quite different Rafale - as with the Mirage 2000-9 - because the french state can not or do not want to follow it. If the community is paramount, the Emirians will have to reduce their ambitions with regard to performance. The choice is now in their hands. They must see if their operational necessities allow them or not to settle for a weapon system fairly close to the F3 "roadmap" French standard. They must decide whether they consider more important to work very closely with us. I know they have already expressed the wish, in case of order, to be able to send their pilots very quickly in our Rafale units where they could train, learn the Rafale and our tactical employment. To obtain a rapid operational rise of their own Rafale squadron. in that case their Rafale configuration and ours must not be very different. But it remains to be seen ... That is where we are I think
.
How long would require the additional developments required by the UAE?
It is difficult to answer precisely this question, especially since I do not have all the elements of the problematic. The first UAE aircraft would not be delivered before 2014. This period should be sufficient to finish to develop a 9 tons M-88. About the radar, we would not probably have in 2014 all the capabilities and performance expected, but they would, I think, nevertheless be already very close to the target. The problem of electric generation requires also time to be processed. This will be a heavy operation for the aircraft. In the case of an order signed this year, we would therefore have some years to develop the additional features. These years should not be wasted. In any case, I think the discussions with Emirians take place on a sound footing. Their negotiators are experts who know exactly what is fighter plane and are aware of the state of the art and of various constraints. Talking to people at this level is very pleasant for the Air Force. However, now the order must materialize.
What about the UAE Mirage 2000-9 ?
The French authorities have been very clear on this subject. Once the Rafale ordered by UAE, the Mirage 2000-9 will be taken back by France which will issue them to a defeasance agency in charge of their resale export. This means that in this hypothesis, it is not envisaged that they equip the French Army.
But would it be interesting for the Army because these are recent cells with advanced weapons systems ?
We can not say that we feel no interest in these machines, because their weapons system displays really astonishing performance. The Air Force could certainly benefit. However, the indispensable work for NATO compatibility on these weapons systems would be very heavy with a cost probably exceeding the one - 700 millions euros - planned for the renovation of our Mirage 2000D, which is a priority for us.
If the UAE buy the Rafale, could the Rafale Transformation Squadron (ETR), which will be created in Saint-Dizier, be relocated at Al-Dhafra to help UAE pilots and benefit from the excellent local weather conditions ?
Why not? but we are not there yet. […] To install the ETR – as a whole or just a part - at Al-Dhafra could be an asset. Our first participation, last autumn, to the ATLC (Advanced Tactical Leadership Course) organized by the UAE Air Warfare Center, has once again demonstrated the richness of such exchanges. If the UAE order the Rafale, we may have to quickly take charge, in a way or another, of the transformation of their pilots on our weapon system. Doing it at Al-Dhafra would be - and this is only my opinion - interesting.
Interview by Jean-Louis Prome
............فرنسا تسيطر تبيع وتشتري
