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Showing posts for query egypt. Show all posts
Showing posts for query egypt. Show all posts Friday, July 18, 2008
Worldwide SAM Site Overview
Click here to download
Current as of: 18 July 2008 (2458 locations)
Latest updates: inactive sites in Afghanistan (SA-3), Bulgaria (SA-2), Germany (SA-2, SA-3), and Turkmenistan (SA-3); active and inactive sites in Algeria (SA-2, SA-3), Egypt (EW, SA-2, SA-3), Libya (SA-3, SAM training range), Russia (EW, SA-2, SA-3, S-300P, radar test facility), Syria (EW, SA-2), and Tajikistan (EW, SA-2); active sites in China (radar test facility), Iran (EW), and the Ukraine (S-300PT); data added to SAM country folders to provide theater and national inventories.
This file contains the locations of SAM sites and related air defense facilities identified in Google Earth imagery. The file contains four separate folders: Range Rings, SAMs by country, SAMs by type, and Historical Sites.
Range Rings: This folder contains representative range rings generated for all SAM sites which are currently active. The folder is divided into various subfolders. First, there is a subfolder for each geographic area. This folder is divided into subfolders, one for each country in that area featuring identified SAM systems. Each country folder will contain various subfolders for each type of active SAM system or identifiable EW radar system. These folders contain the color-coded range rings. Dark red rings indicate HQ-2, SA-2, or S-300V (SA-12) systems. Bright red rings indicate PATRIOT, Tien Kung, Arrow II, NIKE-HERCULES, S-300PT/PS/PM/PMU (SA-10), S-300PM-1/PMU-1 (SA-20), HQ-9, or KS-1A systems. Purple rings indicate SA-5 systems. White rings indicate SA-4 systems. Light blue rings indicate SA-3 systems. Light green rings indicate SA-6 systems. Off green rings indicate SA-11 systems. Orange rings indicate HAWK systems. Blue rings indicate EW radar systems such as the 36D6, 9S18M1, or 64N6. The ranges were taken from Jane's Land-based Air Defence. System modifications such as the Pechora-2M, which increases the SA-3's range to 35km, have not been taken into account as these systems cannot be identified as of yet in Google Earth imagery. Also, ranges for the SA-2 and SA-5 are representative of either the system's maximum ranged variant (SA-5: 300 km), or the most common variant (SA-2: 43 km).
SAMs by country: This folder is at first organized identically to the Range Rings folder. Each geographic area features a folder populated by subfolders for each nation. A nation's subfolder will contain up to three folders of its own, depending on the types of systems or facilities identified therein: Active (containing subfolders for each active SAM system), Inactive (containing all inactive sites), and Facilities (containing EW radar sites, SAM garrisons, and other related facilities).
SAMs by type: This folder contains numerous subfolders organizing the placemarks from the SAMs by country folder in a different fashion. Each individual system or type of facility (such as SAM garrisons or EW radar sites), or has its own subfolder, allowing the user to browse all the examples of a particular SAM system worldwide without sorting through each nation's subfolder in the SAMs by country folder. This allows users to identify nations operating different types of systems with relative ease. There is also a subfolder for inactive SAM sites, which is further divided into subfolders pertaining to each individual SAM system.
Historical Sites: This folder is a new creation. It will eventually be populated with subfolders arranged similarly to the Range Rings and SAMs by country folder. The intent will be to separate SAM site locations pertaining to systems which are no longer in active service in respective nations from the main database. For example, two folders are already present containing placemarks for the inner and outer SA-1 SAM locations surrounding Moscow. SA-1 sites containing other systems such as SA-10 or SA-20 batteries will remain marked as to their current occupant within the main portion of the database. Examples of future sites for inclusion into the Historical Sites section will be former East German SAM sites and Russian SA-2 and SA-3 SAM sites.
Key Contributors
Various individuals have provided SAM site locations for inclusion into this database, and their help is greatly appreciated. These individuals include Lex2 and ChristianNL from the Google Earth Community.
Posted by Sean O'Connor at 00:57 10 comments
Labels: Google Earth Placemark, SAM systems Friday, May 2, 2008
Image of the Week: Cairo
CAIRO SAM GARRISON
The above image depicts a SAM garrison facility in southeastern Cairo, Egypt. The image was acquired on July 14, 2005 and depicts the first sighting of Egypt's Buk-M1-2 (SA-11B GADFLY) SAM system. Egypt's purchase of the Buk-M1-2 was reportedly made in 2005 and the image would appear to indicate that deliveries began shortly thereafter. The inset image depicts a Buk-series TELAR operationally deployed in Srednebelaya, Russia. Comparison of the objects in the two images does confirm that the vehicles seen in Cairo are in fact the Buk-M1-2 TELARs. The Buk-M1-2 provides Egypt with a modern, mobile SAM system that can complement or replace existing assets. The system enjoys a 45 kilometer range, a marked improvement over the earlier Buk models thanks to the inclusion of the 9M317 missile from the Buk-M2 (SA-X-17 GRIZZLY) SAM system, which was designed as the follow-on to the Buk-M1.
SOURCES
-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
Egyptian President Reinforces Friendship with Russia
Posted by Sean O'Connor at 22:00 3 comments
Labels: Buk, Egypt, Image of the Week Saturday, July 21, 2007
The S-125 SAM System: A Site Analysis
INTRODUCTION
The S-125 (SA-3 GOA) SAM system was developed to provide additional low-altitude coverage in areas already defended by S-25 and S-75 SAM systems. S-125 SAM systems were also deployed in areas identified by the Soviet Military as potential enemy low-altitude ingress routes en route to high-priority targets. Interestingly, the S-125 began life as the M-1 (SA-N-1 GOA) naval SAM system, and was chosen for land-based use early in development. Many S-125 SAM systems remain in operation to this day, and there are numerous odifications available. The most current modification is the Pechora-2M mobile variant.
THE SA-3
The S-125 SAM system is a two-stage strategic SAM system. Two missiles are employed, the 5V24 and the 5V27. Both weapons are command guided. The 5V24 missiles possess a 60 kilogram HE fragmentation warhead, and have a range envelope of between 4 and 15 kilometers, with a reach of between 100 and 10,000 meters in altitude. The 5V27 missiles possess an 70 kilogram HE fragmentation warhead, and have ranges between 4 and 25 kilometers with a reach of between 20 and 18,000 meters, depending on the specific variant. The 5V27 can be identified by the addition of two braking fins on the booster section. Upgraded missiles used in Pechora-2 and Pechora-2M systems have a maximum range of 38 kilometers. The I-band RSN-125 (LOW BLOW) radar handles target engagement functions, with a range of 110 kilometers. The RSN-125 has the capability to track 6 targets simultaneously, with the ability to engage a single target at a time.
A TYPICAL SA-3 SITE
A typical S-125 SAM site consists of three or four launch positions arranged in various patterns around a central radar area. Two rail 5P71 or four rail 5P73 launchers are employed. 5V24 missiles are 5.89 meters in length, and 5V27 missiles are 6.09 meters in length, although the difference may not be discernable in overhead imagery. Missile length is sometimes not an effective indicator to use when identifying an S-125 SAM site as the missile rails are often elevated. The launch rails measure approximately 8 meters in length. There is a visible counterbalance and hinge assembly that extends approximately 3.7 meters behind the missiles when they are fitted to the launch rails. This is a convenient feature for identifying an actual launch position as opposed to a missile reload vehicle, which mounts two missiles. The following image depicts a typical three-launcher S-125 site in Syria. Major components and features are labeled.
CIA NIE 11-3-62 provides us with the following description of a typical S-125 site:
EXAMPLES OF COMMON SITE CONFIGURATIONS
The following images depict the four most common S-125 site layouts. The first S-125 site configuration to be examined consists of three launch positions arrayed in a triangular fashion around the RSN-125 radar. The following site in Syria is an example of such a configuration, as is the annotated example shown above:
Some S-125 sites feature three launchers but four prepared launch positions. The following S-125 site in Libya is an example:
Some S-125 sites feature four launch positions arranged in a parallelogram-shaped configuration around the RSN-125 radar. The S-125 site detailed in the CIA document shown above is an example of such a configuration, as is the following site in the Ukraine:
The final common S-125 site configuration features four launch rails positioned in a square pattern around the central RSN-125 radar. The following site in the Ukraine is an example of such a configuration:
NON-STANDARD SA-3 SITES
Some users have placed S-125 systems in sites formerly constructed for and occupied by S-75 SAM systems. This illustrates the need to not only identify a site's configuration, but also the components present as well. The following S-125 battery is located in a former S-75 SAM site in Egypt:
Some S-125-occupied S-75 sites found in Serbia and India are distinctive insofar as they lack revetments for the radar and launch rails. The following S-75 battery is located on a former S-75 site in Serbia:
Some Belarussian S-125 sites are located on prepared sites intended to house S-300P SAM systems. It is likely that these sites were constructed on the locations of former S-125 sites, and that the S-125 systems were retained pending availability of the S-300P systems. The following site is an example of such a Belarussian S-125 deployment:
Many North Korean SAM sites use unorthodox layouts to increase their survivability. The S-125 is no exception. The site depicted below illustrates North Korean survivability efforts, including placing the launchers and the RSN-125 radar inside of bunkers to protect them when they are not in use.
Finally, some S-125 users deploy their systems in seemingly random manner dictated by either terrain constraints or potential threat ingress routes. There are numerous other iterations of the S-125 site; the important factor in identifying the site is to identify the system components. Fortunately, the launch rails themselves, either loaded or unloaded, are readily identifiable in high-resolution imagery.
The following S-125 site in Algeria is an example of a "random" site configuration, in this case dictated by the limited space available for the site as it is located in an urban area:
SYSTEM COVERAGE
Given the relatively short range of the S-125 SAM system, most nations commonly employ them as short-range systems complementing longer-range systems such as the S-75 that the system was originally designed to complement.
The following image depicts the coverage provided by identified active S-125 sites (blue) and S-75 sites (red) around the metropolitan areas of northeastern Egypt:
Other nations, such as Eritrea, Peru, and Zambia, employ the S-125 as their primary air defense system, positioning their launchers around key areas. In these cases it is likely that interceptor aircraft would serve as the primary means of air defense, as the SAM network is too short-ranged and widespread to provide accurate coverage.
The following image depicts S-125 coverage in Eritrea:
CURRENT USERS
The nations listed below have been identified through analysis of Google Earth imagery as being current users of the S-125 SAM system. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of occupied sites currently visible in Google Earth, followed by the number of currently unoccupied sites in that nation.
Algeria (4/0), Angola (7/0), Armenia (2/1), Azerbaijan (4/0), Belarus (4/0), Bulgaria (4/0), Cuba (4/0), Egypt (43/11), Eritrea (3/1), Ethiopia (4/1), Georgia (1/1), India (23/9), Kazakhstan (1/0), Kyrgyzstan (2/0), Libya (10/2), Mozambique (3/0), North Korea (1/0), Peru (7/8), Poland (4/6), Serbia and Montenegro (3/2), Syria (26/4), Tajikistan (2/0), Turkmenistan (3/0), Ukraine (2/2), Uzbekistan (3/0), Vietnam (7/3), Yemen (1/0), Zambia (2/0)
FORMER USERS
The nations listed below have been identified through analysis of Google Earth imagery as having been former users of the S-125 SAM system. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of unoccupied sites currently visible in Google Earth, not including those currently occupied by other SAM systems.
Czech Republic (8), Hungary (8), Iraq (14), Romania (1), Slovakia (4)
SOURCES
-Jane's Land Based Air Defense 2002-03
-Fakel's Missiles, by Vladimir Korovin
-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
-The CIA FOIA website at http://foia.cia.gov provided the documents shown and referenced above
-Site measurements were acquired using Google Earth and as such may not be 100% accurate
Posted by Sean O'Connor at 04:04 1 comments
Labels: Overhead Imagery, SAM Site Overview, SAM systems Tuesday, July 17, 2007
The S-75 SAM System: A Site Analysis
INTRODUCTION
The S-75 (SA-2 GUIDLEINE) SAM system was developed in the USSR to provide a semi-mobile, widely deployable SAM system to complement the S-25 system in place around Moscow. Deploying the S-25 nationwide would have proved to be cost-prohibitive, so a smaller, more compact, and therefore cheaper SAM system was needed for air defense across the USSR and the Warsaw Pact member states. The S-75 remains in widespread use to this day, a testament to the robust design and capability of this Cold-War era SAM system. Chinese-produced derivatives share the same deployment layouts, a testament to their S-75 heritage, and are designated HQ-2.
THE SA-2
The S-75 SAM system is a two-stage strategic SAM system. The command-guided V-750 missiles have a 195 kg HE fragmentation warhead. Ranges vary from variant to variant, with a maximum of between 30 and 67 kilometers. Minimum ranges are as little as 6 kilometers. Altitudes range from a minimum of as little as 100 meters to a maximum of 30,000 meters, depending on the variant. Target engagement functions are handled by the RSN-75 (FAN SONG) radar set, an E or G band system with a range of up to 145 kilometers, depending on the specific model, and a cpaability to engage a single target at a time.
In an interesting footnote, the initial designator for the RSN-75 radar in the West was FRUIT SET, as evidenced by declassified CIA documentation from 1961 (NIE 11-5-6, available online at the CIA's FOIA website). No reason has yet been discerned for the change to FAN SONG.
A TYPICAL SA-2 SITE
S-75 SAM sites are relatively easy to identify on high-resolution imagery. S-75 components are typically arranged in a circular pattern. The RSN-75 engagement radar is positioned in the center of the site, typically atop a large service and command bunker, and there are six launch rails for the V-750 missiles positioned in a circular pattern facing outward around the radar position. The V-750 missiles are between 10.6 and 11.2 meters in length, depending on the variant. The launch rails measure between 10 and 10.5 meters in length in overhead imagery, depending on the resolution. S-75 sites tend to have a diameter of approximately 0.2 kilometers, although diameters of 0.16 and 0.23 kilometers have also been noted. Deployment in crowded urban areas or in some terrain can necessitate a closer or wider spacing of the site components. The V-750 launch rails are housed in circular revetments between 20 and 25 meters across, with HQ-2 sites having revetments up to 30 meters across.
The following image depicts a typical S-75 site in Yemen. Major components are labeled, including a TET used to transport missile reloads from the storage area to the launch rails.
The common practice of placing the launch rails in sturdy revetments enables inactive S-75 sites to still be identifiable, even though they may have been unused for quite some time.
The following image depicts an inactive, overgrown S-75 site in Germany:
EXAMPLES OF COMMON SITE CONFIGURATIONS
The following images depict the most common S-75/HQ-2 site layouts.
The S-75 site depicted below is a Bulgarian site displaying the classic circular layout:
Some S-75 sites use a compressed layout, positioning the launch revetments far closer to the RSN-75 radar position than is normal. This is commonly seen in Egyptian S-75 sites, such as the one seen below:
Some S-75 or HQ-2 sites use a semi-circle layout, as depicted by the HQ-2 site near Shanghai seen below:
Not all S-75 or HQ-2 sites feature a radar bunker or even revetments. In this case the site must be identified by the number of launchers, the size of the missiles, and any identifiable support equipment. The site depicted below is such an example, found in Libya. Note that sand berms have been constructed around some of the components, but these are a far cry from the sturdy revetments found at prepared site locations.
NON-STANDARD SA-2 SITES
S-75 and HQ-2 users have developed some unorthodox site layouts for a variety of reasons. Regardless of the layout, two elements will always be present at an S-75 or HQ-2 launch site: the engagement radar, and the missile launch rails themselves. The most common unorthodox site layouts will be discussed here.
Vietnam has created an unorthodox site layout for its S-75 batteries. The revised layout consists of a single RSN-75 engagement radar surrounded by four, rather than six, launch rails, arranged in various patterns. The reasoning behind the revised layout is unclear, but there are a few logical reasons which may be behind the unusual deployment. First, Vietnam may simply be taking launchers and missiles out of service to save maintenance and upkeep costs. Given that the RSN-75 can only prosecute one engagement at a time, reducing the number of launchers at a given site may be strategically acceptable. Secondly, Vietnam may be limiting the number of in-service missiles to reduce the wear and tear on important defensive assets, enabling more missiles to be kept in reserve storage for wartime use. Thirdly, as the revised sites do not maintain the 360-degree layout with respect to the launch rails, reducing the number of rails at certain sites may be indicative of Vietnam's strategic thinking insofar as potential threat ingress routes are concerned. All of Vietnam's S-75 sites feature this layout save one, but even that site is only configured with four launch rails.
The following image depicts a Vietnamese S-75 site near Nha Trang AB using the aforementioned unorthodox equipment configuration:
The Chinese military has been forced to employ an unorthodox HQ-2 site layout due to force modernization issues. A number of HQ-2 sites are apparently being converted to S-300P or HQ-9 sites. In order to mitigate the potential loss of capability while a site is being modernized, the HQ-2 battery is simply relocated off-site to a nearby area.
The following image depicts a Chinese HQ-2 site being modernized to field the S-300P or HQ-9 strategic SAM system. Note the HQ-2 battery which has been repositioned to the northwest of the site being refurbished. In this case, the battery is kept at half-strength.
Once site modernization is complete, some Chinese S-300P or HQ-9 sites appear to retain the HQ-2 battery, which has been relocated back onto the "new" site. This ensures that local air defenses will not be degraded while S-300P or HQ-9 components are procured or produced in sufficient numbers to take up residence at the relevant site or sites.
The following image depicts a recently modernized SAM site configured for the S-300P or HQ-9 system, clearly illustrating the presence of an HQ-2 battery:
SYSTEM COVERAGE
While the S-75 does not possess the sheer range of more modern strategic SAM systems such as the S-200 or the S-300P series, it is still capable of fulfilling a prominent role in the air defense network of a given nation.
The following image depicts the coverage provided by identified active S-75 sites in Syria:
CURRENT USERS
The nations listed below have been identified through analysis of Google Earth imagery as being current users of the S-75 or HQ-2 SAM system. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of occupied sites currently visible in Google Earth, followed by the number of currently unoccupied sites in that nation.
Albania (2/0), Angola (2/1), Azerbaijan (1/1), Bulgaria (3/0), China (35/7, HQ-2), Cuba (2/0), Egypt (37/100), Ethiopia (6/1), Iran (3/9, HQ-2), Kazakhstan (3/6), Kyrgyzstan (3/0), Libya (8/4), North Korea (15/5), Pakistan (1/0, HQ-2), Syria (24/18), Turkmenistan (2/15), Uzbekistan (1/0), Vietnam (9/1), Yemen (11/1)
FORMER USERS
The nations listed below have been identified through analysis of Google Earth imagery as having been former users of the S-75 or HQ-2 SAM system. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of unoccupied sites currently visible in Google Earth, not including those currently occupied by other SAM systems.
Belarus (1), Czech Republic (1), Estonia (1), Germany (6), Hungary (4), India (2), Iraq (17), Latvia (1), Lithuania (2), Mozambique (1), Poland (9), Romania (3), Russia (9), Slovakia (2), Somalia (2), Ukraine (6)
SOURCES
-Jane's Land Based Air Defense 2002-03
-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
-Site measurements were acquired using Google Earth and as such may not be 100% accurate
-For more information on Pakistan's air defense situation, reference the following article at this site: Modernizing Pakistani Air Defenses
عنوان البلوجر على شبكة النت
http://geimint.blogspot.com/search?q=egypt
Showing posts for query egypt. Show all posts Friday, July 18, 2008
Worldwide SAM Site Overview
Click here to download
Current as of: 18 July 2008 (2458 locations)
Latest updates: inactive sites in Afghanistan (SA-3), Bulgaria (SA-2), Germany (SA-2, SA-3), and Turkmenistan (SA-3); active and inactive sites in Algeria (SA-2, SA-3), Egypt (EW, SA-2, SA-3), Libya (SA-3, SAM training range), Russia (EW, SA-2, SA-3, S-300P, radar test facility), Syria (EW, SA-2), and Tajikistan (EW, SA-2); active sites in China (radar test facility), Iran (EW), and the Ukraine (S-300PT); data added to SAM country folders to provide theater and national inventories.
This file contains the locations of SAM sites and related air defense facilities identified in Google Earth imagery. The file contains four separate folders: Range Rings, SAMs by country, SAMs by type, and Historical Sites.
Range Rings: This folder contains representative range rings generated for all SAM sites which are currently active. The folder is divided into various subfolders. First, there is a subfolder for each geographic area. This folder is divided into subfolders, one for each country in that area featuring identified SAM systems. Each country folder will contain various subfolders for each type of active SAM system or identifiable EW radar system. These folders contain the color-coded range rings. Dark red rings indicate HQ-2, SA-2, or S-300V (SA-12) systems. Bright red rings indicate PATRIOT, Tien Kung, Arrow II, NIKE-HERCULES, S-300PT/PS/PM/PMU (SA-10), S-300PM-1/PMU-1 (SA-20), HQ-9, or KS-1A systems. Purple rings indicate SA-5 systems. White rings indicate SA-4 systems. Light blue rings indicate SA-3 systems. Light green rings indicate SA-6 systems. Off green rings indicate SA-11 systems. Orange rings indicate HAWK systems. Blue rings indicate EW radar systems such as the 36D6, 9S18M1, or 64N6. The ranges were taken from Jane's Land-based Air Defence. System modifications such as the Pechora-2M, which increases the SA-3's range to 35km, have not been taken into account as these systems cannot be identified as of yet in Google Earth imagery. Also, ranges for the SA-2 and SA-5 are representative of either the system's maximum ranged variant (SA-5: 300 km), or the most common variant (SA-2: 43 km).
SAMs by country: This folder is at first organized identically to the Range Rings folder. Each geographic area features a folder populated by subfolders for each nation. A nation's subfolder will contain up to three folders of its own, depending on the types of systems or facilities identified therein: Active (containing subfolders for each active SAM system), Inactive (containing all inactive sites), and Facilities (containing EW radar sites, SAM garrisons, and other related facilities).
SAMs by type: This folder contains numerous subfolders organizing the placemarks from the SAMs by country folder in a different fashion. Each individual system or type of facility (such as SAM garrisons or EW radar sites), or has its own subfolder, allowing the user to browse all the examples of a particular SAM system worldwide without sorting through each nation's subfolder in the SAMs by country folder. This allows users to identify nations operating different types of systems with relative ease. There is also a subfolder for inactive SAM sites, which is further divided into subfolders pertaining to each individual SAM system.
Historical Sites: This folder is a new creation. It will eventually be populated with subfolders arranged similarly to the Range Rings and SAMs by country folder. The intent will be to separate SAM site locations pertaining to systems which are no longer in active service in respective nations from the main database. For example, two folders are already present containing placemarks for the inner and outer SA-1 SAM locations surrounding Moscow. SA-1 sites containing other systems such as SA-10 or SA-20 batteries will remain marked as to their current occupant within the main portion of the database. Examples of future sites for inclusion into the Historical Sites section will be former East German SAM sites and Russian SA-2 and SA-3 SAM sites.
Key Contributors
Various individuals have provided SAM site locations for inclusion into this database, and their help is greatly appreciated. These individuals include Lex2 and ChristianNL from the Google Earth Community.
Posted by Sean O'Connor at 00:57 10 comments
Labels: Google Earth Placemark, SAM systems Friday, May 2, 2008
Image of the Week: Cairo
CAIRO SAM GARRISON
The above image depicts a SAM garrison facility in southeastern Cairo, Egypt. The image was acquired on July 14, 2005 and depicts the first sighting of Egypt's Buk-M1-2 (SA-11B GADFLY) SAM system. Egypt's purchase of the Buk-M1-2 was reportedly made in 2005 and the image would appear to indicate that deliveries began shortly thereafter. The inset image depicts a Buk-series TELAR operationally deployed in Srednebelaya, Russia. Comparison of the objects in the two images does confirm that the vehicles seen in Cairo are in fact the Buk-M1-2 TELARs. The Buk-M1-2 provides Egypt with a modern, mobile SAM system that can complement or replace existing assets. The system enjoys a 45 kilometer range, a marked improvement over the earlier Buk models thanks to the inclusion of the 9M317 missile from the Buk-M2 (SA-X-17 GRIZZLY) SAM system, which was designed as the follow-on to the Buk-M1.
SOURCES
-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
Egyptian President Reinforces Friendship with Russia
Posted by Sean O'Connor at 22:00 3 comments
Labels: Buk, Egypt, Image of the Week Saturday, July 21, 2007
The S-125 SAM System: A Site Analysis
INTRODUCTION
The S-125 (SA-3 GOA) SAM system was developed to provide additional low-altitude coverage in areas already defended by S-25 and S-75 SAM systems. S-125 SAM systems were also deployed in areas identified by the Soviet Military as potential enemy low-altitude ingress routes en route to high-priority targets. Interestingly, the S-125 began life as the M-1 (SA-N-1 GOA) naval SAM system, and was chosen for land-based use early in development. Many S-125 SAM systems remain in operation to this day, and there are numerous odifications available. The most current modification is the Pechora-2M mobile variant.
THE SA-3
The S-125 SAM system is a two-stage strategic SAM system. Two missiles are employed, the 5V24 and the 5V27. Both weapons are command guided. The 5V24 missiles possess a 60 kilogram HE fragmentation warhead, and have a range envelope of between 4 and 15 kilometers, with a reach of between 100 and 10,000 meters in altitude. The 5V27 missiles possess an 70 kilogram HE fragmentation warhead, and have ranges between 4 and 25 kilometers with a reach of between 20 and 18,000 meters, depending on the specific variant. The 5V27 can be identified by the addition of two braking fins on the booster section. Upgraded missiles used in Pechora-2 and Pechora-2M systems have a maximum range of 38 kilometers. The I-band RSN-125 (LOW BLOW) radar handles target engagement functions, with a range of 110 kilometers. The RSN-125 has the capability to track 6 targets simultaneously, with the ability to engage a single target at a time.
A TYPICAL SA-3 SITE
A typical S-125 SAM site consists of three or four launch positions arranged in various patterns around a central radar area. Two rail 5P71 or four rail 5P73 launchers are employed. 5V24 missiles are 5.89 meters in length, and 5V27 missiles are 6.09 meters in length, although the difference may not be discernable in overhead imagery. Missile length is sometimes not an effective indicator to use when identifying an S-125 SAM site as the missile rails are often elevated. The launch rails measure approximately 8 meters in length. There is a visible counterbalance and hinge assembly that extends approximately 3.7 meters behind the missiles when they are fitted to the launch rails. This is a convenient feature for identifying an actual launch position as opposed to a missile reload vehicle, which mounts two missiles. The following image depicts a typical three-launcher S-125 site in Syria. Major components and features are labeled.
CIA NIE 11-3-62 provides us with the following description of a typical S-125 site:
EXAMPLES OF COMMON SITE CONFIGURATIONS
The following images depict the four most common S-125 site layouts. The first S-125 site configuration to be examined consists of three launch positions arrayed in a triangular fashion around the RSN-125 radar. The following site in Syria is an example of such a configuration, as is the annotated example shown above:
Some S-125 sites feature three launchers but four prepared launch positions. The following S-125 site in Libya is an example:
Some S-125 sites feature four launch positions arranged in a parallelogram-shaped configuration around the RSN-125 radar. The S-125 site detailed in the CIA document shown above is an example of such a configuration, as is the following site in the Ukraine:
The final common S-125 site configuration features four launch rails positioned in a square pattern around the central RSN-125 radar. The following site in the Ukraine is an example of such a configuration:
NON-STANDARD SA-3 SITES
Some users have placed S-125 systems in sites formerly constructed for and occupied by S-75 SAM systems. This illustrates the need to not only identify a site's configuration, but also the components present as well. The following S-125 battery is located in a former S-75 SAM site in Egypt:
Some S-125-occupied S-75 sites found in Serbia and India are distinctive insofar as they lack revetments for the radar and launch rails. The following S-75 battery is located on a former S-75 site in Serbia:
Some Belarussian S-125 sites are located on prepared sites intended to house S-300P SAM systems. It is likely that these sites were constructed on the locations of former S-125 sites, and that the S-125 systems were retained pending availability of the S-300P systems. The following site is an example of such a Belarussian S-125 deployment:
Many North Korean SAM sites use unorthodox layouts to increase their survivability. The S-125 is no exception. The site depicted below illustrates North Korean survivability efforts, including placing the launchers and the RSN-125 radar inside of bunkers to protect them when they are not in use.
Finally, some S-125 users deploy their systems in seemingly random manner dictated by either terrain constraints or potential threat ingress routes. There are numerous other iterations of the S-125 site; the important factor in identifying the site is to identify the system components. Fortunately, the launch rails themselves, either loaded or unloaded, are readily identifiable in high-resolution imagery.
The following S-125 site in Algeria is an example of a "random" site configuration, in this case dictated by the limited space available for the site as it is located in an urban area:
SYSTEM COVERAGE
Given the relatively short range of the S-125 SAM system, most nations commonly employ them as short-range systems complementing longer-range systems such as the S-75 that the system was originally designed to complement.
The following image depicts the coverage provided by identified active S-125 sites (blue) and S-75 sites (red) around the metropolitan areas of northeastern Egypt:
Other nations, such as Eritrea, Peru, and Zambia, employ the S-125 as their primary air defense system, positioning their launchers around key areas. In these cases it is likely that interceptor aircraft would serve as the primary means of air defense, as the SAM network is too short-ranged and widespread to provide accurate coverage.
The following image depicts S-125 coverage in Eritrea:
CURRENT USERS
The nations listed below have been identified through analysis of Google Earth imagery as being current users of the S-125 SAM system. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of occupied sites currently visible in Google Earth, followed by the number of currently unoccupied sites in that nation.
Algeria (4/0), Angola (7/0), Armenia (2/1), Azerbaijan (4/0), Belarus (4/0), Bulgaria (4/0), Cuba (4/0), Egypt (43/11), Eritrea (3/1), Ethiopia (4/1), Georgia (1/1), India (23/9), Kazakhstan (1/0), Kyrgyzstan (2/0), Libya (10/2), Mozambique (3/0), North Korea (1/0), Peru (7/8), Poland (4/6), Serbia and Montenegro (3/2), Syria (26/4), Tajikistan (2/0), Turkmenistan (3/0), Ukraine (2/2), Uzbekistan (3/0), Vietnam (7/3), Yemen (1/0), Zambia (2/0)
FORMER USERS
The nations listed below have been identified through analysis of Google Earth imagery as having been former users of the S-125 SAM system. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of unoccupied sites currently visible in Google Earth, not including those currently occupied by other SAM systems.
Czech Republic (8), Hungary (8), Iraq (14), Romania (1), Slovakia (4)
SOURCES
-Jane's Land Based Air Defense 2002-03
-Fakel's Missiles, by Vladimir Korovin
-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
-The CIA FOIA website at http://foia.cia.gov provided the documents shown and referenced above
-Site measurements were acquired using Google Earth and as such may not be 100% accurate
Posted by Sean O'Connor at 04:04 1 comments
Labels: Overhead Imagery, SAM Site Overview, SAM systems Tuesday, July 17, 2007
The S-75 SAM System: A Site Analysis
INTRODUCTION
The S-75 (SA-2 GUIDLEINE) SAM system was developed in the USSR to provide a semi-mobile, widely deployable SAM system to complement the S-25 system in place around Moscow. Deploying the S-25 nationwide would have proved to be cost-prohibitive, so a smaller, more compact, and therefore cheaper SAM system was needed for air defense across the USSR and the Warsaw Pact member states. The S-75 remains in widespread use to this day, a testament to the robust design and capability of this Cold-War era SAM system. Chinese-produced derivatives share the same deployment layouts, a testament to their S-75 heritage, and are designated HQ-2.
THE SA-2
The S-75 SAM system is a two-stage strategic SAM system. The command-guided V-750 missiles have a 195 kg HE fragmentation warhead. Ranges vary from variant to variant, with a maximum of between 30 and 67 kilometers. Minimum ranges are as little as 6 kilometers. Altitudes range from a minimum of as little as 100 meters to a maximum of 30,000 meters, depending on the variant. Target engagement functions are handled by the RSN-75 (FAN SONG) radar set, an E or G band system with a range of up to 145 kilometers, depending on the specific model, and a cpaability to engage a single target at a time.
In an interesting footnote, the initial designator for the RSN-75 radar in the West was FRUIT SET, as evidenced by declassified CIA documentation from 1961 (NIE 11-5-6, available online at the CIA's FOIA website). No reason has yet been discerned for the change to FAN SONG.
A TYPICAL SA-2 SITE
S-75 SAM sites are relatively easy to identify on high-resolution imagery. S-75 components are typically arranged in a circular pattern. The RSN-75 engagement radar is positioned in the center of the site, typically atop a large service and command bunker, and there are six launch rails for the V-750 missiles positioned in a circular pattern facing outward around the radar position. The V-750 missiles are between 10.6 and 11.2 meters in length, depending on the variant. The launch rails measure between 10 and 10.5 meters in length in overhead imagery, depending on the resolution. S-75 sites tend to have a diameter of approximately 0.2 kilometers, although diameters of 0.16 and 0.23 kilometers have also been noted. Deployment in crowded urban areas or in some terrain can necessitate a closer or wider spacing of the site components. The V-750 launch rails are housed in circular revetments between 20 and 25 meters across, with HQ-2 sites having revetments up to 30 meters across.
The following image depicts a typical S-75 site in Yemen. Major components are labeled, including a TET used to transport missile reloads from the storage area to the launch rails.
The common practice of placing the launch rails in sturdy revetments enables inactive S-75 sites to still be identifiable, even though they may have been unused for quite some time.
The following image depicts an inactive, overgrown S-75 site in Germany:
EXAMPLES OF COMMON SITE CONFIGURATIONS
The following images depict the most common S-75/HQ-2 site layouts.
The S-75 site depicted below is a Bulgarian site displaying the classic circular layout:
Some S-75 sites use a compressed layout, positioning the launch revetments far closer to the RSN-75 radar position than is normal. This is commonly seen in Egyptian S-75 sites, such as the one seen below:
Some S-75 or HQ-2 sites use a semi-circle layout, as depicted by the HQ-2 site near Shanghai seen below:
Not all S-75 or HQ-2 sites feature a radar bunker or even revetments. In this case the site must be identified by the number of launchers, the size of the missiles, and any identifiable support equipment. The site depicted below is such an example, found in Libya. Note that sand berms have been constructed around some of the components, but these are a far cry from the sturdy revetments found at prepared site locations.
NON-STANDARD SA-2 SITES
S-75 and HQ-2 users have developed some unorthodox site layouts for a variety of reasons. Regardless of the layout, two elements will always be present at an S-75 or HQ-2 launch site: the engagement radar, and the missile launch rails themselves. The most common unorthodox site layouts will be discussed here.
Vietnam has created an unorthodox site layout for its S-75 batteries. The revised layout consists of a single RSN-75 engagement radar surrounded by four, rather than six, launch rails, arranged in various patterns. The reasoning behind the revised layout is unclear, but there are a few logical reasons which may be behind the unusual deployment. First, Vietnam may simply be taking launchers and missiles out of service to save maintenance and upkeep costs. Given that the RSN-75 can only prosecute one engagement at a time, reducing the number of launchers at a given site may be strategically acceptable. Secondly, Vietnam may be limiting the number of in-service missiles to reduce the wear and tear on important defensive assets, enabling more missiles to be kept in reserve storage for wartime use. Thirdly, as the revised sites do not maintain the 360-degree layout with respect to the launch rails, reducing the number of rails at certain sites may be indicative of Vietnam's strategic thinking insofar as potential threat ingress routes are concerned. All of Vietnam's S-75 sites feature this layout save one, but even that site is only configured with four launch rails.
The following image depicts a Vietnamese S-75 site near Nha Trang AB using the aforementioned unorthodox equipment configuration:
The Chinese military has been forced to employ an unorthodox HQ-2 site layout due to force modernization issues. A number of HQ-2 sites are apparently being converted to S-300P or HQ-9 sites. In order to mitigate the potential loss of capability while a site is being modernized, the HQ-2 battery is simply relocated off-site to a nearby area.
The following image depicts a Chinese HQ-2 site being modernized to field the S-300P or HQ-9 strategic SAM system. Note the HQ-2 battery which has been repositioned to the northwest of the site being refurbished. In this case, the battery is kept at half-strength.
Once site modernization is complete, some Chinese S-300P or HQ-9 sites appear to retain the HQ-2 battery, which has been relocated back onto the "new" site. This ensures that local air defenses will not be degraded while S-300P or HQ-9 components are procured or produced in sufficient numbers to take up residence at the relevant site or sites.
The following image depicts a recently modernized SAM site configured for the S-300P or HQ-9 system, clearly illustrating the presence of an HQ-2 battery:
SYSTEM COVERAGE
While the S-75 does not possess the sheer range of more modern strategic SAM systems such as the S-200 or the S-300P series, it is still capable of fulfilling a prominent role in the air defense network of a given nation.
The following image depicts the coverage provided by identified active S-75 sites in Syria:
CURRENT USERS
The nations listed below have been identified through analysis of Google Earth imagery as being current users of the S-75 or HQ-2 SAM system. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of occupied sites currently visible in Google Earth, followed by the number of currently unoccupied sites in that nation.
Albania (2/0), Angola (2/1), Azerbaijan (1/1), Bulgaria (3/0), China (35/7, HQ-2), Cuba (2/0), Egypt (37/100), Ethiopia (6/1), Iran (3/9, HQ-2), Kazakhstan (3/6), Kyrgyzstan (3/0), Libya (8/4), North Korea (15/5), Pakistan (1/0, HQ-2), Syria (24/18), Turkmenistan (2/15), Uzbekistan (1/0), Vietnam (9/1), Yemen (11/1)
FORMER USERS
The nations listed below have been identified through analysis of Google Earth imagery as having been former users of the S-75 or HQ-2 SAM system. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of unoccupied sites currently visible in Google Earth, not including those currently occupied by other SAM systems.
Belarus (1), Czech Republic (1), Estonia (1), Germany (6), Hungary (4), India (2), Iraq (17), Latvia (1), Lithuania (2), Mozambique (1), Poland (9), Romania (3), Russia (9), Slovakia (2), Somalia (2), Ukraine (6)
SOURCES
-Jane's Land Based Air Defense 2002-03
-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
-Site measurements were acquired using Google Earth and as such may not be 100% accurate
-For more information on Pakistan's air defense situation, reference the following article at this site: Modernizing Pakistani Air Defenses
عنوان البلوجر على شبكة النت
http://geimint.blogspot.com/search?q=egypt
