السعودية تطور صواريخ بالستية فتاكة وتشتري راجمات إفريقية

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10 فبراير 2009
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نبأ نيوز- خاص/ الرياض -


كشفت مصادر عسكرية عن برنامج تسليح سعودي جديد لتطوير القوة الصاروخية للمملكة، التي تمتلك اكبر ترسانة صواريخ في الشرق الأوسط، مؤكدة أن المملكة تسعى لانتاج صواريخ تفوق قدرات الصواريخ البالستية الصينية (CSS-5 و CSS-6) التي اشترتها خلال القرن الماضي.


وافادت المصادر: أن البرنامج الصاروخي السعودي الجديد يسعى لتطوير صواريخ بالستية من حيث القدرة التدميرية والمسافة، ليصل الى ما بين (3000 - 3500) كيلومتر، وهذا المدى يمكنها أن تطال معظم أرجاء أوروبا وشبه القارة الهندية، إلى جانب كونه ذو قدرة تدميرية فتاكة.


وقالت المصادر: أن خبراء آسيويين يشرفون على تطوير البرنامج الصاروخي السعودي، رجحت أنهم باكستانيون، كما أنها لم تستبعد تطلع السعودية الى امتلاك صواريخ بالستية ذات رؤوس نووية، مرجعة اعتقادها إلى تعاظم التهديدات الايرانية، ومواصلة طهران استفزاز دول المنطقة بإعلاناتها المتواصلة بإجراء تجارب على صواريخ جديدة، والتي كان آخرها ما أعلنه "هشمت الله كثيري"- قائد القوات الجوية- من إن بلاده ستدخل الخدمة قريباً سلاح دفاع جوي يجاري وسيلة "س-300" الصاروخية الروسية.


وكان تقرير حديث لمؤسسة (رند) الامريكية، أكد أن "المملكة العربية السعودية تنشر منظومة صواريخ هي الأبعد مدى في منطقة الشرق الأوسط، والمقصود بها منظومة سي أس أس -2 التي اشترتها السعودية من الصين في عام 1987" وأنها "تمتلك عدة عشرات من هذه الصواريخ المتوسطة المدى التي يمكّنها مداها البالغ 2000 كيلومتراً من أن تطال معظم أنحاء أوروبا وأوراسيا وشبه القارة الهندية".


واشار أيضاً إلى "وجود إمكانيات فنية مستقبلية لدى السعودية قد تجعلها تسعى، بالإضافة الى ما لديها من دوافع محتملة، إلى تأسيس مشروع نووي في المستقبل".


وكانت مصادر عسكرية تحدثت عن برنامج وطني سعودي للصواريخ، اشار إلى قيام المملكة بدءً من العام 1996م بإجراء عدة تجارب على صواريخ "سعودية" تراوح مداها ما بين (600 – 1000) كيلو متر، تم إطلاق عدد منها خلال الحرب الأخيرة.


وكشفت أيضاً، أن المملكة تسعى منذ اشهر إلى إبرام صفقة شراء اسلحة من جنوب افريقيا، تحصل بموجبها على (78) وحدة من منظومة راجمة صواريخ متكاملة، تعمل ذاتيًا، ويُطلق عليها اسم صواريخ "(ج- 6).


جدير بالذكر أن هناك سبع دول عربية تملك صواريخ بالستية, هي: مصر، وسوريا، وليبيا، والعراق، واليمن، والمملكة العربية السعودية، والامارات العربية المتحدة.. ومن بين هذه الدول فقط "مصر، وسوريا، وليبيا" تملك أسلحة كيماوية وجرثومية.



 
رد: السعودية تطور صواريخ بالستية فتاكة وتشتري راجمات إفريقية

في ظل الاحداث الحالية

يجب على السعودية ودول الخليج والعربية تطوير اسلحتها

..

الف شكر الى الموضوع

والله يحفظ بلاد الاسلام والمسلمين
 
رد: السعودية تطور صواريخ بالستية فتاكة وتشتري راجمات إفريقية

اميـــــــــــــــــــــن
 
رد: السعودية تطور صواريخ بالستية فتاكة وتشتري راجمات إفريقية

الولايات المتحدة لن تسمح بهذا الصواريخ الصينية حين دخلت ادخلها السعوديون بعمليات مخابراتية و تحت غطاء سرى .
اما بشكل علنى فلن تسمح الولايات المتحدةة ابدا و ستفرض سيطرتها على هذا الشأن بالقوة و لنا فى برنامج الصواريخ المصرى خير مثال برنامج الصواريخ المصرى الذى قطع اشواطا طويلة فى فترة التسعينيات و استطاع المصريون و العراقيون و الاررجنتينييون من خلاله انتاج الصاروخ كوندور و هو صاروخ باليستى يزيد مداه عن 1500 كيلو و ربما يصلى الى 2000 كيلو متر انسحن العراق و الارجنتين و اكملت وحدها حتى تعرضت لضغوط اميريكية شديدة و اضطرت الى ايقاف المشروع مثل هذه المشاريع تحتاج الى مزيد من السرية لأتمامها لأن اعدائك جميعا من الكبار و لن يسمحوا لك بهذا
 
رد: السعودية تطور صواريخ بالستية فتاكة وتشتري راجمات إفريقية

الولايات المتحدة لن تسمح بهذا الصواريخ الصينية حين دخلت ادخلها السعوديون بعمليات مخابراتية و تحت غطاء سرى .
اما بشكل علنى فلن تسمح الولايات المتحدةة ابدا و ستفرض سيطرتها على هذا الشأن بالقوة و لنا فى برنامج الصواريخ المصرى خير مثال برنامج الصواريخ المصرى الذى قطع اشواطا طويلة فى فترة التسعينيات و استطاع المصريون و العراقيون و الاررجنتينييون من خلاله انتاج الصاروخ كوندور و هو صاروخ باليستى يزيد مداه عن 1500 كيلو و ربما يصلى الى 2000 كيلو متر انسحن العراق و الارجنتين و اكملت وحدها حتى تعرضت لضغوط اميريكية شديدة و اضطرت الى ايقاف المشروع مثل هذه المشاريع تحتاج الى مزيد من السرية لأتمامها لأن اعدائك جميعا من الكبار و لن يسمحوا لك بهذا

هــنالك مقومات لدى السعودية ليست لدى الدول الاخرى المذكورة اعلاه

واول هذه المقومات واهمها هو السـرية المطلقة التي تمشي عليها السعودية

ومن النـاحية المــالية ليست هنالك مشكلة لان السعودية اقتصادها يعتمد بشكل كبير

على النفط ولن تخاطر لدول بفرض عقوبات على السعودية خـاصة وان امريكا واوروبا

لآن في ازمة مـالية كبيرة وكلهم ينتظرون مسـاعده من السعودية والصين في ازمتهم

:b070[1]:
 
رد: السعودية تطور صواريخ بالستية فتاكة وتشتري راجمات إفريقية

الـ ج-6 ليست راجمة صواريخ

هذا هو مـــدفع الـ.......

G6 Rhino

g6_rhino.jpg


g6_rhino_l1.jpg



g6_rhino_l2.jpg


g6_rhino_l3.jpg


g6_rhino_l6.jpg


g6_rhino_l5.jpg




اما راجمات الصواريخ التي تصنعها جنوب افريقيا ...........


Valkiri Multiple Artillery Rocket

Valkiri_Multiple_Rocket_Launcher_South-Africa_04.jpg


valkiri_l1.jpg


valkiri_l2.jpg


valkiri_l3.jpg


الصانع : جنوب افريقيا
سنة دخول الخدمة : 1980
الطاقم : 2
الطول : 5.35 م
العيار : 127 مم
عدد الانابيب : 24 انبوب
وقت اعادة التلقيم : 10 دقائق
المدى : 36 كلم


_________________________________


Bateleur

bateleur_l1.jpg


bateleur.jpg


الصانع : جنوب افريقيا
سنة دخول الخدمة : 1989
الطاقم : 5
الطول : 9.3 م
العيار : 127 مم
عدد الانابيب : 50 انبوب
وقت اعادة التلقيم : 20 دقائق
المدى : 36 كلم


^
^
^

لا اعرف اي راجمة صواريخ تتفاوض عليها السعودية منهم


 
رد: السعودية تطور صواريخ بالستية فتاكة وتشتري راجمات إفريقية

بالتوفيق لبلدي الحبيب و انشاء الله سوف تكون سلاحا يلجم من يحارب بلداننا العربية اجمع
 
رد: السعودية تطور صواريخ بالستية فتاكة وتشتري راجمات إفريقية

نرى أهتمـآم حقيقـة من قبـل وزير الدفاع الجـديد ..

نتمـنـى المـزيـد من التقـدم للسـعودية ..
 
رد: السعودية تطور صواريخ بالستية فتاكة وتشتري راجمات إفريقية

يا شباب
المملكة تصنع صواريخ؟
كمان استخدمتها في حرب الجوثيين؟
اتمنى تعطونا اخبأرها للي يعرف عنها اي شيء
 
رد: السعودية تطور صواريخ بالستية فتاكة وتشتري راجمات إفريقية

يا شباب
المملكة تصنع صواريخ؟
كمان استخدمتها في حرب الجوثيين؟
اتمنى تعطونا اخبأرها للي يعرف عنها اي شيء
هل هي صواريخ تركب على مقاتلات
 
رد: السعودية تطور صواريخ بالستية فتاكة وتشتري راجمات إفريقية

سؤال :هل الصوتريخ البالستية السعودية مداها اكبر من الصواريخ البالستية الاسرائيلية ؟
 
رد: السعودية تطور صواريخ بالستية فتاكة وتشتري راجمات إفريقية

سؤال :هل الصوتريخ البالستية السعودية مداها اكبر من الصواريخ البالستية الاسرائيلية ؟

الصواريخ مداها من 1000 الى 3500 مثل ماقال الخبر
 
رد: السعودية تطور صواريخ بالستية فتاكة وتشتري راجمات إفريقية

مصراوي باشا تعرف تترجم ولا اترجم ليك :


FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
New Insights On Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Rocket Forces Revealed In Exposé On Kingdom’s Covert Transition from Aging Chinese CSS-2 Missile Arsenal to New Mobile CSS-5 Nuclear Capability
PATRIOT LOST Author Accuses Former Vice President Dick Cheney of High Crime and George Tenet’s CIA Management of Criminal Misconduct In Handling of Saudi Intelligence
Los Angeles, California, June 17, 2010 – PATRIOT LOST, by Jonathan Scherck, uncovers former Vice President Dick Cheney’s decision to turn a blind eye to Saudi Arabia’s acquisition of nuclear capable CSS-5 medium range ballistic missiles from the People’s Republic of China during the George W. Bush administration.
The book also implicates former Central Intelligence Agency Director George Tenet and senior agency veteran Charles Allen in a cover-up of U.S. satellite imagery in late-2003, imagery that provided initial warning of Riyadh’s oil-for-nuclear weapons deal with Beijing.
U.S. complicity in such a drastic change in the balance of power in the Middle East is problematic for Washington in 2010. President Barack Obama has sought to engage Beijing at the tactical level on the problem of nuclear terrorism while at the same time opting to maintain the Bush era strategy of non-intervention in China’s state-to-state nuclear proliferation practices.
“President Obama’s Nuclear Security Conference held in Washington in April 2010, focusing on the need to keep nuclear materiel out of the hands of international terrorists, was without question a step in the right direction. But such tactical level efforts will only go so far in reigning in the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world.” – from PATRIOT LOST
Scherck’s account was written from his perspective as a Collection Management Officer working in CIA’s Counter-Proliferation Division and is based on direct knowledge of previously undisclosed U.S. satellite imagery analysis of shipments originating from China to Saudi Arabia’s Jeddah Islamic Seaport. In this role, Scherck was also privy to interactions with Cheney’s Office of the Vice President specifically on the Saudi nuclear issue.
“…I think we can all agree looking back now that the act in question—this misguided contempt for speaking truth to power, as it were—was less a classified matter than simply a criminal one.
Likewise, as to the liberties I have knowingly taken herein in discussing otherwise classified imagery analysis, I am no less convinced. The events
captured by U.S. spy satellites flying high above the Arabian Peninsula can hardly be considered in their proper context as an American state secret. Surely, those many illicit Chinese shipments into Saudi Arabia pose far less a threat to America’s national security than to the people of the Middle East.” – from PATRIOT LOST
According to the book, Scherck was frequently at odds with analysts working in the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence who were skeptical at the time of Riyadh’s interest in upgrading to the CSS-5, even amidst overwhelming imagery analysis published by the National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency. Saudi Arabia acquired a conventional missile capability (China’s CSS-2) in the 1980s as part of a deal brokered by Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan. Riyadh has yet to officially acknowledge its Strategic Rocket Forces’ transition to the mobile CSS-5 delivery system.
PATRIOT LOST was first published earlier this month as an eBook, nearly 60 days after being submitted to the CIA’s Publication Review Board (PRB) for approval. Preliminary manuscript reviews typically take 30 days or less, according to the PRB. After receiving no response of any sort (beyond the initial confirmation of receipt), Scherck decided to make the book available to the public.
 
رد: السعودية تطور صواريخ بالستية فتاكة وتشتري راجمات إفريقية

وهنا تعرف تترجم :

saudi missile claims
by jeffrey | 8 june 2010 | 12 comments

a former intelligence contractor is claiming that china finally got around to selling saudi arabia some new missiles to replace the ones it bought two decades ago. Jonathan scherck decided he couldn’t wait for classification review and has been emailing a self-published manuscript to members of congress and jeff stein, who runs the washington post’s spy talk blog:

“i believe the people’s republic of china delivered a turn-key nuclear ballistic missile system to the kingdom of saudi arabia over the course of several years beginning no later than december 2003,” writes jonathan scherck in a self-published book, “patriot lost,” which he provided to spytalk on monday.

[snip]

scherck, who became convinced that the white house was covering up the china-saudi nuclear connection so as not to damage relations with a major u.s. Ally and oil supplier, said he formed his conclusions while reading intelligence reports from riyadh during his 18 months on “the saudi account” in the near east division between 2005 and 2007, as well as talking with other cia personnel in contact with the bush white house.

I’ve wasted the better part of a day on a long post (see below).

Apart from my annoyance at the phrase “nuclear ballistic missile” — this ain’t timberwind, pal — the bottom line is, sure, the saudis were eventually going to get around to buying a replacement system for the decrepit css-2 (df-3) ballistic missiles they bought from china more than two decades ago. That doesn’t have anything to do with nuclear weapons, which i don’t believe for a second the chinese sold saudi arabia.

I am not sure a chinese conventional ballistic missile sale to saudi arabia is a big deal. It is an interesting data point that would have made a nice new yorker article — what, you can’t leak to sy hersh like everyone else? — but probably not worth getting fired over and certainly not worth opening yourself up to criminal prosecution.

Who is jonathan scherck?

Eh, beats me.

According to stein, scherck “joined the cia in 2004 but quit before finishing the agency’s rigorous clandestine career training course, in november of that year. He then joined spectal, a reston, va.-based intelligence contractor, which assigned him to the cia as a collection management officer on the saudi desk.”

so, he’s a beltway bandit. Or at least was one — he was “fired” he told stein, “because of my continued interaction with the” national geospatial intelligence agency.

Scherck appears to have a barebones facebook page, as well as two (1 | 2) linkedin accounts, one of which describes him as a “former u.s. Naval officer, intelligence community contractor and small business owner now working as a freelance writer.”

the two press releases (1 | 2) are hysterical (in both senses), not terribly enlightening and suggest a limited ability to distinguish between missiles and nuclear weapons.

They do not help the credibility of the author.

Is it plausible?

Yeah, sure. Well, the part about china selling missiles to saudi arabia to replace the ones they sold them in the late 1980s. I’d be awfully surprised if they were nuclear-armed.

In 1988, the united states discovered that china had sold saudi arabia css-3 (df-3) ballistic missiles. This triggered a brief moment of panic about whether the missiles came with matching nuclear weapons, though china apparently converted the missiles to carry conventional high explosives. Still, saudi arabia’s purchase kicked off a discussion of just what the hell they were up to. (the best account, i think, is khaled bin sultan with seale, desert warrior, pp. 138-41. The author, bin sultan, arranged for the purchase of the missiles.)

as china’s liquid-fueled css-2 (df-3) ballistic missiles have reached the end of their service life, china has replaced them with nuclear and conventionally-armed solid-fueled css-5 (df-21) ballistic missiles. It is hardly surprising, then, that saudi arabia might seek to do the same thing.

The saudi armed forces chief of staff was pretty up front about saudi arabia’s interest in replacing the css-2 missiles in a 1997 interview with defense news. When khaled bin sultan made a visit to beijing in 1999 to discuss “upgrading previous military purchases”, ap reported it as a trip about replacing the kingdom’s ballistic missiles.

By january 2001, upi’s richard sale quoted anonymous us officials stating that saudi arabia was seeking a “a better and brighter version” of the css-2, and that was a-ok with the (presumably clinton) administration as long as the new version was not “an offensive weapon that would be perceived as a threat to the kingdom’s neighbors.” (richard sale, “saudis hunt for new missiles,” united press international, january 19, 2001.)

so, if scherck’s claim is accurate, the deal was in place “no later than december 2003.” as i said already, i don’t think china transferred nuclear warheads — all the likely candidate missiles come in conventional flavors and the high ratio of missiles to launchers in the first sale fairly screamed conventional missions.

The timing is broadly consistent with other information —in 2002, at least one press report suggested that saudi arabia was modernizing the bases that housed the missiles. Guess how the us intelligence community monitored the conversation of chinese css-2 units to css-5 units? By watching the chinese overhaul the bases — you can see that, thanks to bill gertz who published the full text of a classified assessment entitled, “china incrementally downsizing css-2 irbm force,” naic-1030-098b-96.

Sean o’connor did a nice review
of the saudi arabia’s ballistic missile bases in 2009, which included two new facilities near a place called rawdah. Although o’connor indicated all four bases were “df-3a associated facilities,” josh pollack noted at the time that this conclusion “seems a little forced.”

that josh pollack is a smart guy. Someone should get him a blog.

What kind of frickin’ missiles were they?

Apparently scherck does not indicate whether saudi arabia purchased css-5 (df-21) ballistic missiles from china or something a little less high end (maybe some css-6/m-9/df-15s). Which is the wonkporn we really want.

The natural assumption would be that saudi arabia would replace the css-2 with the css-5, just as china did. That is option a.

But there are other tantalizing possibilities that might tell us about china’s missile program and exports.

Option b, for example, is that saudi arabia might seek css-6 (aka m-9/df-15) ballistic missiles of the sort that china sold to pakistan, and seemed to have become the shaheen missile. Shortly after leaving the pentagon in 2004, dan blumenthal claimed that saudi arabia was “looking at other chinese-made ballistic missiles, such as the newer, more advanced css-6s (mdf-15s).” i’d be surprised at picking something with such a short legs — tehran is out of range — but maybe china didn’t want to export a top-of-the-line df-21 to a us ally and it isn’t like the saudis actually plan on using the damned things — they didn’t in the 1991 gulf war. (“to spare civilians,” we are told.) they are like the car in ferris bueller’s day off — you are not supposed to actually drive it.

Then there is option c, the wildcard. You know what would be perfect for saudi arabia? The pakistani shaheen ii, which some people claim is a chinese missile with the designation m-18. I can’t tell whether the m-18 is vaporware or not, but if it is not, that is the right combination of range and export-friendly technology. If a shaheen ii shows up in saudi arabia, well that would be very interesting.

I confess that i haven’t sorted my way through the tangle of conventionally-armed chinese and pakistani medium range ballistic missiles. Perhaps i should. Perhaps you, dear readers, will.

Maybe stein will ask scherck what sort of missiles they were.

So what?

Finally, i can’t resist a thought about the implication of the deal. “so what?” sez i. Scherck’s press releases seems to paint the sale as a dramatic foreign policy blunder of the bush administration — phrases like “political expediency,” “shocking complicity,” “gross misjudgment” and “egregious mistake” are thrown around.

As foreign blunders go, though, this one hardly rates with invading the wrong country. The sale story would suggest the clinton administration wasn’t prepared to make a fuss about a missile sale, either.

Nor should they have been. I can’t imagine that a new token saudi ballistic missile force armed with conventional warheads is going to undermine regional security any more than the old force did, which is to say not at all.

The reason to object to the sale would be on principle — we should oppose missile sales that would violate the mtcr, even if the seller is, like china, a non-mtcr member. To some extent, i suppose, winking at the sale reinforces the already pervasive belief in china that our nonproliferation efforts are less about regional stability and norms than bare-knuckled power politics.

It is hard, though, to deepen the cynicism in china about us motives on this score. (again, see the entry under “wrong country, invaded”.) and, if we want to stand on principle, then we really could work more energetically to resolve concerns that prevent china’s accession to the mtcr.

That’s not likely to happen any time soon, however, so i can hardly imagine objecting to a us ally purchasing new chinese missiles to replace their old ones.
 
رد: السعودية تطور صواريخ بالستية فتاكة وتشتري راجمات إفريقية

ترسانة الصواريخ الإستراتيجية السعودية
التي ستمطر ايران واسرائيل وكل من يفكر ان يمس السيادة
السعودية او يزعزع امننا
هي

css-2
css-5
css-6
غوري
 
رد: السعودية تطور صواريخ بالستية فتاكة وتشتري راجمات إفريقية

ايه رايك في الخبر ده يدوخك صح :

 
التعديل الأخير:
رد: السعودية تطور صواريخ بالستية فتاكة وتشتري راجمات إفريقية

الترسانه الصاروخية السعودية:

الصاروخ " css-2 "df-3
المواصفات :
الطول : 21 متر
القطر : 2.25 متر
الوزن : 64 طن
المدى : 2650 كم
عام التصنيع : 1971
التحديث : عام 1988 باسم DF-3A بمدى 2800 كم


الصاروخ " css-5 "df-21
المواصفات :
الطول : 10.7 متر
القطر : 1.4 متر
الوزن : 14.700 طن
المدى : 2.150 كم
عام التصنيع : 1987
التحديث عام : 1996 باسم DF-21A بمدى 2500 كم
الصاروخ " css-6 "df-15/M9
المواصفات :
الطول : 9 متر
القطر : 1 متر
الوزن : 6.200 طن
المدى : 600 كم
عام التصنيع : 1991



خامسا: حتف 5/غوري
المدى: ما بين 1350 و1500 كلم وحمولته 700 كلغ.
القطر: من 1.35 إلى 1.32 متر.
الارتفاع: 16 مترا.
الوزن: من 1780 إلى 2180 كلغ.
الوصول إلى الهدف: 110 ثوان.
الوقود: الكيروسين 80% والغازولين 20%.
النوع: غوري من الصواريخ الدفاعية ذات البعد المتوسط (أخذت تسمية غوري من اسم شهاب الدين غوري سلطان غزني الذي غزا الهند بين 1176 و1282م).


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رد: السعودية تطور صواريخ بالستية فتاكة وتشتري راجمات إفريقية

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have concluded a secret agreement on "nuclear cooperation" that will provide the Saudis with nuclear-weapons technology in exchange for cheap oil, according to a ranking Pakistani insider.

The disclosure came at the end of a 26-hour state visit to Islamabad last weekend by Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, Saudi Arabia's de facto ruler, who flew across the Arabian Sea with an entourage of 200, including Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal and several Cabinet ministers.

Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, the pro-American defense minister who is next in line to the throne after the crown prince, was not part of the delegation.

"It will be vehemently denied by both countries," said the Pakistani source, whose information has proven reliable for more than a decade, "but future events will confirm that Pakistan has agreed to provide [Saudi Arabia] with the wherewithal for a nuclear deterrent."

As predicted, Saudi Arabia - which has faced strong international suspicion for years that it was seeking a nuclear capability through Pakistan - strongly denied the claim.

Prince Sultan was quoted in the Saudi newspaper Okaz yesterday saying that "no military agreements were concluded between the kingdom and Pakistan during [Prince Abdullah's] visit to Islamabad."

Mohammad Sadiq, deputy chief of mission for Pakistan's embassy in Washington, also denied any nuclear deal was in the works. "That is totally incorrect," he said in a telephone interview. "We have a clear policy: We will not export our nuclear expertise."

But the CIA believes Pakistan already has shared its nuclear know-how, working with North Korea in exchange for missile technology.

A Pakistani C-130 was spotted by satellite loading North Korean missiles at Pyongyang airport last year. Pakistan, which is estimated to have between 35 and 60 nuclear weapons, said this was a straight purchase for cash and strongly denied a nuclear quid pro quo.

"Both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia," the Pakistani source said, "see a world that is moving from nonproliferation to proliferation of nuclear weapons."

The Saudi rulers, who are Sunni Muslims, are believed to have concluded that nothing will deter the Shi'ite Muslims who rule Iran from continuing their quest for a nuclear weapons capability.

Pakistan, meanwhile, is concerned about a recent arms agreement between India, its nuclear archrival, and Israel, a longtime nuclear power whose inventory is estimated at between 200 and 400 weapons.

To counter what Pakistani and Saudi leaders regard as multiple regional threats, the two countries have decided to quietly move ahead with an exchange of free or cheap Saudi oil for Pakistani nuclear know-how, the Pakistani source said.

Pakistanis have worked as contract pilots for the Royal Saudi Air Force for the past 30 years. Several hundred thousand Pakistani workers are employed by the Gulf states, both as skilled and unskilled workers, and their remittances are a hard currency boon for the Pakistani treasury.

Prince Abdullah reportedly sees Saudi oil reserves, the world's largest, as becoming increasingly vulnerable over the next 10 years.

By mutual agreement, U.S. forces withdrew from Saudi Arabia earlier this year to relocate across the border in the tiny oil sheikdom of Qatar.

Saudi officials also are still chafing over a closed meeting - later well publicized - of the U.S. Defense Policy Board in 2002, where an expert explained, with a 16-slide Powerpoint presentation, why and how the United States should seize and occupy oil fields in the country's Eastern Province.

Several incidents have raised questions over the extent of Saudi-Pakistani cooperation in defense matters.

A new policy paper by Simon Henderson, an analyst with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, noted that Prince Sultan visited Pakistan's highly restricted Kahuta uranium enrichment and missile assembly factory in 1999, a visit that prompted a formal diplomatic complaint from Washington.

And a son of Prince Abdullah attended Pakistan's test-firing last year of its Ghauri-class missile, which has a range of 950 miles and could be used to deliver a nuclear payload.

President Bush was reported to have confronted Pervez Musharraf over the Saudi nuclear issue during the Pakistani president's visit to Camp David this summer, and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage raised the issue during a trip to Islamabad earlier this month, according to Mr. Henderson's paper.

"Apart from proliferation concerns, Washington likely harbors more general fears about what would happen if either of the regimes in Riyadh or Islamabad became radically Islamic," according to Mr. Henderson.

GlobalSecurity.org, a well-connected defense Internet site, found in a recent survey that Saudi Arabia has the infrastructure to exploit such nuclear exports very quickly.

"While there is no direct evidence that Saudi Arabia has chosen a nuclear option, the Saudis have in place a foundation for building a nuclear deterrent," according to the Web site.

*Arnaud de Borchgrave, editor at large of The Washington Times, is editor at large of United Press International as well.


 
رد: السعودية تطور صواريخ بالستية فتاكة وتشتري راجمات إفريقية

CSS-5 Mod 2 (DF-21A/B)
Country: People's Republic of China
Alternate Name: DF-21A
Class: MRBM; ASBM
Basing: Road mobile
Length: 12.30 m
Diameter: 1.40 m
Launch Weight: 15200 kg
Payload: Single warhead, 500 kg
Warhead: Nuclear 90 kT or selectable 20, 90, 150 kT, HE, chemical, submunitions, EMP
Propulsion: 2-stage solid
Range: 2500 km
Status: Operational
In Service: 1996

Details


The CSS-5 mod 2, known to Chinese authorities as DF-21A, is an updated version of the CSS-5, and it has most of the same properties and applications as its predecessor. It is a medium-range, road mobile, two-stage solid-propellant ballistic missile.(1)


The missile represents several advances from the earlier model: 1. Range is increased from 2150 km to 2500 km. 2. Accuracy is increased from 700 m CEP to 50 m CEP, a change which makes the missile far more effective against small or well-armored targets (like missile silos). The accuracy is improved by the use of GPS and a radar correlation terminal guidance system in the missile’s navigation system. 3. Though the payload is reduced from 600 kg to 500 kg, the newer missile can be outfitted with a greater variety of warheads. It can hold three different nuclear warheads of varying yields (20, 90, and 150 kT), an EMP, and the conventional and chemical warheads used in the earlier model.


Compared to the CSS-5, the newer model is considerably longer at 12.3 m and slightly heavier at a launch weight of 15,200 kg. The CSS-5 mod 2 has probably been deployed alongside the CSS-5, though in some cases the newer version may have replaced the original CSS-5. In total (all CSS-5 missiles, including the modified version) a 2007 report issued by the Department of Defense noted that 60-80 missiles were in operational use.



Two flight tests of the CSS-5 mod 2 were made in July and December 2002 with decoys fitted to the warheads. Though Chinese authorities denied the claim, some reports referred to the decoys as multiple warheads. In either case, these new warheads represent a considerable upgrade in the missile’s ability to foil ballistic missile defenses, especially defenses that do not focus on the boost-stage of enemy missiles.



Reports in 1997 suggested that Saudi Arabia was considering purchasing the CSS-5 Mod 2 to replace the CSS-2 missiles obtained from the PRC in 1987, though there are no known exports of the missile. The most recent recorded test occurred in February 2004, though it is believed that additional tests have been made that were not reported.


Another variation of the CSS-5 was reported in the development stages in 2006. This missile is known as DF-21B, though some sources refer to a DF-21D.(2) It is believed that this missile is similar in size to the CSS-5 mod 2/DF-21A, but uses a superior navigation system. This navigation system, which probably employs pop-out fins for maneuvering the re-entry vehicle and an active radar seeker, is believed to have a CEP of 10m or less. It was probably designed for deployment against large ships – and could be used to keep the United States Navy out of any dispute between China and Taiwan. This version of the CSS-5 may employ a similar RV unit to the DF-15 and carry nuclear, EMP, rod, or conventional warheads. The rod warhead would be employed against a ship’s radar and communications antenna.




Footnotes

1. Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue 50, ed. Duncan Lennox, (Surrey, UK: Jane's Information Group, January 2009) 25-26.

2. Mark A. Stokes, “Prepared Statement of Mark A. Stokes Executive Director Project 2049 Institute Before The U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on China’s Emergent Military Aerospace and Commercial Aviation Capabilities,” 20 May 2010, available at , accessed on 21 July 2010.







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قوية هذي قوية
 
رد: السعودية تطور صواريخ بالستية فتاكة وتشتري راجمات إفريقية

ايران : السعوديه وباكستان لديهم سلاح نووي ولم يكلمهم احد !


هدد ممثل إيران في الأمم المتحدة محمد خزاعي بأن بلاده ستحرق تل أبيب إذا

تعرضت إسرائيل لها بأي سوء.

وقال خزاعي في كلمة ألقاها أمام حشد في مدينة كاشمر شمالي شرقي إيران اليوم


إذا قام الكيان الصهيوني بأقل تعرض لأراضي الجمهورية الإسلامية فإنها ستحرق

جبهة القتال كلها وتل أبيب بالذات".


وأشار إلى أن "الكثيرين يعتقدون أن على إيران تقديم التنازل لأميركا وبريطانيا فيما

يخص البرنامج النووي لكي يكف هذان البلدان عن إلحاق الأذى بها، ويطرحون

علينا هذا الموضوع في حين تملك دول بالمنطقة وحتى الكيان الصهيوني الرؤوس

النووية".



ولفت إلى امتلاك إسرائيل حالياً 230 رأساً نووياً عسكرياً على حد قوله، وقال "إن

هناك دولا مثل باکستان والسعودية في الشرق الأوسط وفي جوارنا تمتلكان القدرة

النووية والعسكرية".




واعتبر المسؤول الإيراني أن الهدف من فرض الحظر على بلاده "هو إجبارنا على

تغيير برنامجنا النووي السلمي وهؤلاء اتخذوا من البرنامج النووي السلمي ذريعة

في حين يعلم هؤلاء‌ جيداً أن نشاط الجمهورية الإسلامية النووي هو سلمي بحت

وليس هناك أي داع للقلق أو الخوف من إيران".



يذكر أن إسرائيل لم تستبعد القيام بعمل عسكري يعوق البرنامج النووي الإيراني

متهمة إيران بالسعي لإنتاج أسلحة نووية، وهو ما تنفيه إيران التي حذر قادتها مرارا

من مهاجمة بلدهم وقالوا إنهم سيردون على أي هجوم تشنه إسرائيل أو الولايات

المتحدة التي تقود حملة ضغوط دولية على إيران للتخلي عن برنامجها النووي.





المصدر قناة الجزيره




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