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How? The Deadly Question for the F-35 Joint Strike FighterAir Power Australia - Australia's Independent Defence Think Tank
Air Power Australia NOTAM
5th July, 2010
© 2010 C. L. Mills
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How will the intended 2,443 F-35s JSF impose air dominance for the USA and its Allies? That is the question to ask.
Search the Internet for material on the JSF and you will find terabyte after terabyte of articles, pictures, Powerpoint presentations, PDFs, tables and laudatory Blogs. And how much relates to how the JSF will deliver this capability? You will find assertions and statement such as ‘six times better Relative Loss Exchange Ratio than legacy aircraft’ [1], or ‘The operational arguments focus on combat effectiveness against top foreign fighter aircraft such as the Russian Su-27 and MiG-29. Lockheed Martin and USAF analysts put the loss-exchange ratio at 30-1 for the F-22, 3-1 for the F-35 and 1-1 or less for the F-15, F/A-18 and F-16’[2].
And how will the F-35 JSF perform, not against truly obsolete legacy aircraft like the Su-27SK and the MiG-29, but against modern fighters like the Su-35S? We can answer these questions with a head-to-head analysis of the two aircraft.
Air combat is a complex mix of art, science and engineering. Aircraft performance, weapons performance, networked sensors and pilot skill all contribute to the final Loss Exchange Ratio (LER). The only simplification is that aircraft approach, engage in combat and the survivors depart. This activity can be examined in a ‘kill-chain’ with the following stages: ‘Detect-Identify-Engage-Disengage-Destroy’ (DIED2).
Here is a scenario. In the ‘Blue’ corner, we have a flight of four F-35A JSFs, each armed with four AIM-120D Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missiles and the 25 mm GD ATP GAU-22/A cannon. No additional weapons or fuel are carried, because these would compromise the JSFs' “low observability” to X-Band radar. In the ‘Red’ corner, we have a flight of four Su-35S, each armed with four RVV-SD Active Radar Seeker BVR Missiles, four RVV-SD Infra-Red (IR) Seeker BVR missiles, two RVV-MD Within Visual Range (WVR) missiles, the 30mm GSh-301 cannon, KNIRTI SAP-518 jammers on the wingtips and a 6,000 litre conformal tank between the engines. Each aircraft has the full range of sensors and countermeasures.
Here is a table to show how they compare:
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Figure 1: Diversity in missile airframes and seekers. A Western pilot must be proficient in evasion tactics for no less than six different families of BVR missile airframes, and four different categories of missile seeker. The endgame radiofrequency and optical countermeasures suites in a Western airframe must be effective against seven different families of missile seeker, including variants thereof. A pilot flying a Russian or Chinese supplied fighter only needs tactics and technology to defeat the AIM-120B/C/D AMRAAM. Not included is the R-27AE Alamo with a digital variant of the RVV-SD active radar terminal seeker (Diagram © 2010 Dr Carlo Kopp).
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Figure 2: A key problem for the F-35 family of aircraft is that genuine X/S-band low observability is only achieved in a relatively narrow angular sector around the nose of the aircraft. This forces the aircraft to ‘point it's nose’ at the highest threat, denying flexibility in prosecuting a missile shot, or evading multiple threats. The absence of cheek and aft radar arrays exacerbates the problem, and cannot be fixed given the weight, power and cooling problems in the basic airframe design (Diagram © 2010 Dr Carlo Kopp).
Whoa! The F-35A assessments are all marked in Red and Yellow – Inferior or Equivalent. Why is that?
Let’s look at each element of the ‘kill-chain’.
Detect:
Electronic Support Measures: Air combat aircraft emit radiation from jet engines, radar, JTIS/MIDSs terminal, radio transmissions. Specialised equipment in combat aircraft knows the frequencies of these transmissions and has sensors to detect them. Attempts are made to minimise emissions through a process of ‘Emission Control’ (EMCON) but these can only be partially successful. Both the JSF and the Su-35S have a full range of these sensors, and are assessed as being equally effective in ESM capability.
ESA Radar X-Band: This is the primary sensor for jet fighters. The radar cross section of the F-35A is substantially lower than that of the Su-35S especially in the front sector, but the Sukhoi has sufficient power and a much larger antenna to partially overcome that difference. Both types are ‘networked’ so in a multi-ship engagement, the geometrical spread of the Su-35S flight in part negates the lower observability of the JSF by illuminating the JSF from angles where its low observability is weakest. Expect the F-35A to often get the ‘first look’, but the Su-35S flight to detect the JSF outside the range of the JSFs' BVR missiles. So where it matters, the limited low observability of the JSF provides little advantage.
ESA Radar L-Band: The Su-35S will have this lower-frequency radar in its wing leading edges. The JSF is ‘stealthed’ for X-Band, not for L-Band. While the antenna size of the Su-35S L-Band radar limits its performance, there will be times when the L-Band radar detects the JSF before the X-Band radar. The JSF does not have an L-Band Radar and is assessed accordingly.
Infra-Red Search & Track: There is a different approach to Infra-Red sensors. The JSF has a superb Electro-Optical Distributed Aperture System (DAS) designed to cover the sphere around the aircraft, but strongly optimised for air-to-ground operations. The Su-35S has a large aperture OLS-35 IRST optimised to scan for other aircraft at long range in its area of interest. DAS is a ‘staring array’ while the OLS-35 is a ‘scanning array’. The difference in detection range is like the difference between a person searching with a naked eye compared with another searching with a telescope. If the telescope is pointed in the right direction, it will get first detection. Add to that the factor that the JSF has the hottest engine in the market, and the IRST of the Su-35S is assessed as a superior aid to air combat.
Identification: Not much need to be said here. The threat of fratricide in BVR air combat has led to the development of identification systems that will reliable separate friend from foe. Fratricide still happens though, especially in mixed, close-in fights.
Engagement:
Mach on Entry: High Mach increases the energy of BVR missiles, sending them further. The design top speed of the Su-35S is 2.25, limited by canopy and radome heating, so it has surplus power and the fuel to burn to sustain high Mach numbers. The drag of the external stores is likely to reduce this to something below Mach 2, but the missiles are cleared for launch at all speeds. The JSF has yet to demonstrate a flight above Mach 1.05, but even if it reaches its design speed of Mach 1.6, it is clearly inferior.
Altitude on Entry: Like Mach, a higher altitude adds potential energy to BVR missiles, sending them further, while an enemy’s missiles must ‘climb the hill,’ severely reducing range. A second factor is that missiles fired from a higher altitude have less drag, again increasing range. The JSF is optimised for Strike missions flown at about 15-25,000 feet, while the Su-35S is optimised for air combat missions at about 40,000 feet and above, with a combat ceiling close to 60,000 feet. Points go to the Su-35S on operating altitude.
Missile Range: The RVV-SD and the AIM-120D have roughly equivalent ranges, but when the RVV-SD has a high-Mach, high-altitude launch; it will outrange the AIM-120D. The Su-35S is assessed at delivering a longer BVR engagement range. This area of superiority will be increased once the RVV-AE-PD ramjet missile becomes operational. In addition, the Su-35S can carry the very long range R-37 and R-172 missiles, with ranges to 200 nautical miles.
Missile Seeker Diversity: The AIM-120D currently has an active radar seeker, while the RVV-SD/R-77ME and the R-77TE have active and infra-Red (IIR) seekers respectively. Mixed sensor seekers complicate defences, for example, the F-35 may turn to defeat an active seeker and expose a hot part of the aircraft to an IR seeker. Russian doctrine is to ‘pair’ missiles with an active seeker followed by a IR seeker, creating diversity in the fight and creating ‘kill’ opportunities. The Russian missiles also have the option of passive anti-radiation seekers, designed to home on X-band radar. This diversity in missile seeker sensors gives an advantage to the Su-35S.
Signature Exposure: This is a factor that primarily affects the JSF, known to have a ‘Pacman’ radar cross-section at X-Band, with a Low Observability ‘notch’ at the front. As it manoeuvres, it can turn the notch away from an aircraft searching sensor, and expose a higher radar cross-section to that search, or expose a broadside or rear-side to another aircraft. The F-35 relying on a ‘can’t see me, can’t kill me’ capability, has more to lose in a spread, manoeuvring engagement than the Su-35S, which will generally be detectable by the JSF for most of the engagement. This exposure can occur, for example, when the JSF is guiding a missile and turns away to reduce the closure rate, thereby exposing both the aircraft and an incoming missile to longer range detection, or detection from a widely spaced wingman. As the JSF is reliant on signature reduction for survival, it has more to lose if its signature increases, so is assessed as more vulnerable in the dynamics of a multi-ship, networked, turning engagement where signature management is very difficult.
Endgame Electronic Countermeasures (ECM): The ‘modus operandi’ of stealth aircraft is not to radiate, or return radiation, which is the way ECM countermeasures work. Su-35S has ECM, JSF does not, except for intended AESA Radar jamming modes across a limited forward cone of about 120 degrees. ECM based on Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) can be very effective, especially against missiles with limited processing power and time to resolve targets. The Su-35S also has several ECM modes. The JSF is assessed as inferior, because it does not employ ECM to defeat attack.
Decoys Towed / Fired: The Su-35S has the option of deploying towed decoys to lure a closing missile away from the body of the aircraft. The JSF approach is different, with small ‘Gen-X’ active decoys being fired as a missile closes. These measures are assessed as being approximately equivalent, with the towed decoys which are at co-speed to the target likely to present the more effective countermeasure.
Flares and Chaff: These are outmoded countermeasures, but still add to the difficulty of guiding a missile to close proximity of an airframe. The GSh-301 is claimed to have rounds that fire chaff forward of the aircraft, so chaff-discrimination processing in a closing missile might be deceived. Nonetheless, the countermeasures are assessed as equivalent.
Mach for a Tail-Chase / Fuel Reserves for Afterburner: At some time in a fight, an aircraft has to depart, for example when ‘Winchester’ or out of ammunition, or ‘Bingo’ or down to just enough fuel to get home. Then the fight becomes a tail-chase. The Su-35S with its higher Mach can close on a JSF, the reverse is not the case. The ability of the Su-35S to carry large fuel loads, and the prodigious consumption of the JSF F135 engine in maximum afterburner exacerbates this perilous situation for the JSF. The advantage is with the Su-35S in these aspects of engaging in a fight when the JSF is attempting to disengage.
Disengagement: This is one of the under-assessed areas of future air combat. When missiles of roughly equivalent range are fired, they travel for over 100 seconds to the target. This transit time provides an opportunity for countermeasures to defeat the attack. Missile motor launch-flares are intensive and difficult to hide from Infra-Red sensors, so in many engagements, there will be early warning of an incoming missile. Active seekers ‘light-up’ at about 10 nautical miles from the target, still providing valuable warning time. Here is a range of disengagement measures:
Airframe Agility: Once warned of a launch, the defending aircraft can sometimes defeat the attack by rapidly turning away to force the missile into a tail-chase.
Antenna Coverage: AESA radars like the JSF APG-81 working from a fixed back-plate cover a cone of about 120 degrees. The Su-35S has an ESA radar working from a gimballed ‘swash-plate’ that covers about 240 degrees around the nose, and there is a second radar in the ‘stinger’ albeit with less capability, to cover the remainder of the sphere. If the Su-35S and the JSF fire a BVR missile at the same time and at maximum range, the Su-35S can turn away to about 120 degrees off the line joining the two aircraft, while the JSF is constrained to about 60 degrees. This runs the JSF into the Su-35S’s missile, while the Su-35S is running away from the JSF’s missile. The result could be an RVV-SD hit and an AIM-120 miss. Points to the Su-35S on this aspect.
Mach on Egress / Fuel Reserves for Afterburner: This is an extension of the antenna coverage capability, as the Su-35S can accelerate away from the incoming missile, forcing it to drop-short. The JSF does not have this performance and is assessed as inferior.
Destroy:
Missile Seeker Diversity: At terminal phases of an engagement, there may be several missiles in the vicinity, with aircraft manoeuvring to defeat the attack. An incoming missile with an IR seeker may be presented with the ‘rear end’ of a JSF and track for a kill. This opportunity is not available to the JSF attacking the Su-35S, as its limited missile carriage does not include BVR missiles with IR seekers.
Missile Agility: This is the ‘flip side’ of aircraft agility. The R-77 has the famous ‘potato masher’ lattice-tail control surfaces, that while increasing drag over conventional surfaces, also give greater terminal manoeuvring capability. So, the Su-35S BVR weapons can out-turn the F-35’s weapons.
Warhead Lethality: This is a mix of warhead destructive power and the vulnerability of the target airframe. The AIM-120D has an 18 Kg, fragmentation warhead, and the Su-35S widely spaced armoured engines, armoured sections of the airframe and redundancy of system. The R-77 missiles have 30 kg expanding-rod warheads to destroy the single-engine JSF, from which critical systems like fire suppression have been removed to reduce weight and cost. The Su-35S is assessed as superior.
WVR Missiles: This is as simple as ‘the Su-35S carries WVR missiles, the JSF does not’ (in this example). The JSF can carry WVR missiles, but they are an external mount, impairing radar signatures.
Guns Lethality: Bigger is better. 30 mm rounds have more explosive power than 25 mm rounds. Again, the airframe vulnerability is an issue and a single 30 mm hit to the JSF’s single engine could bring it down.
At the end of the kill-chain, it seems, prima facie, that the Su-35S has all the ‘right stuff’ for air combat, while the F-35 JSF does not. This should come as no surprise, because the design brief for the JSF was that the F-22A would ‘sanitise’ airspace and deliver air dominance, making it safe for the Joint STRIKE Fighter to deliver follow-up strike capabilities.
Now that the F-22A Raptor program is being terminated with insufficient aircraft to deliver air dominance, this role is now being assigned to the F-35 JSF.
Given the intent of the OSD to employ the F-35 Joint Strike fighter as an air dominance fighter, the fundamental and unanswered question is:
HOW
الاف 35 لن تحتاج لكل هذا فهى ستراها و ستستهدفها قبل ان تدرى الاخيرة انها فى دائرة الخطر اساسا و بخصوص المناورة حاول ان تقارن الاف 22 بالاف 117 و سترى الفرق الكبير و مع ذلك كانت سيدة الاجواءكلامك انت اللى خطا 1000%
how? The deadly question for the f-35 joint strike fighter http://www.defence.pk/forums/militar...omparison.html
قارنها بالاف 22 رابتور
http://translate.googleusercontent.c...kfmdashcin0jsw
قارنها بالاف 35
http://www.lastcombat.com/su-35_vs_f-35.html
لتانى مره بقولك كلامك خطا 1000% لان السوخوى 35 اذا شغلت رادارها السلبى ستكون شبحيه تماما و بمقطع رادارى 0.01 م و ستكتشف الاف 35 اولا وتقفل عليها اولا و تدمرها بخلاف انها حتى على الاسواء افتراض و اطلقت على السوخوى 35 فان السوخوى 35 ستتفادى و تشوش على صواريخها بفضل نظم الحمايه الذاتي و التشويش و المناوره التى لا تضاهى التى تتمتع بها السوخوى 35 واضح ان معلوماتك عن السوخوى 35 بها قصور شديد راجع هذا المصدر
Su-35BM/T-10BM : The last Flanker
By Zarko Bulatovic | April 27, 2007 on 11:32 am | In Documentation, Fighters, Su-35 Super Flanker, Sukhoi | This aircraft has not reached serial production stage yet, thus the avionics configuration is subjectable to changes. The Aviapedia staff will keep close eye on the matter, so stay tuned for possible article updates.
Introduction :
Su-35BM will be the last developed Flanker. An final upgrade, final variant. Actually, the designation is quite confusing, since Su-35 already exists in Russian Air Force. Su-35 was the export designation for upgraded Su-27, called Su-27M, internal Sukhoi designation T-10M. Su-27M gave baseline Flanker new avionics, as well as precision air-to-ground capability. Only five of these are in service with VVS (Russian Air Force), with 237th regiment based at Kubinka Air Base. VVS chose another path instead; to incorporate technologies tested in Su-35/T-10M, together with those of Su-30MK, into an standard upgrade project for the baseline Flanker, the Su-27SM. The Su-35 designation was also used for Su-37, dubbed as “Terminator”. Aircraft was a testbed for 2D thrust-vectoring engines, mounted on Su-35/T-10M.
The new Su-35BM is going to fill the interim gap between standard 4+ generation Su-27SM in service today, and PAK-FA, 5th generation fighter in developement stage. Thus, Su-35BM is designated as 4++ generation fighter, together with new MiG-35. Official first flight will commence late this year, Sukhoi officialy stated that year 2007 is the ending year of all work on Su-35BM. After MAKS 2007, Su-35BM will be put on state trials. The aircraft should be ordered by VVS, after all, they’re the ones who supported the initial beggining of work on the BM, after successful Su-27SM program.
Main specifications [SIZE=-1]Length[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]21.9 meters[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Height[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]5.9 meters[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Wingspan[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]15.3 meters[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Take-off weight, with two R-77 and two R-73[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]25.3 tons[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Take-off weight, with maximum payload[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]34.5 tons[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Total thrust available, two Saturn 177S powerplants[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]29 tons[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Thrust to weight ratio, under normal and maximum load[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]1.14 / 0.84[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Maximum fuel in integrated fueltanks[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]11.5 tons[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Maximum weapons load[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]8 tons[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Service ceiling[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]18 kilometers[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Range with maximum fuel, on sea-level and altitude[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]1,580 km / 3,600 km[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Ferry range, with two PTB-2000 external tanks[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]4,500 km[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Acceleration from 600kph to 1100kph, at 1000m alt and 50% fuel[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]13.8 seconds[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Acceleration from 1100kph to 1300kph, at 1000m alt and 50% fuel[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]8.0 seconds[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Maximum rate of climb, at 1000m alt[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]280 meters / sec[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Maximum airspeed, low-level and altitude (200m / 11000m)[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]1,400 kph / M2.25[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Maximum G-load[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]9 G’s[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Take-off run, full afterburner, normal weight[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]400-450 meters[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Landing roll, brakes + parachute, standard landing weight[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]650 meters[/SIZE] Information taken from official KnAAPO brochures Official description from KnAAPO (manufacturer) follows : “Su-35 is designed to gain air superiority through manned and unmanned aircraft destroying, by guided missiles, in medium and long range engagements and dogfights; to destroy ground and surface targets by all type of weapon, as well as destroy the enemy ground infrastructure facilities located very far from the base airfields, heavily protected by active AAD system”
The most important Su-35BM/T-10BM characteristics are : supreme flight performance (superagility), long range information targeting systems, jam-proof datalinks for squadron or ground control operations, high performance short, medium and long range missiles of both anti-air and anti-ground type, carried externally on fourteen hardpoints, sophisticated EW/ECM/ER systems, radar cross-section reduction, high-power sensors with adequate computing power and sensory fusion technique, cockpit with large LCD multi-function displays, and an in-flight refuelling probe.
Unlike Su-37, which was seen as remarkable aircraft by aerospace community, Su-35BM will have all Russian systems. Su-37 had it’s cockpit systems imported from French Sextant/Thales.
Airframe :
Su-35BM is more alike standard Su-27S, than Su-35/T-10M. It has no canards, has smaller fins, tailcone is smaller than those found on T-10M. High-lift surfaces are larger, big flaperons occupying complete wing trailing edge. Airframe structure is more “refined”, with usage of RAM coating and new all-composites material. Latter is said to grant 20% of weight reduction and an RCS signature suppression. Su-35BM also has larger air intakes.
Powerplant :
Engines that were planned for T-10BM are Saturn AL-41F1, with supercruise capability, rated at 15 metric tons of thrust each. This family of engines will power PAK-FA too, and are going to power Su-34 Fullback long range strike aircraft. The AL-41 series was built to feed power-hungry aircraft such as MiG’s MFI (1.42/1.44), and S-37/Su-47 Berkut. It was stated that first versions of these engines powered the MFI, but, recent statements from NPO Saturn pointed out, that engines won’t be ready for the first preproduction versions of PAK-FA. Thus, it’s viable to concur that Su-35BM won’t have it’s first flight with AL-41F1. To note : the MFI has flown on AL-31’s, while the Berkut was fitted with D-30F-6 engines, powerplant from MiG-31.
However, NPO Saturn managed to develop heavily upgraded AL-31F engines, and designated them AL-41F1A, or article 117S. The designation of AL-41(X) notes that thrust is closer to projected AL-41F series, but the AL-41F1A’s feature old, refubrished core. The AL-41F’s will have all-new core.
AL-41F1A are equipeed with three-dimensional thrust vectoring nozzles, too, so both of Russian 4++ generation aircraft will be 3D TVC capable, if we count the fact that Morskaya Osa engines can be upgraded with all-axis nozzles. As it’s stated on official sites, AL-41F1A’s have 14.5 tons of thrust each, that means 29 tons of thrust for Su-35BM. Since some early sources claimed that airframe material enhancement reduced Su-35BM weight by 20%, aircraft could have an greatly increased thrust-to-weight ratio, ensuring superb combat and flight performance.
Sensors and avionics :
Main radar system for the Su-35BM is the Tikhomirov NIIP Irbis-E (N035E). While it’s pointed out that this will be the radar model used on Su-35BM, it’s also probable that Su-35BM could fly with Phazotron NIIR radar, the Sokol III (N031 Zhuk-MSFE). Given the latest achievements on the field of AESA technology by Phazotron, that are already visible in form of complete systems found on the other Russian 4++ gen aircraft, MiG-35, Su-35BM could be equipped with an derivative of current Phazotron AESA models. However, Irbis is marked as the number one option for the radar system.
Tikhomirov NIIP Irbis-E radar uses electronically scanned array (ESA). It’s a multifunctional radar system, working in X-band, holded on two-axis hydraulic drive. Radar uses EKVS-E BTsVM Solo35 computing system. The Irbis-E can track 30 different targets, while retaining continous airspace scan, eg. track-while-scan mode. The fire control system can simultaneously guide two semi-active radar guided missiles. If used in conjuction with active radar guided missiles, this number is eight. In air to surface operations, radar is capable of mapping land and sea targets, and detection of targets in real-beam, Doppler, and SAR modes. Four ground targets can be tracked at the same time, while two can be attacked at the same time, too. Since Irbis-E has enormeous power output, up to 20 kilowatts, it can detect an “standard” target (RCS at 3 square meters) 400 kilometers away. Normally, that figure is given for head-on aspect, in tail-on aspect it drops down to 150 km. Stealth targets (RCS at 0.01 square meters) can be detected at 90 km range. Irbis-E is also capable of target identification, and can conduct simultaneous air-to-air and air-to-ground operations.
Su-35BM also has rearward radar system, to locate and track targets behind aircraft. Rear radar is located in tailcone. It’s still not known what system is going to use; Tikhomirov NIIP suggested it’s Osa type ESA radar for this task, but has also revealed it’s work on active-array radars that could fill this task, too. That information was given by NIIP to the public two years ago. The rear radar system is not something new for the Russian design bureaus; Su-35/T-10M features Phazotron N012 in the tailcone, MiG’s 1.42/1.44 MFI featured Phazotron N015, and the Su-34 Fullback features Leninets V005 tailcone radar system.
As every Russian 4th gen fighter has optronic infrared search and track system, Su-35BM will naturally feature that too. OLS-35 can track four different IR signatures at once. Maximum detection range for tail-on aspect is 90 km, and for head-on 50 km. The laser rangefinder can measure distance up to 20 km against aerial targets, and up to 30 km against ground based targets.
Electronic warfare system, the KNIRTI L175M Khibiny-M, is capable of accurate detection of the threats, threat coordinate mapping, and it’s also responsible for jamming signal generation and emmision replication/imitation, via wing-tip carried pods. The system has a separate display in the Su-35BM cockpit. The L175M, together with frontal and back radars and optronic complex is hooked up to “sensory fusion” package. Khibiny can also provide guidance for passive-radiation guided missiles, such as R-27EP and the new long-range type of AAM. Su-35BM also features approx. 150 aerials on it’s airframe. Apart from standard RWR (radar warning receiever), Su-35BM also has laser emission warning system, MAWS (missile approach warning system), and standard chaff / flare dispenser.
Powerful computer system will control all those sensory elements, giving information to the pilot in unique interface; via the two large LCD MFD’s found in cockpit, and shown in pilot’s helmet mounted display as well. Cockpit is summarized in MAK-35 system; two 22.5×30 cm AMLCD’s, IKSh-1M widescreen HUD, and one back-up multifunctional display. The nav / attack functions are the responsibilty of KRNPO-35, and the plane is fitted with laser-gyro system, LINS-2000.
The aircraft features inertial / sattelite navigation systems, radio navigation system, digital maps, optical fiber and digital communication multiplex comm systems. The comm system has two UHF/VHF radios, Link-16 capacity, and encryption capability. FBW has quadruple redundancy, and the engines support full authority digital engine control, FADEC.
Weapons :
Su-35BM, as an true multirole fighter, will have both air-to-air, air-to-ground, and anti-ship weaponry. Whole current pallete of A2G precision missiles and bombs will be supported on Su-35BM. Regarding air-to-air, the aircraft has an Archer, Alamo, and Adder family capability (R-73, R-27, R-77). Su-35BM will also be able to launch ultra-long range active radar missiles. The type of this weapon shown on the Su-35BM model was Novator KS-172S-1 AAM. The same missile has been presented on the displayed Su-35BM at MAKS 2007 airshow. The KS-172S-1 has an engagement range over 300 kilometers, can be used against any kind of aircraft flying from 3 meters altitude to 30 kilometers altitude, up to 4000 kilometers per hour of speed, and up to 12G. The only thing that’s confirmed is that Su-35BM will have ultralong range radar missile engagement capability; KS-172S-1 has not been asured. The other ULR AAM in Russian developement is Vympel K-37/R-37M. It’s an upgrade of MiG-31M’s R-37 missile, which has been sucessfully tested against targets 300 kilometers away.
Other Vympel’s designs are not confirmed either; such as ramjet, thermal, or antiradiation variant of R-77. This capability could be easily added at some future point. Vympel also stated that it has finished working on the upgraded variant of antiradiation R-27P. Since L175M is chosen for the standard electronic warfare module for all new Russian aircraft, R-27P could be connected to work in conjuction with Su-35BM’s EW unit. Both short and long burn variants of the antiradiation R-27, eg. the 27P and the 27EP, are on the payload list.
The misterious unspecified long-range anti-ground, anti-ship and anti-radar missiles are still a matter of debate, but several sources indicate that GRAU-coded 3M14AE and 3M54AE missiles are the unspecified weapons. Both missiles are produced by NPO Novator, and Sukhoi has a long tradition of partnership with this design bureau; this raises the issue of long-range AAM too, since Sukhoi is clearly pushing the Novator’s KS-172S-1 design, while the VVS wants Vympel’s R-37M for MiG-31 deep modernization variant. In any case, Russia won’t use two similiar types of AAM’s in the same time period, so the R-72 could be used for export, while the R-37M would be used on domestic version of Su-35BM.
3M14AE and 3M54AE are the missiles from “Kalibr” system, developed from naval “Club” system. The first is LACM, while the other is standard anti-ship missile. The unspecified anti-radar missile could turn up as new Raduga X-58UShE. It works in wide-band regime, and has a maximum range of 200 km. The sole-carried large ASM/AGM is suspected to be Yakhont-M, GRAU coded 3M55A. Yakhont-M is the upgraded export variant of P-800 Onyx missile. Original Onyx has the range of 300 km.
Su-35BM is also fitted with standard 30mm gun of Flanker family; Gryazev-Shipunov GSh-301.
Weapons [SIZE=-1]Novator R-72 (KS-172S-1) or Vympel R-37M (”Arrow”)[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]400 km range, active and semi-active radar, passive radiation guidance
Maximum of five carried. AAM.[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Vympel R-77 / RVV-AE (”Adder”)[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]100 km range, active radar guidance
Maximum of twelve carried. AAM.[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Vympel R-27ET[1] (”Alamo”)[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]110-130 km range, thermal guidance
Maximum of four carried. AAM.[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Vympel R-27EP[1] (”Alamo”)[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]110-130 km range, passive radiation guidance
Maximum of four carried. AAM.[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Vympel R-27ER[1] (”Alamo”)[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]110-130 km range, semi-active radar guidance
Maximum of eight carried. AAM.[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Vympel R-73E (”Archer”)[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]30 km range, thermal guidance
Maximum of six carried. AAM.[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1] [/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Non-specified ultralong range air to ground missile[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Maximum of one carried. AGM.[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Non-specified long range air to ground missile[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Maximum of three carried. AGM.[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Non-specified long range anti-radar missile[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Maximum of five carried. AGM.[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Non-specified long range air to ship missile[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Maximum of five carried. ASM.[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Raduga X-59M[K] Ovod (”Kazoo”)[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]140 km range, TV guidance
Maximum of 5 carried, AGM/ASM.[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Zvezda X-31A/P (”Krypton”)[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]70 / 140 km range, active radar / passive radiation guidance
Maximum of 6 carried, AGM.[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Molniya X-29TE[L] (”Kedge”)[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]10 km range, TV / laser guidance
Maximum of 6 carried, AGM.[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]FSUE LGB-250[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]300 kg warhead, laser guidance
Maximum of eight carried, smart bomb.[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]FSUE KAB-500KR/OD[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]500 kg warhead, TV guidance
Maximum of eight carried, smart bomb.
[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]FSUE KAB-1500KR/LG[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]1500 kg warhead, TV / laser guidance
Maximum of three carried, smart bomb.[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]S-25LD[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]10 km range, laser guidance
Maximum of six carried, guided rocket.[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]500kg class bomb[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Maximum of ten carried, gravity bomb.[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]250kg class bomb[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Maximum of thirty-two carried, gravity bomb.[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]B-8M-1[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Maximum of 120 carried in six dispensers, unguided rocket.[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]B-13L[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Maximum of 30 carried in six dispensers, unguided rocket.[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]S-250FM-PU[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]Maximum of six carried, unguided rocket.[/SIZE] Payload capacity from KnAAPO, weapon specs from various sources
لا يجب الاستغناء عن المقاتلات الصينيه فلها الاستخدام المناسب لها و ثق فى ان قادة قواتنا المسلحه يدرسون خطواتهم بدقه لا تمتلكها انت او اى احد منا فنحن هواه وهم محترفين هم من يضع تكتيكات القتال و يدرب عليها بناء على العلم الدقيق بكل صغيره و كبير لدى اسرائيل فلا تجهدوا انفسكم بالتخطيط من على الصطبه كما نقول بالعاميه و اطمئنوا
