افضل مقاتلة لمصر ؟

[acme]

رد: افضل مقاتلة لمصر ؟

الباك فا اذا ظهرت للوجود

او اف 22 اذا افرجت عنها امريكا و ازالت الحظر عليها

 

[Mig-25PD]

رد: افضل مقاتلة لمصر ؟

افضل مقاتله لمصر او لاي دوله عربيه هي طائره تصنع محليا ....؟؟تماما كما تفعل الهند والصين ...غير ذلك سنبقى دائما نلهث وراء غيرنا ....ولهذا ج ف-17 برايي الافضل لمصر لتبدا المشروع عليها ...

أوافقك الرأي ولكن مثل هذا المشروع الضخم يحتاج لوقت طويل جداً والمشكلة ان مصر ستخرج الميج-21 من الخدمة قريباً فيجب سد هذه الفجوة بأسرع وقت لذلك لو راجعت ردي السابق ارى ان الحصول على الميج-29 اس ام تي وفي نفس الوقت التباحث مع الصينيين او الباكستانيين في نقل تكنولوجية الجي اف-17 وصنعها بمصر .
الميج-29 اس ام تي هي ارخص المقاتلات المعروضة حالياً ويجب أخذ الإقتصاد المصري في الحسبان خصوصاً انه يجب شرائها بكميات كبيرة ، كما ان الميج-29 رغم رخص سعرها هي قوية بما يكفي لحماية سماء مصر خصوصاً اذا سلحت بالآر-77 .

 

[Ak]

رد: افضل مقاتلة لمصر ؟

لماذا لم تدرج الـسو 35 في الخيارات ..؟؟؟؟؟؟؟؟؟؟؟؟؟؟؟؟

لكني صوت على الرافييل لكونها هيا والتايفون وقبلهم السو 35 .. قادرين على الأف 35 ...​

ملحوظه / لو كان تم إدراج السو 35 في الخيارات لكنت قمت بالتصويت علها بدون تردد .​

انت سألت وجاوبت على نفسك لما قلت هتختارها بدون تردد وعلشان كده انا لم اضع العمالقة سوخوى 35 واف 35 لان اولا هيتم اختيارهم بدون تردد وثانيا زى ما انا قلت فى اول الموضوع احنا هنا بنصوت للمقاتلات اللى ممكن نجيب منها كميات كبيرة جدا لتعويض الخارج من الخدمة اوكى ؟

 

[riman]

رد: افضل مقاتلة لمصر ؟

تصنيع مقاتلة سياخذ وقتا ليظهر الي النور

لكن الان يجب البحث عن مقاتلة علي الاقل توصف بانها محترمة

و علي هذا فالرافال افضل

لان السوخوي 35 طلباتها الاولي محجوزة للقوات الجوية الروسية و ستاخذ وقتا هي الاخري حتي تاتي لمصر اذا تم التعاقد عليها

 

[BERKUT_SU]

رد: افضل مقاتلة لمصر ؟

أوافقك الرأي ولكن مثل هذا المشروع الضخم يحتاج لوقت طويل جداً والمشكلة ان مصر ستخرج الميج-21 من الخدمة قريباً فيجب سد هذه الفجوة بأسرع وقت لذلك لو راجعت ردي السابق ارى ان الحصول على الميج-29 اس ام تي وفي نفس الوقت التباحث مع الصينيين او الباكستانيين في نقل تكنولوجية الجي اف-17 وصنعها بمصر .
الميج-29 اس ام تي هي ارخص المقاتلات المعروضة حالياً ويجب أخذ الإقتصاد المصري في الحسبان خصوصاً انه يجب شرائها بكميات كبيرة ، كما ان الميج-29 رغم رخص سعرها هي قوية بما يكفي لحماية سماء مصر خصوصاً اذا سلحت بالآر-77 .

الميج-29 لا تستطيع مواجهة ف-35 الاسرائيليه اولا لاسباب كثيره والسوخوي افضل منها في هذا الامر

ثانيا الميج-29 و مثلها الاف16 طائرات صغيره لا تتحمل تطورات كثيره مستقبلا

ثالثا : انا قلت السو-35 بجانب مشروع الطائره الصينيه ....وانا قلت السو-35 وليس الرافال لان تسليح السوخوي مصمم للقتال ضد الطائرات الامريكيه بشكل اساسي وهو تسليح ممتاز .

رابعا بالنسبه لكلام الاخت ريمان فان السو-30 يمكن تطويرها الى مستوى اعلى ممتاز لكن انا قلت سو-35 اختصارا للكلام.....

خامسا : الميج-29 مصممه كطائرة اعتراض اساسا اما سو-30\35 فهي متعددة الاغراض اساسا وهذا ليس عيبا لكن يجب ان يعطى كل شيء حقه ....اي لا يمكن جعل ميج-29 عامود فقرى لسلاح جوي مهما كانت ممتازه هذه الطائره

سادسا : لا تفكر ابدا اخي بموضوع سعر طائره ابدا عندما بتعلق الامر بالامن القومي ...ستذهل لو تعرف مثلا حقيقة سعر القاذفه الامريكيه ب-2 ههههههههه اي ان مصر او اي بلد عربي لن يتردد في شراء اسلحه ثمينه عند الضروره وسترى ما اقصد لاحقا عند اقتراب وصول ف-35 لاسرائيل ...لكن الافضل البدء بمشروع مقاتله حتى لو كانت طائره شراعيه ....المهم الخطوه الاولى ..لاحقا يتم تراكم الخبره لانتاج طائرات افضل ...

 

[Ak]

رد: افضل مقاتلة لمصر ؟

سادسا : لا تفكر ابدا اخي بموضوع سعر طائره ابدا عندما بتعلق الامر بالامن القومي ...ستذهل لو تعرف مثلا حقيقة سعر القاذفه الامريكيه ب-2 ههههههههه اي ان مصر او اي بلد عربي لن يتردد في شراء اسلحه ثمينه عند الضروره وسترى ما اقصد لاحقا عند اقتراب وصول ف-35 لاسرائيل ...لكن الافضل البدء بمشروع مقاتله حتى لو كانت طائره شراعيه ....المهم الخطوه الاولى ..لاحقا يتم تراكم الخبره لانتاج طائرات افضل ...

اخى اختلف معك تماما اولا لان مصر غير الدول التانية حيث ان تعداد سكان مصر حوالى 82 مليون ومصر محتاجة مشروعات ضخمة جدا تستنفذ جزء كبير من دخل مصر وطبعا اى صفقة عسكرية لازم يدخل فيها التكلفة بدليل ان اسرائيل بقى لها سنييييييين طويلة متفوقة تماما فى الجو واحنا ولا اشترينا طائرة واحدة ممكن انها تواجه الاكتساح الاسرائيلى ده وطبعا الكلام اللى قلته فى الاول ده هو اللى بيقوله المسئولين ان مفيش فلوس وعلشان المشروعات ...." قال فيه مشروعات يعنى !!!:hlp[1]:" .

 

[BERKUT_SU]

رد: افضل مقاتلة لمصر ؟

اخى اختلف معك تماما اولا لان مصر غير الدول التانية حيث ان تعداد سكان مصر حوالى 82 مليون ومصر محتاجة مشروعات ضخمة جدا تستنفذ جزء كبير من دخل مصر وطبعا اى صفقة عسكرية لازم يدخل فيها التكلفة بدليل ان اسرائيل بقى لها سنييييييين طويلة متفوقة تماما فى الجو واحنا ولا اشترينا طائرة واحدة ممكن انها تواجه الاكتساح الاسرائيلى ده وطبعا الكلام اللى قلته فى الاول ده هو اللى بيقوله المسئولين ان مفيش فلوس وعلشان المشروعات ...." قال فيه مشروعات يعنى !!!:hlp[1]:" .

To keep eyes away

 

[Ak]

رد: افضل مقاتلة لمصر ؟

To keep eyes away

اتمنى ان كلامك يطلع صح وما يطلع مثل عبد الحكيم عامر قبل 67 وكله تمام ياريس وعندنا مفاجأت وهنقطعهم ونهايتنا كانت :inv[1]:

 

[ابو ناصر]

رد: افضل مقاتلة لمصر ؟

انا ارى ان المناسب لمصر هي السوخوي 30 او الرافال

وكل التوفيق لشقيقة مصر​

 

[Ak]

رد: افضل مقاتلة لمصر ؟

يا جماعة مكتوب ان سعر Mig 29 SMT خمسة وسبعين مليون دولار معقولة !!ومش مكتوب جنب السعر ان المعلومة ده محتاجة مصدر يعنى المعلومة ده بمصدر فعلا

ليس لديك تصريح لمشاهدة الرابط، فضلا قم ب تسجيل الدخول او تسجيل

 

[Mig-25PD]

رد: افضل مقاتلة لمصر ؟

خمسة وسبعين مليون دولار مستحيل !!! اكيد هناك خطأ في المعلومة فالميج-29 هي الأرخص في المقاتلات الروسية الحديثة ولو وصلت لهذا السعر فالأفضل هي السوخوي-30 فهي حسب نفس الموقع (الوكيبيدا) يتراوح سعرها ما بين 33 إلى 40 مليون دولار .

 

[BERKUT_SU]

رد: افضل مقاتلة لمصر ؟

اخى اختلف معك تماما اولا لان مصر غير الدول التانية حيث ان تعداد سكان مصر حوالى 82 مليون ومصر محتاجة مشروعات ضخمة جدا تستنفذ جزء كبير من دخل مصر وطبعا اى صفقة عسكرية لازم يدخل فيها التكلفة بدليل ان اسرائيل بقى لها سنييييييين طويلة متفوقة تماما فى الجو واحنا ولا اشترينا طائرة واحدة ممكن انها تواجه الاكتساح الاسرائيلى ده وطبعا الكلام اللى قلته فى الاول ده هو اللى بيقوله المسئولين ان مفيش فلوس وعلشان المشروعات ...." قال فيه مشروعات يعنى !!!:hlp[1]:" .

اخي اسرائيل تتفوق منذ زمن ولليوم على مصر عسكريا ...لكن هناك نقطه يغفلها الكثير من الاخوه الذين يطالبون بشراء ميج اوز سوخوي اورافال او باك فا او ف22 والنقطه هي مايلي :

الوضع الحالي بين مصر واسرائيل يميل لاسرائيل ميلا كبيرا ولكن لن يصل الى مستوى ساحق لانه ببساطه مصر ستقاتل بشكل دفاعي ضد ف15 و ف16 --وعندها ستكون هناك خسائر بنسبه عاليه للمصريين لمصلحة اسرائيل ...لكن عند دخول ف-35 وهي مخصصه ضد الدفاعات الجويه والاهداف الارضيه بشكل خاص فان قتالها سيكون بشكل اساسي لتدمير الدفاعات الجويه المصريه كونها طائره خفيه باقل خسائر ممكنه حيث لا يبدو ان هناك طريقه موثوقه لدى مصر للتصدي لها ....ومصر لن تستطيع تحمل الخسائر في هذه الحاله وسيكون تفوق ساحق لاسرائيلخصوصا مع الطائرات بدون طيار المسلحه تسليحا قويا ....وهنا مصر لن تقف كالمتفرج عند دخول ف-35 لانه خطر كبير على امنها ...اما بميزان القوى الحالي صحيح انه يميل لاسرائيل لكن ليس لدرجة ساحقه ...اي بالنهايه س-400 او سو- 35 او الاثنين معا سيكون ضروريا جدا ولا مجال للتهاون بالامر لانه ببساطه سيكون هذه المره الدفاع الجوي على المحك وليس فقط سلاح الجو المصري اي انك تخاطر بجيش كامل وليس فقط احتمال خسارة جوله جويه او عدة مقاتلات

 

[redcrash]

رد: افضل مقاتلة لمصر ؟

أخي اشرف كلام لا غبار عليه بخصوص بعض المقاتلات مثل الميج و الاف 16 خصوصا كون الكيان يملك افضل النسخ من الاف 16 والتي ستحال الى الخط الثاني بعد دخول الاف 35 .
لكني اود ان اعلق على نقطة قللت انت من شأنها وهو السعر .
أخي نخن نتكلم عن مصر وليس دول الخليج فمثال بسيط جدا .
الكيان سيحصل على 75 طائرة اف 35 إضافة الى مايملك من الاف 16 والاف 15 .
مصر تمتلك بضعة طائرات قادرة على قتالها و هي حقيقة ربما لا يتجاوز العدد 24 طائرة اف 16 .
هنا يغيب التافوء العددي الذي سيكون اهم شيئ .
أذا كيف ستعوض مصر ؟
لنفرض ان مصر ستدخل فقط 50 طائرة و لتكن الرفال مثلا .
ثمن طائرة الرفال الواحدة 80 مليون دولار مع التسليح ثمنها 120 مليون دولار .
لناخد بالوسط 100 مليون ل 50 طائرة ستكلف مصر 5 مليارات دولار .. هل مصر جاهزة لدفع هذا المبلغ ؟؟؟
أعتقد انه مستحيل .
طبعا بدون الولوج للشروط الفرنسية التي ستجعلها طائرات للعرض الارضي فقط .
نذهب للخيار الثاني و هو السو 35 .... لا اعرف سعرها بالتحديد لكن لنظع سعر منطقي للسو 30 .
السو 30 مع كامل تجهيزها حوالي 50-45 مليون دولار مع بعض الأضافة يترفع الرقم " مثلا كلفت السخوي الجزائرية حوالي 63 مليون دولار مع التسليح و التجهيز " بدون الصيانة و التدريب " يعني سعر الطائرة فقط مع التسليح .
لو فرضنا ان سعرها 50 مليون مع التسليح فسعر 50 طائرة هو 2.5 مليار دولار " طبعا سعر السو 35 حسب علمي بدون تسليح بحدود 60 مليون ".... فهل مصر مستعدة لدفع مبلغ 2.5 مليار دولار من اجل 50 سو 30 ؟؟
وبالمقابل هل ممكن ل 50 طائرة ان تحقق الكثير لمصر مقابل اكثر من 200 طائرة صهيونية ممتازة التجهيز + الاف 35 ؟

أعتقد ان المعادلة المصرية صعبة جدا وهذا ما يفسر تأخر المصرين كثيرا في تطوير سلاح الجو لذيهم لان اي مغامرة في محاولة كسر الهوة بينهم وبين الصهاينة يتحول الاقتصاد المصري الى خراب .

الدفاع الجوي أيضا مكلف جدا فإدخال انظمة دفاع جوي مثل الاس 300/400 ليس سهلا ابدا خصوصا ان التعامل مع الصهاينة من بناب الدفاع الجوي الارضي أمر مستحيل , و لمجابهة الصهاينة بالجو يجب ضمان على الاقل تقليل فاعليته من قبل الطيران قبل أن يحين و قت تدخل الدفاعات الارضية .

أعتقد ان الخيارات المصرية محدودة جدا .... اما شراء طائرات ممتازة وبسعر مرتفع جدا واعداد قليلة أو شراء طائارت بأعداد كبيرة ورخسية مثل الصينية لكن بفاعلية قليلة جداااااااا.
​

 

[BERKUT_SU]

رد: افضل مقاتلة لمصر ؟

أخي اشرف كلام لا غبار عليه بخصوص بعض المقاتلات مثل الميج و الاف 16 خصوصا كون الكيان يملك افضل النسخ من الاف 16 والتي ستحال الى الخط الثاني بعد دخول الاف 35 .
لكني اود ان اعلق على نقطة قللت انت من شأنها وهو السعر .
أخي نخن نتكلم عن مصر وليس دول الخليج فمثال بسيط جدا .
الكيان سيحصل على 75 طائرة اف 35 إضافة الى مايملك من الاف 16 والاف 15 .
مصر تمتلك بضعة طائرات قادرة على قتالها و هي حقيقة ربما لا يتجاوز العدد 24 طائرة اف 16 .
هنا يغيب التافوء العددي الذي سيكون اهم شيئ .
أذا كيف ستعوض مصر ؟
لنفرض ان مصر ستدخل فقط 50 طائرة و لتكن الرفال مثلا .
ثمن طائرة الرفال الواحدة 80 مليون دولار مع التسليح ثمنها 120 مليون دولار .
لناخد بالوسط 100 مليون ل 50 طائرة ستكلف مصر 5 مليارات دولار .. هل مصر جاهزة لدفع هذا المبلغ ؟؟؟
أعتقد انه مستحيل .
طبعا بدون الولوج للشروط الفرنسية التي ستجعلها طائرات للعرض الارضي فقط .
نذهب للخيار الثاني و هو السو 35 .... لا اعرف سعرها بالتحديد لكن لنظع سعر منطقي للسو 30 .
السو 30 مع كامل تجهيزها حوالي 50-45 مليون دولار مع بعض الأضافة يترفع الرقم " مثلا كلفت السخوي الجزائرية حوالي 63 مليون دولار مع التسليح و التجهيز " بدون الصيانة و التدريب " يعني سعر الطائرة فقط مع التسليح .
لو فرضنا ان سعرها 50 مليون مع التسليح فسعر 50 طائرة هو 2.5 مليار دولار " طبعا سعر السو 35 حسب علمي بدون تسليح بحدود 60 مليون ".... فهل مصر مستعدة لدفع مبلغ 2.5 مليار دولار من اجل 50 سو 30 ؟؟
وبالمقابل هل ممكن ل 50 طائرة ان تحقق الكثير لمصر مقابل اكثر من 200 طائرة صهيونية ممتازة التجهيز + الاف 35 ؟

أعتقد ان المعادلة المصرية صعبة جدا وهذا ما يفسر تأخر المصرين كثيرا في تطوير سلاح الجو لذيهم لان اي مغامرة في محاولة كسر الهوة بينهم وبين الصهاينة يتحول الاقتصاد المصري الى خراب .

الدفاع الجوي أيضا مكلف جدا فإدخال انظمة دفاع جوي مثل الاس 300/400 ليس سهلا ابدا خصوصا ان التعامل مع الصهاينة من بناب الدفاع الجوي الارضي أمر مستحيل , و لمجابهة الصهاينة بالجو يجب ضمان على الاقل تقليل فاعليته من قبل الطيران قبل أن يحين و قت تدخل الدفاعات الارضية .

أعتقد ان الخيارات المصرية محدودة جدا .... اما شراء طائرات ممتازة وبسعر مرتفع جدا واعداد قليلة أو شراء طائارت بأعداد كبيرة ورخسية مثل الصينية لكن بفاعلية قليلة جداااااااا.
​

Which u prefer to lose a war and all u build or to get assistance and loans or even giveup important growth plans and provide cash 4 weapons?

 

[redcrash]

رد: افضل مقاتلة لمصر ؟

Which u prefer to lose a war and all u build or to get assistance and loans or even giveup important growth plans and provide cash 4 weapons?

:nunu[1]: يعني تريد ان تجعل الشعب يضيع من اجل سواد عيون الجيش الصهيوني و إستعراض العضلات .!!!!
هناك شيئ أهملته في تفسيرك " الحرب قد تكون او لا تكون ".
فعلى مصر اذا المخاطرة بقسم ميزاينة التنمية مع الجيش لسبب قد لا يوجد ؟؟
و اذا لم تفعل و قامت حرب لن يكون هناك وقت للندم او التجهيز ؟؟

هذه أكبر مشكلة ستعاني منها مصر والخيار صعب .
:leb[1]:
وطبع لا احد يقول نحن اخوة وسنساعد مصر :12[1]: فهي لن تجد مساعدة من اي دولة الله اذا قامت الحرب فعليا " وانا متأكد انه لن يتدخل احد من العرب ".

:nunu[1]::nunu[1]::nunu[1]::nunu[1]:
أو انك ناسي ان ميزانية مصر محدودة وليست دولة غنية مثل الخليج .
!!! ولذيها مشاريع تنموية اهم بكثير من محاولة الامساك بالسحب ؟؟؟
​

 

[BERKUT_SU]

رد: افضل مقاتلة لمصر ؟

:nunu[1]: يعني تريد ان تجعل الشعب يضيع من اجل سواد عيون الجيش الصهيوني و إستعراض العضلات .!!!!
هناك شيئ أهملته في تفسيرك " الحرب قد تكون او لا تكون ".
فعلى مصر اذا المخاطرة بقسم ميزاينة التنمية مع الجيش لسبب قد لا يوجد ؟؟
و اذا لم تفعل و قامت حرب لن يكون هناك وقت للندم او التجهيز ؟؟

هذه أكبر مشكلة ستعاني منها مصر والخيار صعب .
:leb[1]:
وطبع لا احد يقول نحن اخوة وسنساعد مصر :12[1]: فهي لن تجد مساعدة من اي دولة الله اذا قامت الحرب فعليا " وانا متأكد انه لن يتدخل احد من العرب ".

:nunu[1]::nunu[1]::nunu[1]::nunu[1]:
أو انك ناسي ان ميزانية مصر محدودة وليست دولة غنية مثل الخليج .
!!! ولذيها مشاريع تنموية اهم بكثير من محاولة الامساك بالسحب ؟؟؟
​

لا احد سيضيع اخي اولا اذا تسلحت مصر بل على العكس ستصيع اذا لم تتسلح خصوصا انك امام عدو لا يؤمن الا بالقوه ولا يؤمن له جانب

ثانيا التسليح سيكون لسواد عيون الامن القومي المصري وليس من اجل اسرائيل او استعراض العضلات والموضوع اكبر من عرض عضلات كما تقول ..... هل تعلم كم تصرف روسيا على التسلح مع ان دخل المواطن فيها لا يماثل شيء من دخل المواطن في امريكا ؟

ثالثا انا لم اهمل شي في تفسيري لان التسلح دائما باتي بناءا على حالة الحرب او اللاحرب ولا يكون عندما تبدا الحرب لانك تكون خسرتها مقدما

رابعا : انت تتكلم وكان مصر دوله مفلسه لا تمتلك ميزانيه عسكريه وهذا اكبر وهم ...مصر لا تريد ان تصبح هدفا للاعلام الذي يمثل اي دوله تتسلح بانها رابع اكبر جيش في العالم وانه يريد تدمير اسرائيل وحرق نصفها او ربعها حسب مزاجهم هههههه لهذا سترى ان الموضوع لن يقف عند ف16 بعد فتره لكن هذا هو العمل السليم ان تنتظر صاحب الدعايه للتسلح اولا حتى لا تتسلط عليك الاضواء وتصبح مثل هتلر .....

 

[ilove_egypt]

رد: افضل مقاتلة لمصر ؟

Egypt's Defense Expenditures:
$2.7 Billion or $14 Billion?​

A cursory review of the official published figures of Egypt’s military expenditures indicate that there exists serious anomalies between the decade-long Egyptian arms buildup and its officially stated annual defense budget.52 Official figures of Egyptian defense expenditures have reflected a dramatic decline in its yearly defense budget. However, contemporaneous with its declining expenditures, Egypt has been in the midst of transforming its military from a 1970s Soviet-based military to a modern 1990s Western-based military. For example, in 1985 only 20% of Egyptian armor and some 50% of Egyptian aircraft were of Western origin. Today, over 85% of Egyptian armor and almost 85% of Egyptian aircraft are from the West.

This presents a serious anomaly since militaries generally experience increased costs during transition periods, as more funds are needed for training, familiarization, and maintenance costs. In this respect, it is worth noting that Egypt is not only absorbing Western equipment but is also adapting Western war-fighting doctrines and command and control techniques. Consequently, it is incongruous to believe that a country can transform a military consisting of: over 440,000 personnel, 3,500 Main Battle Tanks, and over 550 Combat Aircraft, in so dramatic a fashion, while simultaneously reducing its expenditures by over 60%. This is especially true of a third-world country lacking a history of fiducial discipline and one that is hardly imbued with the traditions of thrift and efficiency when it comes to its bureaucracy.

While ascertaining accurate Egyptian annual defense expenditures is a challenging task, given the unavailability of accurate data from the host country, it is by no means impossible. Given the relative availability of open sources in the West, it is possible to obtain general information on the Operational and Maintenance (O&M) costs incurred in training, fielding, and sustaining various military units.53 From this information, it is possible to extrapolate how much it would cost Egypt to construct, train, field, and sustain its military.

While this analysis is far from precise, given the enormous cultural and political discrepancies that would cause deviations in the amount devoted toward maintenance and training, it is far more accurate than relying on official published figures. This is due to the relative stability in what a supplier or manufacturer charges for consumable and repair parts. Indeed, if anything, the cost to a third-world country to maintain its equipment should be incrementally higher since the part in question is subject to a myriad of additional costs associated with importing the component. This chapter analyzes the costs involved to field, train, and maintain a military of the quality and quantitative size, as that of Egypt, in an attempt to ascertain a more accurate estimate of yearly Egyptian military expenditures.

ARMY

Heavy Divisions

Egypt currently fields and maintains four active armored divisions and eight mechanized divisions. The majority of the hardware of these weapons are US made M-60 Al/3s tanks, MJAl tanks, and M-113 armored personnel carriers. According to a published Total Force Policy Report to the Congress (December 31, 1990), the annual cost to field and maintain an active US Army Armored/Mechanized division is $976 million dollars.54 Of this amount, yearly operational costs for the armored division are $146 million and for the mechanized division $140.3 million.55 An additional $175 million is spent on equipment avg./yr., and the remaining funds are associated personnel costs (military pay, family housing, etc.). A more detailed breakdown of the yearly operational costs are as follows:

Armored Division
Mechanized Division

Consumables
$48.962
$47.995

Reparables
$70.266
$65.267

POL
$ 5.651
$ 5.470

Indirect
$21.152
$21.609

$146.031
$140.341


Source: Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. Cost figures are in millions.

This would put Egypt’s yearly operational costs for maintaining its four armored and eight mechanized divisions at $584.1 million and $1,122.7 million respectively Consequently the total yearly operational costs for Egypt to maintain its heavy divisions would be $1,706.8 million or 46.3% of Egypt’s total officially reported annual defense expenditures. Additionally, the annual cost for equipment avg./yr. per heavy division is $185 million or a total of $2,220 million for Egypt’s 12 heavy divisions.56 This puts the total annual costs of maintaining Egypt’s 12 heavy divisions at $3,926.8 million (excluding personnel costs) or 133% of Egypt’s total officially reported annual defense expenditures.

Additionally, Egypt maintains the equivalent of at least one additional armored and mechanized division in the form of independent brigades. These include a Republican Guard armored brigade, two armored brigades, and four mechanized brigades. Moreover, the overall costs associated with these units are approximately 30% higher given their independent command structure.57 Consequently, the addition of these two divisions adds approximately $853 million to the total costs for Egypt to maintain its heavy forces. These additions put the total annual costs of maintaining Egypt’s heavy forces at $4,779.8 million (excluding personnel costs).

Light/Airborne Divisions

In addition to its heavy divisions, Egypt also fields the equivalent of two more divisions in the form of three independent infantry brigades, 2 airmobile brigades and a parachute brigade. According to a March 4, 1997, Department of Defense information paper submitted to the House National Security Committee, the yearly operating costs for infantry divisions are as follows: Light Infantry Division ($583 million); Airborne Division ($733 million), Air Assault Division ($951 million).

As with the heavy units, the majority of expenditures, approximately 65%, are derived from direct personnel (military pay, housing, travel, etc.) expenses. After deducting the personnel expenses we are left with the following yearly operating costs: Light Infantry Division ($204 million), Airborne Division ($256.5 million), Air Assault Division ($332.8 million).

However, since Egypt maintains these units in the form of independent brigades, the costs associated in maintaining these units are approximately 30% higher than if they were part of a division. This raises the yearly operating costs: $272 million for the three independent infantry brigades. $111.5 million for the independent airborne brigade, and $295 million for the two independent airmobile brigades, thereby putting the total estimated yearly operating costs to maintain its independent light units at $678.8 million (excluding personnel costs).

Field Artillery

Egypt maintains 15 independent artillery brigades. Its artillery strength consists of: over 1,100 major towed weapons including D-20 152mm, A-19 Model 1931/1937 122mm and M-46 130mm weapons; 150 self-propelled weapons including M109A1 155mm howitzers; 200 multiple rocket launchers; and more than 21 surface-to-surface missile launchers.

A breakdown of the yearly operational costs for an artillery brigade is as follows:

Consumables
$3.573

Reparables
$9.633

POL
$0.311

Indirect
$1.822


$15.339


Source: Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.
Cost figures are in millions and are for a 155mm Self-Propelled Artillery Battalion.
These figures exclude personnel and equipment costs avg./yr.

If we multiply the 15 brigades by the yearly operational costs of $15.339 million we arrive at a figure of $230.08 million. Additionally, since these battalions are constructed in the form of independent brigades, and have their own command and support structures, an additional $4.6 million needs to be added to each brigade thereby bringing the annual operational costs per brigade to $19.93 million and a total annual expenditure rate for Egypt’s field artillery assets to $298.95 million (excluding personnel and equipment costs avg./yr.).

Air Defense Command

The Egyptian Air Defense Command consists of approximately 80,000 men and is organized into five divisions with over 100 battalions, These forces include over 90 SA-2/3/6 battalions, as well as 12 batteries each of I-HAWK, Chapparal, and Crotale. Additionally, they man a number of fixed-site AA guns including 23mm ZU-23, S7mm S-60, 8Smm and 100mm KS-19 guns. A more detailed breakdown of the yearly operational costs for an ADA battalion are as follows:

Consumables
$1.45

Reparables
$1.36

POL
$0.11

Indirect
$0.77

$3.69


Source: Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.
Cost figures are in millions and are for a US ADA Avenger Battalion.
These figures exclude personnel and equipment costs avg./yr.

If we multiply the yearly operational costs of $3.69 million by Egypt’s 100 active duty ADA battalions, we arrive at a total figure of $369 million for the maintenance of Egypt’s Air Defense Command (excluding personnel and equipment costs avg./yr.). While the actual costs of maintaining a lesser quality ADA Battalion may be lower, this estimate is viable, and may be considerably lower in actual estimates, when accounting for the fact that Egypt maintains a totally independent command structure for its ADA assets.

Air Force

The Egyptian Air Force consists of over 550 aircraft comprising seven squadrons of strike aviation aircraft and a fighter force of 16 squadrons. These forces include some 190 F-16s, 100 Mirages, and over 200 aging Chinese J series and Soviet MiGs. These forces are equipped with a wide variety of missiles including AA-2 Atoll, AIM-7 Sparrows, AIM-9 Sidewinders, AM-39 and Excoets. Egypt has a transport force that includes 19 C-130Hs, five DHC-5Ds, and one Super King Air. Moreover, Egypt possesses over 100 attack helicopters, comprising some 15 squadrons including 24 AH-64s (with an additional 12 on order) and 74 French Gazelles. Additionally, Egypt has 18 airborne warning and control aircraft as well as a large number of rotary wing transport and support helicopters. A detailed breakdown of the yearly operational costs for a squadron of F-16C/Ds is as follows:

Aviation Fuel
$4.3

Depot Maintenance
$0.8

Consumable Supplies
$1.7

Depot Level Reparables
$6.5

Training Munitions
$1.1

Rel and Safety Mod Kits
$1.1

Rel and Safety Mod Install
$0.2

Training
$0.5

$16.2


Source: Department of the Air Force, 11th Wing, Freedom of Information Manager.
Cost figures are in millions. These figures exclude personnel and equipment costs avg./yr.

If we multiply the yearly operational costs by the 23 squadrons in the Egyptian Air Force we arrive at a yearly operational cost of $372.6 million (excluding personnel and equipment costs avg./yr.).

A detailed breakdown of the yearly operational costs for a squadron of Ah-64s is as follows:

Consumables
$ 2.34

Reparables
$11.02

POL
$ 0.46

Indirect
$ 0.36

$14.18


Source: Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.
Cost figures are in millions. These figures exclude personnel and equipment costs avg./yr.

Using the figure of $14.18 million for the average yearly operating cost per squadron, we arrive at a total figure of $212.7 million for the yearly operational costs for Egypt’s 15 attack helicopter squadrons. This brings the total cost for Egypt’s attack fighters and helicopters to $585.3 million (excluding personnel and equipment costs avg./yr). While the actual yearly operational cost may differ due to the fact that not all the squadrons are F-16C/Ds and Ah-64s, this discrepancy is adequately compensated by the fact that the analysis is excluding the large number of aircraft including its transportation and training assets.

Navy

Egypt’s navy consists of 33 patrol boats, eight frigates, nine minesweepers, eight submarines and one aging destroyer. Its naval aviation assets include 10 Seasprites, nine Gazelles, and five Sea Kings. The Egyptian Coast Guard is part of the navy and operates around 60 small patrol craft, nine Swift-ships, and 12 PCIs.

Data concerning the number of training and operational hours that the ships in the Egyptian navy conduct each year is unavailable. However, the hourly costs to operate naval aircraft and vessels of a similar type found in the Egyptian navy are as follows:

Component
Hourly Cost

FFG-7
$3,039

Minesweeper
$1,036

E-2C
$2,761

SH-2
$ 830


Source: Department of the Navy, Freedom of Information Office.
These figures exclude personnel and equipment costs avg./yr.

Given the high hourly cost involved in operating naval vessels, and the size and magnitude of the Egyptian navy, a yearly operational cost (excluding personnel and equipment replacement costs) of $150 million is a conservative estimate.

Personnel Costs

Thus far, this discussion has not addressed the myriad personnel expenses including salaries, clothing, food, housing, and medical costs involved in maintaining and sustaining a large military. Traditionally. these are the largest expenses that a military incurs. Using the example of the US heavy division, at least $617 million or 63% of its annual budget is devoted to personnel expenses. While recognizing that Egyptian personnel expenses do not approach US levels, the maintenance and sustainment of a large standing army does consume a substantial portion of its officially stated budget.

Egypt has approximately 440,000 men in uniform. Of these, approximately 275,000 are conscripts. However, just the basic costs involved in maintaining such a large military consumes a significantly higher amount than Egypt’s reported defense expenditures, especially, following the institution of a number or reforms by the military during the 1980s to improve the quality of life of military service, in hopes of making it more appealing and attractive to more volunteers.

These reforms have included: periodic pay raises, reduced prices when purchasing cars, access to better health care, visits to special resort areas, and special commissaries that carried products unavailable to the general civilian populace. However, by far the most ambitious and expensive project was the construction of military cities. Each city is designed to accommodate as many as 150,000 people and includes (in addition to a comfortable apartment) schools, nurseries, supermarkets, banks, water purification systems, and solar heating.58 The construction of these cities represents a considerable expenditure and is arguably comparable, in both scope and cost, to the benefits offered active-duty US service members.59 While most of these reforms were directed towards career and volunteer soldiers, the quality of life of the Egyptian conscript also improved during this time.

Consequently considering the direct costs of sustaining a soldier, such as clothing, feeding, housing, health care, etc., coupled with the indirect costs such as benefits paid to retirees, construction and maintenance of the military cities, and dependent care, an average cost of $25 per day per soldier is rather modest. However, using $25 as the average cost per soldier and multiplying that amount by the number of personnel in its active forces, we arrive at an annual expenditure rate of $4.015 million (excluding direct pay).

The average pay for a conscript is about $10 a month. However, volunteers, career enlisted soldiers, and officers enjoy substantially higher wages that are competitive with the civilian sector. Using the per-capita income of $689 (FY 94 figure) as the average annual salary for career soldiers and $120 as the annual salary for a conscript, we arrive at a total yearly expenditure for salaries of $113.685 million for career and volunteer soldiers, and $33 million for conscripts, for a total annual expenditure of $146.685 million on salaries. This raises the total yearly personnel expenditure to $4,161.685 million.

It is important to stress that this is a conservative estimate of personnel expenditures. Normally, personnel expenditures constitute the lion’s share of a military’s budget. Indeed, approximately 65% of the yearly operational costs of fielding, maintaining, and sustaining a US unit is devoted to personnel costs. Moreover, US figures exclude all of the collateral costs included in this Egyptian estimate such as civilian construction, retirement pay, etc.

Reserves

In addition to its large standing army, Egypt also sustains a reserve force of over 600,000 soldiers. However, unlike most Western armies, the Egyptian reserve system is thought to be totally dysfunctional with only some 150,000 soldiers receiving any meaningful training.60 Taking the 150,000 soldiers and estimating that they receive an average of 30 days training at an average cost of 60% of that of an active-duty soldier, we arrive at a total reserve budget of $187.470 million. Furthermore, assuming that an additional 150,000 receive a total of 15 days training, at a cost of 40% of that of an active-duty soldier, we arrive at an additional cost of $37.6 million for a total annual reserve cost of $225.5 million. This averages out to a yearly expenditure of $752 per soldier.

A conservative estimate of the Egyptian military budget is far higher than its official figure of $2.7 billion. Indeed, as the following table illustrates, Egypt actually spends a minimum of more than four times its officially reported figures to maintain, sustain, and operate a military as large and qualitative as it does:

Component
Estimated Yearly Operating Costs

Heavy Divisions
$ 4,779.8 million

Light/Airborne Divisions
$ 678.8 million

Air Defense Command
$ 369.0 million

Artillery
$ 298.9 million

Air Force
$ 585.3 million

Navy
$ 150.0 million

Personnel Costs
$ 4,161.0 million

Reserves
$ 225.5 million

Total
$ 11,249.0 million


Once again, it needs to be reiterated that these figures are conservative estimates and that the actual figures could be higher (as many smaller components, as well as equipment costs avg./yr. for many units were not included in calculating the total annual figures).61 In this respect, it is worth noting that the US FY97 O&M budget request for its 510,000 troop army is $21.4 billion and that Egypt fields an army over 60% (310,000 troops) the size of that of the United States.62 Consequently, a comparable level of spending would put Egyptian O&M expenditures at around $12.84 billion for just its active duty components. Moreover, the daily logistical costs of doing business, i.e. transporting equipment, import overhead costs related to part and equipment purchases, fuel, oil, etc. tend to be more expensive in third-world countries than in the United States. Consequently, actual expenditures for any given piece of equipment should be higher.

Additionally, three important considerations need to be noted. First, unlike the Egyptian military, US forces logically should not have to devote as much resources (per unit) on training as compared to the Egyptians. This is due to the fact that US training doctrine has not undergone the extensive evolution of changing its war-fighting doctrine to the extent of the Egyptians. Notwithstanding the constant state of transition of the US military, as it integrates particular nuances of its doctrine into the system, it is hardly of the revolutionary nature that is currently taking place within the Egyptian military establishment as it transforms its military from a Soviet-based to a Western-based military.

Second, the Egyptian military, as it adopts and integrates Western war-fighting doctrine, has to reorganize and retrain much of its military. Since sustainment operations are relatively less costly than training costs, it stands to reason that the Egyptian’s operation and maintenance (O&M) expenditures (per unit of measure) to train its forces, should not substantially deviate from what it costs the US military to sustain their forces.

A typical US Armored Division trains about 12 to 15 weeks annually. This training includes “train-up” time spent to prepare for, and participate in, one or two major deployments such as to The National Training Center. Egypt also conducts two or three major deployments annually, such as Bright Star and Badr exercises. Consequently, given the relatively small amount of time US forces actually spend training, it is hard to imagine the Egyptians training substantially less.

Finally, US military planners vehemently contend that the current levels of spending are the minimum required to sustain their forces. The Department of Defense has been arguing since the beginning of its drawdown in the late 1980s that any significant reductions would make US forces “hollow” and incapable of fulfilling US national strategic objectives. Consequently, either the Egyptians are spending a similar amount on O&M or they are fielding a very hollow army. Whatever the case, the task of the strategic planner is to assume the worst.

Moreover, this estimate does not even begin to take into consideration the score of civilian administrative and support tasks that are needed to sustain a divisional unit such as: non-divisional training support services, civilian support services and O&M costs for non-divisional support facilities, as well as administrative and staffing costs for the maintenance of Egypt’s military schools and institutions.63

Most important, this analysis has excluded three critical and extremely expensive components of the Egyptian military industrial complex. These components are Egypt’s defense industry, its non-conventional weapons research and development programs, and its military intelligence network. Traditionally, these components are among the most expensive outlays of military expenditures. While it is not possible to obtain open source data on the cost of these components, a conservative estimate, given the size and magnitude of these programs, is $4 to $6 billion. This would put actual annual Egyptian military expenditures at between $15 and $17 billion.

In 1994, Egypt surpassed the United States to become the second largest arms importer, behind Saudi Arabia, in the world. Moreover, Egypt, in a region that leads the world in the import of weapons, is the only Middle East country to have increased its arms purchases yearly since 1990. Whatever the actual figures of annual Egyptian military expenditures, it is clear that it is far higher than its reported $2.7 billion.

Indeed, this analysis is probably significantly underestimating actual Egyptian military expenditures. The Egyptian military industrial complex pervades all aspects of Egyptian society thereby blurring the distinction between civil and military expenditures.

While most published sources put annual Egyptian military expenditures at 7 to 10% of gross national product, this figure is grossly underestimated. Given the size of its active conventional forces, its large non-conventional research and development programs, and its conventional military defense industry, actual annual Egyptian military expenditures is closer to 20 to 30% of its gross national product (GNP). Historically, only countries engaged in a full-scale war have devoted such a large percentage of their GNP to defense.

Egypt is bordered by Libya, Sudan, and Israel. While Sudan’s Islamic regime is potentially ideologically threatening, its 300 main battle tanks (250 of which are T-54/55s) and some 50 combat aircraft pose a negligible threat to Egypt. On paper, Libya’s military is far more formidable than Sudan’s. However, its forces hardly present a threat to Egypt. Approximately 1,600 of Libya’s 2,200 tanks are old Soviet T-54/5s. Moreover, a lack of manpower has forced Libya to place over half of its armor, as well as many of its 400 aircraft, in storage, thereby making Libya little more than a massive arms depot.64

It is significant to note that Libya’s 80,000 man military is less than 20% the size of Egypt’s. Finally, despite the triangle of tension that periodically erupts between Egypt and its Islamic neighbors, the three countries have demonstrated a willingness to rally over perceived pan-Islamic issues. For example, notwithstanding the belief that Sudan was behind the June 1995 assassination attempt on Mubarak’s life, Egypt opposed attempts by the United States to impose a military embargo on Sudan. Egypt also opposed the US when it threatened to take military action against a suspected Libyan chemical plant. Consequently, Israeli strategic planners should be asking themselves towards whom is the current, Egyptian military buildup directed.

However, this does not suggest that war is imminent or a high probability in the short-term. Currently, the Egyptians, despite their major modernization efforts, are still incapable of launching a successful and credible military offensive that would pose an existential threat to Israel. Egypt still suffers from a number of qualitative weaknesses that would make an Egyptian attack in the short-term a strategic mistake.65 However, Egypt currently possesses a formidable defense capability. This capability affords Egypt greater flexibility as it pursues its strategic goal of achieving regional hegemony.

The quantitative and qualitative size of the Egyptian military would serve as a powerful deterrent in any deterioration of relations between Egypt and Israel, thereby affording Egypt the capability of heightening tensions to the level of those that existed in June 1967. Consequently, given Egypt’s strategic interests, an Egyptian remilitarization of the Sinai, in the mid-term, cannot be ruled out. Unlike 1967, Israel would have to absorb such a psychological blow as the balance of forces would preclude Israel from achieving strategic surprise.

CONCLUSIONS

Notwithstanding the enormous military buildup of forces in the region, the IDF still maintains a discernable qualitative advantage over the neighboring Arab forces in weaponry, manpower, and integration of war-fighting technologies. However, the decade-long massive influx of Western weaponry to the Arab countries has seriously eroded Israel’s qualitative superiority while simultaneously widening the quantitative gap in favor of the Arabs.

The influx of Western armaments poses at least two significant adverse ramifications for Israel. First, the influx of Western technology will insure that the technological gap between Israel and its neighbors will remain significantly reduced as compared to other periods. The influx of Western technology and the deployment by the Arabs of “smart weapons” has dramatically increased the ability of the common Arab combat soldier. The underlying premise dictating the production of many US weapons is the KISS principle (keep it simple, stupid). Under this principle, weapons are designed to be utilized by soldiers with negligible understanding of how these weapons may work. Today, weapons of extreme lethality can now effectively be employed by soldiers who traditionally lacked the capability to effectively employ sophisticated equipment.

Consequently, Israel’s much heralded human qualitative edge is somewhat neutralized, as many of these weapons have made target acquisition, and therefore target destruction, much simpler. Moreover, the Arabs have closed the human qualitative gap due to a tremendous increase in the number of engineer and natural science graduates from Arab universities in the last two decades.66 How this would relate on any future battlefield is open to speculation. However, it probably would significantly increase Israeli losses in any future conflict.

Second, the relative cost for Israel to maintain any qualitative gap is now much greater. Israel has generally maintained a high degree of technological advanced armaments. Consequently, each incremental gain in Israel’s qualitative advantage will cost that country substantially more in research and development costs. This will make the relative cost of each new system more expensive and will limit any attempt by Israel to hold, or decrease, the Arab’s quantitative advantage.

Technology returns tend towards an S shape: increasing performance for cost in its early growth phase and diminishing returns during its later phase. As Israel precedes its neighbors along the S curve, Israel’s costs will increase faster if it desires to maintain a constant level of technological superiority.67 Consequently, Israel can maintain qualitative superiority only by devoting more resources from force structures to technology. Since Israel, as virtually every country, operates within well-defined budget constraints, it can maintain its qualitative advantage only at the expense of allowing the quantitative gap to increase.

Compounding this problem are numerous reports of declining motivation and military preparedness within the IDF.68 The roots of this decline can be traced to the political debate during the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and the misuse of IDF forces during the Intifada. However, it was the broadening of the ideological schism between supporters and opponents of the peace process, coupled with the unrealistic expectations concerning the peace process by the previous government, that has exacerbated the morale problem. Should this trend of declining IDF motivation continue, coupled with increasing qualitative capabilities of its Arab neighbors, then the probability of Israel maintaining an overall qualitative edge is in jeopardy.69 If Israel loses its discernable qualitative edge, then the prospects for a tactical military defeat in a future war would shift from a negligible to a distinct possibility. It needs to be emphasized that the Arab states do not need to achieve qualitative parity with Israel. They only need to erode the Israeli qualitative advantage enough to allow their quantitative superiority to overwhelm the much smaller IDF.

Consequently, while the IDF still may hold a qualitative advantage over its neighbors, this advantage has been severely eroded when comparing the current correlation of forces to other periods of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This advantage continues to dissipate as weapons flood the region from both the West and East as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 1991 Gulf War has removed the last restraints regarding such sales.

Unless current trends are reversed, the prospects of a future Arab-Israeli war will increase exponentially as more and more weapons find their way to the Middle East. This will occur regardless of the outcome of the current peace process. It is the consensus opinion of many regional and military experts that deterrence of a future Arab-Israeli war is a direct function of Israel maintaining a perceived superiority in the balance of forces.70 Should this perception change, the probability of a future war will be high. Consequently unless progress in the peace process is accompanied by recognition from the Islamic states that Israel must maintain strategic parity with the collective might of all potential enemies, then the peace process will not succeed. Thus far, the Islamic countries are not willing to concede this issue and current trends do not bode well for the future.

Estimates are that the Middle East will continue to lead the world in arms purchases through the rest of the decade.71 Saudi Arabia, currently the world’s largest arms importer, will continue to lead the world in arms imports and will import an additional $32.4 billion in weaponry during the remainder of the decade.72 In any future Arab-Israeli war, these weapons will undoubtedly find their way to the battlefield. Given this environment, Israeli military strategic planners would be well advised to pay closer attention to its neighbor in the south■

ليس لديك تصريح لمشاهدة الرابط، فضلا قم ب تسجيل الدخول او تسجيل

ملحوظة/

توجد ميزانية تمويل مصرية لتمويل السلاح المصرى__تسمى__ مخصصات الرئاسة__يدخل فيها موارد مالية بدون المرور على ميزانية الدولة او احهزة الدولة, تم اتباعها بعد حرب اكتوبر 73 , لتمويل حرب طويلة قد تضطر مصر الى دخولها, وبالتالى فهى غير خاضعة للرقابة الحكومية او الدولية.......... هذا ما يفسر ارتفاع نفقات مصر العسكرية عن ما هو ينشر ويوضح ذلك المقال الاسرائيلى المنشور بالارقام.





​

 

[mody100]

رد: افضل مقاتلة لمصر ؟

egypt's defense expenditures:
$2.7 billion or $14 billion?​

a cursory review of the official published figures of egypt’s military expenditures indicate that there exists serious anomalies between the decade-long egyptian arms buildup and its officially stated annual defense budget.52 official figures of egyptian defense expenditures have reflected a dramatic decline in its yearly defense budget. However, contemporaneous with its declining expenditures, egypt has been in the midst of transforming its military from a 1970s soviet-based military to a modern 1990s western-based military. For example, in 1985 only 20% of egyptian armor and some 50% of egyptian aircraft were of western origin. Today, over 85% of egyptian armor and almost 85% of egyptian aircraft are from the west.

This presents a serious anomaly since militaries generally experience increased costs during transition periods, as more funds are needed for training, familiarization, and maintenance costs. In this respect, it is worth noting that egypt is not only absorbing western equipment but is also adapting western war-fighting doctrines and command and control techniques. Consequently, it is incongruous to believe that a country can transform a military consisting of: Over 440,000 personnel, 3,500 main battle tanks, and over 550 combat aircraft, in so dramatic a fashion, while simultaneously reducing its expenditures by over 60%. This is especially true of a third-world country lacking a history of fiducial discipline and one that is hardly imbued with the traditions of thrift and efficiency when it comes to its bureaucracy.

While ascertaining accurate egyptian annual defense expenditures is a challenging task, given the unavailability of accurate data from the host country, it is by no means impossible. Given the relative availability of open sources in the west, it is possible to obtain general information on the operational and maintenance (o&m) costs incurred in training, fielding, and sustaining various military units.53 from this information, it is possible to extrapolate how much it would cost egypt to construct, train, field, and sustain its military.

While this analysis is far from precise, given the enormous cultural and political discrepancies that would cause deviations in the amount devoted toward maintenance and training, it is far more accurate than relying on official published figures. This is due to the relative stability in what a supplier or manufacturer charges for consumable and repair parts. Indeed, if anything, the cost to a third-world country to maintain its equipment should be incrementally higher since the part in question is subject to a myriad of additional costs associated with importing the component. This chapter analyzes the costs involved to field, train, and maintain a military of the quality and quantitative size, as that of egypt, in an attempt to ascertain a more accurate estimate of yearly egyptian military expenditures.

Army

heavy divisions

egypt currently fields and maintains four active armored divisions and eight mechanized divisions. The majority of the hardware of these weapons are us made m-60 al/3s tanks, mjal tanks, and m-113 armored personnel carriers. According to a published total force policy report to the congress (december 31, 1990), the annual cost to field and maintain an active us army armored/mechanized division is $976 million dollars.54 of this amount, yearly operational costs for the armored division are $146 million and for the mechanized division $140.3 million.55 an additional $175 million is spent on equipment avg./yr., and the remaining funds are associated personnel costs (military pay, family housing, etc.). A more detailed breakdown of the yearly operational costs are as follows:

Armored division
mechanized division

consumables
$48.962
$47.995

reparables
$70.266
$65.267

pol
$ 5.651
$ 5.470

indirect
$21.152
$21.609

$146.031
$140.341


source: Department of the army, office of the deputy chief of staff for operations. Cost figures are in millions.

This would put egypt’s yearly operational costs for maintaining its four armored and eight mechanized divisions at $584.1 million and $1,122.7 million respectively consequently the total yearly operational costs for egypt to maintain its heavy divisions would be $1,706.8 million or 46.3% of egypt’s total officially reported annual defense expenditures. Additionally, the annual cost for equipment avg./yr. Per heavy division is $185 million or a total of $2,220 million for egypt’s 12 heavy divisions.56 this puts the total annual costs of maintaining egypt’s 12 heavy divisions at $3,926.8 million (excluding personnel costs) or 133% of egypt’s total officially reported annual defense expenditures.

Additionally, egypt maintains the equivalent of at least one additional armored and mechanized division in the form of independent brigades. These include a republican guard armored brigade, two armored brigades, and four mechanized brigades. Moreover, the overall costs associated with these units are approximately 30% higher given their independent command structure.57 consequently, the addition of these two divisions adds approximately $853 million to the total costs for egypt to maintain its heavy forces. These additions put the total annual costs of maintaining egypt’s heavy forces at $4,779.8 million (excluding personnel costs).

Light/airborne divisions

in addition to its heavy divisions, egypt also fields the equivalent of two more divisions in the form of three independent infantry brigades, 2 airmobile brigades and a parachute brigade. According to a march 4, 1997, department of defense information paper submitted to the house national security committee, the yearly operating costs for infantry divisions are as follows: Light infantry division ($583 million); airborne division ($733 million), air assault division ($951 million).

As with the heavy units, the majority of expenditures, approximately 65%, are derived from direct personnel (military pay, housing, travel, etc.) expenses. After deducting the personnel expenses we are left with the following yearly operating costs: Light infantry division ($204 million), airborne division ($256.5 million), air assault division ($332.8 million).

However, since egypt maintains these units in the form of independent brigades, the costs associated in maintaining these units are approximately 30% higher than if they were part of a division. This raises the yearly operating costs: $272 million for the three independent infantry brigades. $111.5 million for the independent airborne brigade, and $295 million for the two independent airmobile brigades, thereby putting the total estimated yearly operating costs to maintain its independent light units at $678.8 million (excluding personnel costs).

Field artillery

egypt maintains 15 independent artillery brigades. Its artillery strength consists of: Over 1,100 major towed weapons including d-20 152mm, a-19 model 1931/1937 122mm and m-46 130mm weapons; 150 self-propelled weapons including m109a1 155mm howitzers; 200 multiple rocket launchers; and more than 21 surface-to-surface missile launchers.

A breakdown of the yearly operational costs for an artillery brigade is as follows:

Consumables
$3.573

reparables
$9.633

pol
$0.311

indirect
$1.822


$15.339


source: Department of the army, office of the deputy chief of staff for operations.
Cost figures are in millions and are for a 155mm self-propelled artillery battalion.
These figures exclude personnel and equipment costs avg./yr.

If we multiply the 15 brigades by the yearly operational costs of $15.339 million we arrive at a figure of $230.08 million. Additionally, since these battalions are constructed in the form of independent brigades, and have their own command and support structures, an additional $4.6 million needs to be added to each brigade thereby bringing the annual operational costs per brigade to $19.93 million and a total annual expenditure rate for egypt’s field artillery assets to $298.95 million (excluding personnel and equipment costs avg./yr.).

Air defense command

the egyptian air defense command consists of approximately 80,000 men and is organized into five divisions with over 100 battalions, these forces include over 90 sa-2/3/6 battalions, as well as 12 batteries each of i-hawk, chapparal, and crotale. Additionally, they man a number of fixed-site aa guns including 23mm zu-23, s7mm s-60, 8smm and 100mm ks-19 guns. A more detailed breakdown of the yearly operational costs for an ada battalion are as follows:

Consumables
$1.45

reparables
$1.36

pol
$0.11

indirect
$0.77

$3.69


source: Department of the army, office of the deputy chief of staff for operations.
Cost figures are in millions and are for a us ada avenger battalion.
These figures exclude personnel and equipment costs avg./yr.

If we multiply the yearly operational costs of $3.69 million by egypt’s 100 active duty ada battalions, we arrive at a total figure of $369 million for the maintenance of egypt’s air defense command (excluding personnel and equipment costs avg./yr.). While the actual costs of maintaining a lesser quality ada battalion may be lower, this estimate is viable, and may be considerably lower in actual estimates, when accounting for the fact that egypt maintains a totally independent command structure for its ada assets.

Air force

the egyptian air force consists of over 550 aircraft comprising seven squadrons of strike aviation aircraft and a fighter force of 16 squadrons. These forces include some 190 f-16s, 100 mirages, and over 200 aging chinese j series and soviet migs. These forces are equipped with a wide variety of missiles including aa-2 atoll, aim-7 sparrows, aim-9 sidewinders, am-39 and excoets. Egypt has a transport force that includes 19 c-130hs, five dhc-5ds, and one super king air. Moreover, egypt possesses over 100 attack helicopters, comprising some 15 squadrons including 24 ah-64s (with an additional 12 on order) and 74 french gazelles. Additionally, egypt has 18 airborne warning and control aircraft as well as a large number of rotary wing transport and support helicopters. A detailed breakdown of the yearly operational costs for a squadron of f-16c/ds is as follows:

Aviation fuel
$4.3

depot maintenance
$0.8

consumable supplies
$1.7

depot level reparables
$6.5

training munitions
$1.1

rel and safety mod kits
$1.1

rel and safety mod install
$0.2

training
$0.5

$16.2


source: Department of the air force, 11th wing, freedom of information manager.
Cost figures are in millions. These figures exclude personnel and equipment costs avg./yr.

If we multiply the yearly operational costs by the 23 squadrons in the egyptian air force we arrive at a yearly operational cost of $372.6 million (excluding personnel and equipment costs avg./yr.).

A detailed breakdown of the yearly operational costs for a squadron of ah-64s is as follows:

Consumables
$ 2.34

reparables
$11.02

pol
$ 0.46

indirect
$ 0.36

$14.18


source: Department of the army, office of the deputy chief of staff for operations.
Cost figures are in millions. These figures exclude personnel and equipment costs avg./yr.

Using the figure of $14.18 million for the average yearly operating cost per squadron, we arrive at a total figure of $212.7 million for the yearly operational costs for egypt’s 15 attack helicopter squadrons. This brings the total cost for egypt’s attack fighters and helicopters to $585.3 million (excluding personnel and equipment costs avg./yr). While the actual yearly operational cost may differ due to the fact that not all the squadrons are f-16c/ds and ah-64s, this discrepancy is adequately compensated by the fact that the analysis is excluding the large number of aircraft including its transportation and training assets.

Navy

egypt’s navy consists of 33 patrol boats, eight frigates, nine minesweepers, eight submarines and one aging destroyer. Its naval aviation assets include 10 seasprites, nine gazelles, and five sea kings. The egyptian coast guard is part of the navy and operates around 60 small patrol craft, nine swift-ships, and 12 pcis.

Data concerning the number of training and operational hours that the ships in the egyptian navy conduct each year is unavailable. However, the hourly costs to operate naval aircraft and vessels of a similar type found in the egyptian navy are as follows:

Component
hourly cost

ffg-7
$3,039

minesweeper
$1,036

e-2c
$2,761

sh-2
$ 830


source: Department of the navy, freedom of information office.
These figures exclude personnel and equipment costs avg./yr.

Given the high hourly cost involved in operating naval vessels, and the size and magnitude of the egyptian navy, a yearly operational cost (excluding personnel and equipment replacement costs) of $150 million is a conservative estimate.

Personnel costs

thus far, this discussion has not addressed the myriad personnel expenses including salaries, clothing, food, housing, and medical costs involved in maintaining and sustaining a large military. Traditionally. These are the largest expenses that a military incurs. Using the example of the us heavy division, at least $617 million or 63% of its annual budget is devoted to personnel expenses. While recognizing that egyptian personnel expenses do not approach us levels, the maintenance and sustainment of a large standing army does consume a substantial portion of its officially stated budget.

Egypt has approximately 440,000 men in uniform. Of these, approximately 275,000 are conscripts. However, just the basic costs involved in maintaining such a large military consumes a significantly higher amount than egypt’s reported defense expenditures, especially, following the institution of a number or reforms by the military during the 1980s to improve the quality of life of military service, in hopes of making it more appealing and attractive to more volunteers.

These reforms have included: Periodic pay raises, reduced prices when purchasing cars, access to better health care, visits to special resort areas, and special commissaries that carried products unavailable to the general civilian populace. However, by far the most ambitious and expensive project was the construction of military cities. Each city is designed to accommodate as many as 150,000 people and includes (in addition to a comfortable apartment) schools, nurseries, supermarkets, banks, water purification systems, and solar heating.58 the construction of these cities represents a considerable expenditure and is arguably comparable, in both scope and cost, to the benefits offered active-duty us service members.59 while most of these reforms were directed towards career and volunteer soldiers, the quality of life of the egyptian conscript also improved during this time.

Consequently considering the direct costs of sustaining a soldier, such as clothing, feeding, housing, health care, etc., coupled with the indirect costs such as benefits paid to retirees, construction and maintenance of the military cities, and dependent care, an average cost of $25 per day per soldier is rather modest. However, using $25 as the average cost per soldier and multiplying that amount by the number of personnel in its active forces, we arrive at an annual expenditure rate of $4.015 million (excluding direct pay).

The average pay for a conscript is about $10 a month. However, volunteers, career enlisted soldiers, and officers enjoy substantially higher wages that are competitive with the civilian sector. Using the per-capita income of $689 (fy 94 figure) as the average annual salary for career soldiers and $120 as the annual salary for a conscript, we arrive at a total yearly expenditure for salaries of $113.685 million for career and volunteer soldiers, and $33 million for conscripts, for a total annual expenditure of $146.685 million on salaries. This raises the total yearly personnel expenditure to $4,161.685 million.

It is important to stress that this is a conservative estimate of personnel expenditures. Normally, personnel expenditures constitute the lion’s share of a military’s budget. Indeed, approximately 65% of the yearly operational costs of fielding, maintaining, and sustaining a us unit is devoted to personnel costs. Moreover, us figures exclude all of the collateral costs included in this egyptian estimate such as civilian construction, retirement pay, etc.

Reserves

in addition to its large standing army, egypt also sustains a reserve force of over 600,000 soldiers. However, unlike most western armies, the egyptian reserve system is thought to be totally dysfunctional with only some 150,000 soldiers receiving any meaningful training.60 taking the 150,000 soldiers and estimating that they receive an average of 30 days training at an average cost of 60% of that of an active-duty soldier, we arrive at a total reserve budget of $187.470 million. Furthermore, assuming that an additional 150,000 receive a total of 15 days training, at a cost of 40% of that of an active-duty soldier, we arrive at an additional cost of $37.6 million for a total annual reserve cost of $225.5 million. This averages out to a yearly expenditure of $752 per soldier.

A conservative estimate of the egyptian military budget is far higher than its official figure of $2.7 billion. Indeed, as the following table illustrates, egypt actually spends a minimum of more than four times its officially reported figures to maintain, sustain, and operate a military as large and qualitative as it does:

Component
estimated yearly operating costs

heavy divisions
$ 4,779.8 million

light/airborne divisions
$ 678.8 million

air defense command
$ 369.0 million

artillery
$ 298.9 million

air force
$ 585.3 million

navy
$ 150.0 million

personnel costs
$ 4,161.0 million

reserves
$ 225.5 million

total
$ 11,249.0 million


once again, it needs to be reiterated that these figures are conservative estimates and that the actual figures could be higher (as many smaller components, as well as equipment costs avg./yr. For many units were not included in calculating the total annual figures).61 in this respect, it is worth noting that the us fy97 o&m budget request for its 510,000 troop army is $21.4 billion and that egypt fields an army over 60% (310,000 troops) the size of that of the united states.62 consequently, a comparable level of spending would put egyptian o&m expenditures at around $12.84 billion for just its active duty components. Moreover, the daily logistical costs of doing business, i.e. Transporting equipment, import overhead costs related to part and equipment purchases, fuel, oil, etc. Tend to be more expensive in third-world countries than in the united states. Consequently, actual expenditures for any given piece of equipment should be higher.

Additionally, three important considerations need to be noted. First, unlike the egyptian military, us forces logically should not have to devote as much resources (per unit) on training as compared to the egyptians. This is due to the fact that us training doctrine has not undergone the extensive evolution of changing its war-fighting doctrine to the extent of the egyptians. Notwithstanding the constant state of transition of the us military, as it integrates particular nuances of its doctrine into the system, it is hardly of the revolutionary nature that is currently taking place within the egyptian military establishment as it transforms its military from a soviet-based to a western-based military.

Second, the egyptian military, as it adopts and integrates western war-fighting doctrine, has to reorganize and retrain much of its military. Since sustainment operations are relatively less costly than training costs, it stands to reason that the egyptian’s operation and maintenance (o&m) expenditures (per unit of measure) to train its forces, should not substantially deviate from what it costs the us military to sustain their forces.

A typical us armored division trains about 12 to 15 weeks annually. This training includes “train-up” time spent to prepare for, and participate in, one or two major deployments such as to the national training center. Egypt also conducts two or three major deployments annually, such as bright star and badr exercises. Consequently, given the relatively small amount of time us forces actually spend training, it is hard to imagine the egyptians training substantially less.

Finally, us military planners vehemently contend that the current levels of spending are the minimum required to sustain their forces. The department of defense has been arguing since the beginning of its drawdown in the late 1980s that any significant reductions would make us forces “hollow” and incapable of fulfilling us national strategic objectives. Consequently, either the egyptians are spending a similar amount on o&m or they are fielding a very hollow army. Whatever the case, the task of the strategic planner is to assume the worst.

Moreover, this estimate does not even begin to take into consideration the score of civilian administrative and support tasks that are needed to sustain a divisional unit such as: Non-divisional training support services, civilian support services and o&m costs for non-divisional support facilities, as well as administrative and staffing costs for the maintenance of egypt’s military schools and institutions.63

most important, this analysis has excluded three critical and extremely expensive components of the egyptian military industrial complex. These components are egypt’s defense industry, its non-conventional weapons research and development programs, and its military intelligence network. Traditionally, these components are among the most expensive outlays of military expenditures. While it is not possible to obtain open source data on the cost of these components, a conservative estimate, given the size and magnitude of these programs, is $4 to $6 billion. This would put actual annual egyptian military expenditures at between $15 and $17 billion.

In 1994, egypt surpassed the united states to become the second largest arms importer, behind saudi arabia, in the world. Moreover, egypt, in a region that leads the world in the import of weapons, is the only middle east country to have increased its arms purchases yearly since 1990. Whatever the actual figures of annual egyptian military expenditures, it is clear that it is far higher than its reported $2.7 billion.

Indeed, this analysis is probably significantly underestimating actual egyptian military expenditures. The egyptian military industrial complex pervades all aspects of egyptian society thereby blurring the distinction between civil and military expenditures.

While most published sources put annual egyptian military expenditures at 7 to 10% of gross national product, this figure is grossly underestimated. Given the size of its active conventional forces, its large non-conventional research and development programs, and its conventional military defense industry, actual annual egyptian military expenditures is closer to 20 to 30% of its gross national product (gnp). Historically, only countries engaged in a full-scale war have devoted such a large percentage of their gnp to defense.

Egypt is bordered by libya, sudan, and israel. While sudan’s islamic regime is potentially ideologically threatening, its 300 main battle tanks (250 of which are t-54/55s) and some 50 combat aircraft pose a negligible threat to egypt. On paper, libya’s military is far more formidable than sudan’s. However, its forces hardly present a threat to egypt. Approximately 1,600 of libya’s 2,200 tanks are old soviet t-54/5s. Moreover, a lack of manpower has forced libya to place over half of its armor, as well as many of its 400 aircraft, in storage, thereby making libya little more than a massive arms depot.64

it is significant to note that libya’s 80,000 man military is less than 20% the size of egypt’s. Finally, despite the triangle of tension that periodically erupts between egypt and its islamic neighbors, the three countries have demonstrated a willingness to rally over perceived pan-islamic issues. For example, notwithstanding the belief that sudan was behind the june 1995 assassination attempt on mubarak’s life, egypt opposed attempts by the united states to impose a military embargo on sudan. Egypt also opposed the us when it threatened to take military action against a suspected libyan chemical plant. Consequently, israeli strategic planners should be asking themselves towards whom is the current, egyptian military buildup directed.

However, this does not suggest that war is imminent or a high probability in the short-term. Currently, the egyptians, despite their major modernization efforts, are still incapable of launching a successful and credible military offensive that would pose an existential threat to israel. Egypt still suffers from a number of qualitative weaknesses that would make an egyptian attack in the short-term a strategic mistake.65 however, egypt currently possesses a formidable defense capability. This capability affords egypt greater flexibility as it pursues its strategic goal of achieving regional hegemony.

The quantitative and qualitative size of the egyptian military would serve as a powerful deterrent in any deterioration of relations between egypt and israel, thereby affording egypt the capability of heightening tensions to the level of those that existed in june 1967. Consequently, given egypt’s strategic interests, an egyptian remilitarization of the sinai, in the mid-term, cannot be ruled out. Unlike 1967, israel would have to absorb such a psychological blow as the balance of forces would preclude israel from achieving strategic surprise.

Conclusions

notwithstanding the enormous military buildup of forces in the region, the idf still maintains a discernable qualitative advantage over the neighboring arab forces in weaponry, manpower, and integration of war-fighting technologies. However, the decade-long massive influx of western weaponry to the arab countries has seriously eroded israel’s qualitative superiority while simultaneously widening the quantitative gap in favor of the arabs.

The influx of western armaments poses at least two significant adverse ramifications for israel. First, the influx of western technology will insure that the technological gap between israel and its neighbors will remain significantly reduced as compared to other periods. The influx of western technology and the deployment by the arabs of “smart weapons” has dramatically increased the ability of the common arab combat soldier. The underlying premise dictating the production of many us weapons is the kiss principle (keep it simple, stupid). Under this principle, weapons are designed to be utilized by soldiers with negligible understanding of how these weapons may work. Today, weapons of extreme lethality can now effectively be employed by soldiers who traditionally lacked the capability to effectively employ sophisticated equipment.

Consequently, israel’s much heralded human qualitative edge is somewhat neutralized, as many of these weapons have made target acquisition, and therefore target destruction, much simpler. Moreover, the arabs have closed the human qualitative gap due to a tremendous increase in the number of engineer and natural science graduates from arab universities in the last two decades.66 how this would relate on any future battlefield is open to speculation. However, it probably would significantly increase israeli losses in any future conflict.

Second, the relative cost for israel to maintain any qualitative gap is now much greater. Israel has generally maintained a high degree of technological advanced armaments. Consequently, each incremental gain in israel’s qualitative advantage will cost that country substantially more in research and development costs. This will make the relative cost of each new system more expensive and will limit any attempt by israel to hold, or decrease, the arab’s quantitative advantage.

Technology returns tend towards an s shape: Increasing performance for cost in its early growth phase and diminishing returns during its later phase. As israel precedes its neighbors along the s curve, israel’s costs will increase faster if it desires to maintain a constant level of technological superiority.67 consequently, israel can maintain qualitative superiority only by devoting more resources from force structures to technology. Since israel, as virtually every country, operates within well-defined budget constraints, it can maintain its qualitative advantage only at the expense of allowing the quantitative gap to increase.

Compounding this problem are numerous reports of declining motivation and military preparedness within the idf.68 the roots of this decline can be traced to the political debate during the 1982 israeli invasion of lebanon, and the misuse of idf forces during the intifada. However, it was the broadening of the ideological schism between supporters and opponents of the peace process, coupled with the unrealistic expectations concerning the peace process by the previous government, that has exacerbated the morale problem. Should this trend of declining idf motivation continue, coupled with increasing qualitative capabilities of its arab neighbors, then the probability of israel maintaining an overall qualitative edge is in jeopardy.69 if israel loses its discernable qualitative edge, then the prospects for a tactical military defeat in a future war would shift from a negligible to a distinct possibility. It needs to be emphasized that the arab states do not need to achieve qualitative parity with israel. They only need to erode the israeli qualitative advantage enough to allow their quantitative superiority to overwhelm the much smaller idf.

Consequently, while the idf still may hold a qualitative advantage over its neighbors, this advantage has been severely eroded when comparing the current correlation of forces to other periods of the arab-israeli conflict. This advantage continues to dissipate as weapons flood the region from both the west and east as the collapse of the soviet union and the 1991 gulf war has removed the last restraints regarding such sales.

Unless current trends are reversed, the prospects of a future arab-israeli war will increase exponentially as more and more weapons find their way to the middle east. This will occur regardless of the outcome of the current peace process. It is the consensus opinion of many regional and military experts that deterrence of a future arab-israeli war is a direct function of israel maintaining a perceived superiority in the balance of forces.70 should this perception change, the probability of a future war will be high. Consequently unless progress in the peace process is accompanied by recognition from the islamic states that israel must maintain strategic parity with the collective might of all potential enemies, then the peace process will not succeed. Thus far, the islamic countries are not willing to concede this issue and current trends do not bode well for the future.

Estimates are that the middle east will continue to lead the world in arms purchases through the rest of the decade.71 saudi arabia, currently the world’s largest arms importer, will continue to lead the world in arms imports and will import an additional $32.4 billion in weaponry during the remainder of the decade.72 in any future arab-israeli war, these weapons will undoubtedly find their way to the battlefield. Given this environment, israeli military strategic planners would be well advised to pay closer attention to its neighbor in the south■

ليس لديك تصريح لمشاهدة الرابط، فضلا قم ب تسجيل الدخول او تسجيل

ملحوظة/

توجد ميزانية تمويل مصرية لتمويل السلاح المصرى__تسمى__ مخصصات الرئاسة__يدخل فيها موارد مالية بدون المرور على ميزانية الدولة او احهزة الدولة, تم اتباعها بعد حرب اكتوبر 73 , لتمويل حرب طويلة قد تضطر مصر الى دخولها, وبالتالى فهى غير خاضعة للرقابة الحكومية او الدولية.......... هذا ما يفسر ارتفاع نفقات مصر العسكرية عن ما هو ينشر ويوضح ذلك المقال الاسرائيلى المنشور بالارقام.





​

انت متاكد من الكلام ده؟؟؟؟ اول مره اسمع عن حكايه المخصصات الرئاسيه

 

[Amir_Pharaoh]

رد: افضل مقاتلة لمصر ؟

أنا لا أعرف شىء عن مخصصات الرئاسة ..
لكن أعتقد أن الانفاق العسكرى لا يخضع حتى لرقابة مجلس الشعب ! .. أم أنا مخطىء ؟!

 

[ilove_egypt]

رد: افضل مقاتلة لمصر ؟

انت متاكد من الكلام ده؟؟؟؟ اول مره اسمع عن حكايه المخصصات الرئاسيه

اخى ليس لى اية مصلحة فى انى اكذب او ازيف الحقائق, او ابالغ فيها,او اجمل من صورة سيئة ان كانت كذلك....هناك بند اسمة مخصصات رئاسة متبع فى معظم الدول العربية لتمويل دفاعاتها او اية نفقة طارئة خاصة بالامن القومى لتلك الدولة كمشتريات سلاح او تمويل صناعة برامج تسليحية او تمويل عمل مخابراتى الخ الخ, خصوصا مصر والعراق فى عهد صدام وسوريا, ومصر على الاخص لانها كانت من اهم الدروس المستفادة من حرب اكتوبر...وعموما هناك عدم شفافية يتعلق بنفقات مصر العسكرية وكذلك حجم انفاق مصر القومى وناتجها القومى, وكل تلك المعايير الاقتصادية.راجع المقال الاسرائيلى المنشور اخى لتعرف شكل انفاق مصر العسكرى.




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