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- 14 يونيو 2009
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رد: اخيرا وصلت مقاتلة الجيل الخامس الروسية
Sukhoi PAK FA: First Observations Part 1
By Sergio Coniglio
06:51 GMT, February 10, 2010 On 29 January 2010, the Sukhoi PAK-FA (Perspektivnyi Aviatsionnyi Kompleks Frontovoi Aviatsy, literally "Future Front line Aircraft System"), which could variously be described as a technology demonstrator, the first prototype of the future T-50 fighter, or an intermediate step between the two, took to the air for the first time from the freezing runway of Dzemgi Air Force Base (shared with the KnAAPO plant) at Komsomolsk-on-Amur in the Russian Far East Siberia (see also http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/497/). A fundamental step has at last been accomplished in the development of the long-expected Russian response to the American F-22 RAPTOR air dominance fighter.
The aircraft, with Sukhoi test pilot Sergey Bogdan in the cockpit, remained airborne for 47 minutes, enabling an initial evaluation of its controllability, engine performance and primary systems operation, including retraction and extraction of the landing gear. “The aircraft performed excellently at all flight-test points. It is easy and comfortable to pilot”, said Sergey Bogdan.
“Today we’ve embarked on an extensive flight test programme of the 5th generation fighter,” commented Mikhail Pogosyan, Sukhoi Company Director General. “This is a great success of both Russian science and design school. This achievement rests upon a cooperation team comprised of more than a hundred of our suppliers and strategic partners. The PAK FA programme advances Russian aeronautics together with allied industries to an entirely new technological level. These aircraft, together with upgraded 4th generation fighters will define Russian Air Force potential for the next decades.
“Sukhoi plans to further elaborate on the PAK FA programme which will involve our Indian partners”, Mr Pogosyan added. “I am strongly convinced that our joint project will excel its Western rivals in cost-effectiveness and will not only allow strengthening the defence power of Russian and Indian Air Forces, but also gain a significant share of the world market”.
Some Russian sources have suggested that the T-50 will enter service in 2015 (e.g. Russian 5th-generation fighter deliveries delayed until 2015), but this is but wishful thinking. Only another flyable PAK FA prototype and a ground test item exist thus far, while Sukhoi has indicated they will complete five prototypes for initial testing. These are scheduled for completion in 2011-12, with the company expecting to then produce an initial batch of pre-series aircraft for operational trials by 2015. A more credible projected IOC date for the T-50 would thus be towards the end of the decade - i.e. some 12-15 years after the F-22. Such a delay would be roughly in line when not with the scientific and technological potential of the Russian aerospace industry, then certainly with the Russian MoD’s financial muscle and the irredeemable time loss of the “black years” following the collapse of the USSR. There are persistent rumours of the PAK FA programme being largely financed directly by Sukhoi (some 75%, with the remaining 25% being provided by India), and in any case it is quite obvious that it could only progress thanks to the substantial revenues from export sales of Su-27/-30s.
Much has already been written and speculated about this first Russian 5th combat aircraft, but virtually nothing is known for certain. The few photos and the couple of videos documenting the first flight are all that is available for a first assessment of the aircraft’s characteristics, analysing its overall external configuration and trying to deduct the Russian Air Force’s requirements on which the PAK FA design can be assumed to be tailored.
Operational Considerations
As expected, the twin-engine PAK FA is a large aircraft, with roughly the same physical size and weight class as the Su-27/-30 family it is aimed to replace. The aircraft’s general configuration strongly suggests a design optimised primarily for the air superiority role, even though the T-50 will almost certainly eventually go along the same road as the Su-27 and evolve into a very capable multirole fighter-bomber. This emphasis on air-to-air combat is arguably due to both the Russian Air Force perceiving its main roles in a very different way than the USAF, and the fact that the Service’s deep strike requirements are satisfactorily covered by the very capable (although admittedly not stealthy) Su-34s currently being delivered.
Even though it is nearly automatic to think of the PAK FA/T-50 in terms of a direct confrontation vs. the F-22, and this may indeed have been the original goal when the programme was first launched in the late 1980s, in the current global strategic scenario it is perhaps more likely that the Russians are rather interested in maintaining an air superiority edge over China’s current J-11s/SU-27s/-30s and future J-12. Also, the expected future worldwide usage of the F-35 JSF attack aircraft with its low observability qualities requires an interceptor capable to deal with this peculiar threat.
Further considerations can be done as regards the expected future place of the T-50 in the Russian Air Force’s inventory, and thus the overall combat aircraft programmes in Russia. When first information on the PAK FA project started to circulate, the programme was widely reported to be intended to replace both the Su-27 and the MiG-29, thus leading to a single-type combat aircraft fleet not unlike the French Air Force’s with its RAFALE. Whether this was purely “disinformacija”, or the Russians were actually planning in that direction back then, it is impossible to ascertain. The fact is, the T-50 given its size and expected avionics complexity will most definitely be an expensive aircraft both to procure and operate, and it is very difficult to imagine how the Russian Air Force could ever be able to acquire it in large number - not to mention the type, for all of Mr Pogosyan’s rosy forecast, having a rather limited potential export market. Current Western and unofficial Russian estimates are of a production run of some 250 aircraft for the Russian Air Force, and even this may prove to be overoptimistic. The combination of the T-50 as the spearhead of a tactical combat fleet composed largely by modernised 4th generation types, as suggested by Mr. Pogosyan, does certainly make sense - but it is rather doubtful whether it could really last for “decades”, apart from the Su-35. Also, the upgrade programmes currently underway do not involve the MiG-29.
Hence, and although the notion of the Russian MoD and national industry being able to sustain the simultaneous development and eventual procurement of t w o different 5th generation fighters does admittedly defy imagination, the eventual launch of a programme for a smaller and less expensive “lo” fighter in a “hi/lo” mix with the T-50 looks virtually compulsory. Failing to do so would leave the Russian Air Force critically crippled in quantitative terms, and would consign the future export market for “affordable” fighter aircraft to Western and Chinese designs.
Sukhoi PAK FA: First Observations Part 1
By Sergio Coniglio
06:51 GMT, February 10, 2010 On 29 January 2010, the Sukhoi PAK-FA (Perspektivnyi Aviatsionnyi Kompleks Frontovoi Aviatsy, literally "Future Front line Aircraft System"), which could variously be described as a technology demonstrator, the first prototype of the future T-50 fighter, or an intermediate step between the two, took to the air for the first time from the freezing runway of Dzemgi Air Force Base (shared with the KnAAPO plant) at Komsomolsk-on-Amur in the Russian Far East Siberia (see also http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/497/). A fundamental step has at last been accomplished in the development of the long-expected Russian response to the American F-22 RAPTOR air dominance fighter.
The aircraft, with Sukhoi test pilot Sergey Bogdan in the cockpit, remained airborne for 47 minutes, enabling an initial evaluation of its controllability, engine performance and primary systems operation, including retraction and extraction of the landing gear. “The aircraft performed excellently at all flight-test points. It is easy and comfortable to pilot”, said Sergey Bogdan.
“Today we’ve embarked on an extensive flight test programme of the 5th generation fighter,” commented Mikhail Pogosyan, Sukhoi Company Director General. “This is a great success of both Russian science and design school. This achievement rests upon a cooperation team comprised of more than a hundred of our suppliers and strategic partners. The PAK FA programme advances Russian aeronautics together with allied industries to an entirely new technological level. These aircraft, together with upgraded 4th generation fighters will define Russian Air Force potential for the next decades.
“Sukhoi plans to further elaborate on the PAK FA programme which will involve our Indian partners”, Mr Pogosyan added. “I am strongly convinced that our joint project will excel its Western rivals in cost-effectiveness and will not only allow strengthening the defence power of Russian and Indian Air Forces, but also gain a significant share of the world market”.
Some Russian sources have suggested that the T-50 will enter service in 2015 (e.g. Russian 5th-generation fighter deliveries delayed until 2015), but this is but wishful thinking. Only another flyable PAK FA prototype and a ground test item exist thus far, while Sukhoi has indicated they will complete five prototypes for initial testing. These are scheduled for completion in 2011-12, with the company expecting to then produce an initial batch of pre-series aircraft for operational trials by 2015. A more credible projected IOC date for the T-50 would thus be towards the end of the decade - i.e. some 12-15 years after the F-22. Such a delay would be roughly in line when not with the scientific and technological potential of the Russian aerospace industry, then certainly with the Russian MoD’s financial muscle and the irredeemable time loss of the “black years” following the collapse of the USSR. There are persistent rumours of the PAK FA programme being largely financed directly by Sukhoi (some 75%, with the remaining 25% being provided by India), and in any case it is quite obvious that it could only progress thanks to the substantial revenues from export sales of Su-27/-30s.
Much has already been written and speculated about this first Russian 5th combat aircraft, but virtually nothing is known for certain. The few photos and the couple of videos documenting the first flight are all that is available for a first assessment of the aircraft’s characteristics, analysing its overall external configuration and trying to deduct the Russian Air Force’s requirements on which the PAK FA design can be assumed to be tailored.
Operational Considerations
As expected, the twin-engine PAK FA is a large aircraft, with roughly the same physical size and weight class as the Su-27/-30 family it is aimed to replace. The aircraft’s general configuration strongly suggests a design optimised primarily for the air superiority role, even though the T-50 will almost certainly eventually go along the same road as the Su-27 and evolve into a very capable multirole fighter-bomber. This emphasis on air-to-air combat is arguably due to both the Russian Air Force perceiving its main roles in a very different way than the USAF, and the fact that the Service’s deep strike requirements are satisfactorily covered by the very capable (although admittedly not stealthy) Su-34s currently being delivered.
Even though it is nearly automatic to think of the PAK FA/T-50 in terms of a direct confrontation vs. the F-22, and this may indeed have been the original goal when the programme was first launched in the late 1980s, in the current global strategic scenario it is perhaps more likely that the Russians are rather interested in maintaining an air superiority edge over China’s current J-11s/SU-27s/-30s and future J-12. Also, the expected future worldwide usage of the F-35 JSF attack aircraft with its low observability qualities requires an interceptor capable to deal with this peculiar threat.
Further considerations can be done as regards the expected future place of the T-50 in the Russian Air Force’s inventory, and thus the overall combat aircraft programmes in Russia. When first information on the PAK FA project started to circulate, the programme was widely reported to be intended to replace both the Su-27 and the MiG-29, thus leading to a single-type combat aircraft fleet not unlike the French Air Force’s with its RAFALE. Whether this was purely “disinformacija”, or the Russians were actually planning in that direction back then, it is impossible to ascertain. The fact is, the T-50 given its size and expected avionics complexity will most definitely be an expensive aircraft both to procure and operate, and it is very difficult to imagine how the Russian Air Force could ever be able to acquire it in large number - not to mention the type, for all of Mr Pogosyan’s rosy forecast, having a rather limited potential export market. Current Western and unofficial Russian estimates are of a production run of some 250 aircraft for the Russian Air Force, and even this may prove to be overoptimistic. The combination of the T-50 as the spearhead of a tactical combat fleet composed largely by modernised 4th generation types, as suggested by Mr. Pogosyan, does certainly make sense - but it is rather doubtful whether it could really last for “decades”, apart from the Su-35. Also, the upgrade programmes currently underway do not involve the MiG-29.
Hence, and although the notion of the Russian MoD and national industry being able to sustain the simultaneous development and eventual procurement of t w o different 5th generation fighters does admittedly defy imagination, the eventual launch of a programme for a smaller and less expensive “lo” fighter in a “hi/lo” mix with the T-50 looks virtually compulsory. Failing to do so would leave the Russian Air Force critically crippled in quantitative terms, and would consign the future export market for “affordable” fighter aircraft to Western and Chinese designs.
