- إنضم
- 5 مايو 2008
- المشاركات
- 6,654
- التفاعل
Dr. Dany Shoham is a researcher at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University, Ramat
Gan, Israel, specializing in chemical and biological warfare in Arab countries and around the world. Formerly, he
was a senior analyst and lieutenant colonel in Israeli military intelligence. Dr. Shoham received a Ph.D. in medical
microbiology from Tel-Aviv University. He has published 16 articles on virology and a monograph on chemical
weapons in Syria and Egypt
This report assesses whether Saudi Arabia has or
can be expected to acquire chemical and biological
weapons (CBW). No solid evidence points
to Saudi Arabian acquisition of CBW. Further, Saudi
Arabia has the options of conventional arms or friendship
with the United States as deterrents, and often pursues
conciliation or participation in the various
nonproliferation regimes as strategies for dealing with
potential threats. It is the purpose of this report, however,
to analyze the prospects for and feasibility of CBW
acquisition by Saudi Arabia. Though unavoidably speculative
due to the lack of concrete information, the analysis
presented here shows that there are data and indications
that ought to be examined further.
The methodology of this report is primarily deductive.
It examines Saudi Arabia’s threat environment and
strategic vulnerabilities in conjunction with Saudi resources
and expertise to determine its likely motivation
and capability to acquire CBW. The analysis is supplemented
by a discussion of the available empirical evidence
on these questions.
Situated in a region characterized by significant CBW
proliferation, Saudi Arabia possesses almost unlimited
financial resources and an extensive scientific-technological
infrastructure. These conditions would seem to
encourage Saudi Arabia to pursue a CBW capability, as
do several other factors: an acute CBW threat from Iraq
during the 1990-1991 Gulf conflict; a Saudi arsenal of
ballistic missiles, including long-range CSS-2 missiles
originally developed by China for non-conventional warheads;
and close relations between Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan, which is generally believed to have both nuclear
and CBW capabilities. This report examines these various
factors in an effort to assess the current and anticipated
status of CBW proliferation in the Saudi Arabian
context. Following a brief review of CBW-relevant
events in Saudi Arabia, the report will first explore the
strategic vulnerability that might motivate a desire for
CBW, and then discuss the technical and scientific resources
that would enable Saudi Arabia to acquire a CBW
capability.
EVENTS OF CONCERN
Several events, though sporadic, indicate that Saudi
Arabia may have both the motivation and the capability
to acquire CBW. The major one is the 1991 Gulf War.
In November 1990 the commander of the joint forces in
Saudi Arabia, Emir Khaled Bin Sultan, stated that Iraqi
use of CBW could not be ruled out and that Saudi forces
were fully prepared to deal with this contingency.1 Indeed,
following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia engaged in extensive defensive preparations
against a possible CBW attack. Throughout the Gulf
War, Saudi Arabia was confronted with the CBW threat
and its strategic, operational, and tactical ramifications.
A likely outcome would be the increased attractiveness
of acquiring CBW capabilities, both for deterrence and
retaliatory purposes.
التقرير كامل
Gan, Israel, specializing in chemical and biological warfare in Arab countries and around the world. Formerly, he
was a senior analyst and lieutenant colonel in Israeli military intelligence. Dr. Shoham received a Ph.D. in medical
microbiology from Tel-Aviv University. He has published 16 articles on virology and a monograph on chemical
weapons in Syria and Egypt
This report assesses whether Saudi Arabia has or
can be expected to acquire chemical and biological
weapons (CBW). No solid evidence points
to Saudi Arabian acquisition of CBW. Further, Saudi
Arabia has the options of conventional arms or friendship
with the United States as deterrents, and often pursues
conciliation or participation in the various
nonproliferation regimes as strategies for dealing with
potential threats. It is the purpose of this report, however,
to analyze the prospects for and feasibility of CBW
acquisition by Saudi Arabia. Though unavoidably speculative
due to the lack of concrete information, the analysis
presented here shows that there are data and indications
that ought to be examined further.
The methodology of this report is primarily deductive.
It examines Saudi Arabia’s threat environment and
strategic vulnerabilities in conjunction with Saudi resources
and expertise to determine its likely motivation
and capability to acquire CBW. The analysis is supplemented
by a discussion of the available empirical evidence
on these questions.
Situated in a region characterized by significant CBW
proliferation, Saudi Arabia possesses almost unlimited
financial resources and an extensive scientific-technological
infrastructure. These conditions would seem to
encourage Saudi Arabia to pursue a CBW capability, as
do several other factors: an acute CBW threat from Iraq
during the 1990-1991 Gulf conflict; a Saudi arsenal of
ballistic missiles, including long-range CSS-2 missiles
originally developed by China for non-conventional warheads;
and close relations between Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan, which is generally believed to have both nuclear
and CBW capabilities. This report examines these various
factors in an effort to assess the current and anticipated
status of CBW proliferation in the Saudi Arabian
context. Following a brief review of CBW-relevant
events in Saudi Arabia, the report will first explore the
strategic vulnerability that might motivate a desire for
CBW, and then discuss the technical and scientific resources
that would enable Saudi Arabia to acquire a CBW
capability.
EVENTS OF CONCERN
Several events, though sporadic, indicate that Saudi
Arabia may have both the motivation and the capability
to acquire CBW. The major one is the 1991 Gulf War.
In November 1990 the commander of the joint forces in
Saudi Arabia, Emir Khaled Bin Sultan, stated that Iraqi
use of CBW could not be ruled out and that Saudi forces
were fully prepared to deal with this contingency.1 Indeed,
following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia engaged in extensive defensive preparations
against a possible CBW attack. Throughout the Gulf
War, Saudi Arabia was confronted with the CBW threat
and its strategic, operational, and tactical ramifications.
A likely outcome would be the increased attractiveness
of acquiring CBW capabilities, both for deterrence and
retaliatory purposes.
التقرير كامل
ليس لديك تصريح لمشاهدة الرابط، فضلا قم ب تسجيل الدخول او تسجيل
