- إنضم
- 5 مايو 2008
- المشاركات
- 6,654
- التفاعل
رد: السعودية تطور صواريخ بالستية فتاكة وتشتري راجمات إفريقية
ليس لديك تصريح لمشاهدة الرابط، فضلا قم ب تسجيل الدخول او تسجيل
السعودية تطور صواريخ بالستية فتاكة وتشتري راجمات إفريقية
- بادئ الموضوع ابوالعدل
- تاريخ البدء
- إنضم
- 5 مايو 2008
- المشاركات
- 6,654
- التفاعل
رد: السعودية تطور صواريخ بالستية فتاكة وتشتري راجمات إفريقية
Saudi Arabia's Ballistic Missile Force
INTRODUCTION
One of the most overlooked military arsenals in the Middle East is the Saudi ******* ballistic missile force. The presence of this capability, in context with the specific weapon system employed, raises a number of significant questions about the potential nuclear ambitions of Saudi Arabia. Analysis of currently available imagery also suggests that ballistic missiles are not a capability which Saudi Arabia will be seeking to divest itself of at any point in the near future.
THE SAUDI MISSILE FORCE
At some point in the mid 1980's, Saudi Arabia chose to pursue a ballistic missile force. Friendly Islamic nations such as Pakistan did not possess a significant ballistic missile program at this time, nor did North Korea. The only other nation producing ballistic missiles which would have been amenable to an export was China. Towards the end of the 1980's China agreed to develop a conventionally-armed ballistic missile for export to the Saudis. The weapon chosen for modification was the DF-3A (CSS-2) IRBM, a nuclear-tipped weapon already in service with the Chinese military for well over a decade.
The first weapons were delivered to Saudi Arabia in 1988, and it is not known precisely how many were purchased. Sources provide varying estimates, ranging from between 30 missiles and 9 launchers to 120 missiles and 12 launchers. Identified DF-3A associated facilities inside of Saudi Arabia suggest that the number may well be far closer to the latter estimate; two facilities have been positively identified, each housing two garrisons and various support and storage facilities. These facilities are Al Joffer and Al Sulayyil, approximately 90 and 450 km southwest of Riyadh, respectively. The locations of these facilities, as well as two other facilities which may be related to the Saudi ******* ballistic missile force and will be described later, can be seen in the image below:
THE DF-3A
The DF-3A is a single stage IRBM initially developed for the PLA's 2nd Artillery Division. Entering service in 1971, the initial DF-3 variant was a nuclear-tipped weapon, representing the first Chinese-developed ballistic missile. An improved propulsion system and other refinements were introduced in the 1980's with the DF-3A variant. The initial DF-3 had a range of 2,500 km, increased to 2,800 km in the DF-3A. Maximum range capability with a reduced payload is 4,000 km, and the weapon is credited with the ability to fly a depressed-angle profile to a range of 1,550 km, providing a limited degree of anti-missile defense. The DF-3 series weapons are road mobile, but employ prepared launch sites, allowing them to be dispersed from a garrison. Preparation time for erecting and fueling the missile is approximately two hours, and the storable liquid fuel propellant allows the missile to remain ready to fire for a short period of time.
The weapon is erected on a circular pad approximately 100 meters in diameter. A reinforced pad in the center serves as the panch point for the missile, with the support vehicles being positioned around the launcher on the pad. An example of a Saudi ******* DF-3A launch pad can be seen in the image below:
AL SULAYYIL
The first identified DF-3A facility in Saudi Arabia is at Al Sulayyil, near the southern end of the Jabal Tuwayq escarpment. This geological feature, running approximately 800 kilometers roughly south from a location north of Riyadh, provides a natural method of concealing and protecting Saudi Arabia's ballistic missile infrastructure. The complex consists of an administrative and support facility, and a large missile base contained within a secure perimeter. The Al Sulayyil facility was first described in detail by Ronen Bergman, writing for the Israeli publication Yediot Ahronot in March of 2002.
An overview of the Al Sulayyil DF-3A complex can be seen in the image below:
The missile compound itself is divided into three main areas: two missile garrisons with associated support facilities, and a central compound. Both garrison areas differ in their layout due to terrain constraints, but are nearly identical in terms of the facilities they possess. Each garrison area, accessed by separate entry control points within the overall complex itself, contain a garrison compound for missile launchers and support equipment, three separate bunkers ostensibly for missile and/or warhead storage, a missile handling facility for warhead mating, and a high bay garage where missiles and launchers are joined and erected for calibration before deployment.
An image of the northern missile garrison area can be seen below:
The southern missile garrison is located in close proximity to the compound's central area. The central area contains a former support area likely associated with the construction of the missile complexes, a possible launch control facility, and two bunkers.
An image of the central area and the southern missile garrison area can be seen below:
The missile garrison itself is not as expansive in the southern facility as it is in the northern facility. The reasoning behind this is not clear. Both facilities contain four identical equipment and vehicle garages and a drive through garage likely maintaining the launchers themselves. The northern garrison possesses two additional garages and a high bay garage. As high bay garages are typically employed for launcher or missile support functions, it is possible that the northern facility provides training or maintenance support for the DF-3A unit.
An image depicting the two DF-3A garrisons can be seen in the image below:
Despite reporting to the contrary which suggests that there are numerous launch pads contained within the complex, only two prepared launch sites have been identified within Al Sulayyil. It is possible that weapons may be erected from the reinforced pads or roadways surrounding many of the facilities, but this cannot be confirmed using the available imagery.
AL JOFFER
The second identified DF-3A facility in Saudi Arabia is the Al Joffer facility. As with the Al Sulayyil facility, it is located within the Jabal Tuwayq escarpment. The Al Joffer facility is located closer to the northern end of the escarpment, near Riyadh. The facilities found inside of the Al Joffer facility are virtually identical to those found at the Al Sulayyil facility, consisting of an administrative and support facility, and a secure missile complex consisting of two garrison areas and a central support area. Even the missile garrisons themselves depict the same differences as those described above in the Al Sulayyil facility. Different terrain considerations than those found at the Al Sulayyil facility result in the Al Joffer facility being more expansive, with the two missile garrisons being separated by a greater distance.
An overview of the Al Joffer DF-3A complex can be seen in the image below:
Apart from the distances involved, there are two major differences between the Al Joffer and Al Sulayyil facilities. First, Al Joffer only contains a single fixed launch pad, whereas Al Sulayyil contains two. Secondly, Al Joffer still contains an active support facility inside of the main complex in the central area. Given that the imagery was captured in 2004, this suggests that the Al Joffer facility was not fully operational before that date, providing a potential explanation for the lack of a second prepared launch pad.
In contrast, the Al Sulayyil facility, particularly the northern garrison area, has remained unchanged in imagery between 2003 and 2007, suggesting that it was the first facility to become operational with the DF-3A.
An image comparing the Al Sulayyil northern garrison's appearance in 2003 (top) and 2007 (bottom) can be seen below:
POSSIBLE FACILITIES
There are two potential facilities in Saudi Arabia that may serve the DF-3A force. One is located approximately 280 km west of Al Sulayyil near the settlement of Rawdah, while the other is located in Saudi Arabia's northwestern desert region. As with the previous two facilities, both of these locations are strategically placed inside of terrain features for protection.
Rawdah
The Rawdah complex is a massive facility consisting of numerous underground facilities (UGFs) and hardened bunkers. While the true purpose of this facility is not known, there is evidence to suggest that it supports DF-3A operations in some capacity. The complex is divided into two main areas, an support area and a separate area containing the aforementioned hardened facilities.
An overview of the Rawdah complex can be seen in the iamge below:
The support area consists of an administrative compound with support facilities, an underground drive-through complex, and two potential missile launch pads. The administrative compound is relatively nondescript, but the other facilities are worthy of further inspection. The underground drive-through facility is nearly 600 meters long. In most cases it could be viewed as simply a pass through the terrain allowing for easier travel, but the support area is connected by a two lane paved road with the outside area. The purpose of this large UGF may be for storage or for command functions. The latter is unlikely given the lack of any visible communications-related infrastructure atop the terrain under which the drive-through facility passes. The most logical assumption therefore is that the facility is designed for a storage purpose. The two possible launch pads are the most significant evidence suggesting that the Rawdah facility does support the DF-3A. One pad can be seen with six 20 meter long objects which match the dimensions of DF-3A towed transporter-erectors. This pad is of a circular configuration 90 meters across, matching those found at the Al Sulayyil and Al Joffer DF-3A facilities. The reinforced launch pad in the center is missing, suggesting that this may be a training site. The second possible launch area consists of a concrete pad enclosed by a fence. While this potential launch site differs in configuration from those positively identified at Al Sulayyil and Al Joffer, its dimensions would allow a DF-3A to be erected and fired.
The support area of the Rawdah complex can be seen in the image below:
The remaining facilities at Rawdah are concentrated to the northwest of the support area. This area contains numerous bunkers and UGFs, as well as two potential launch areas. The launch areas consist of a hardened pad and an extension of a roadway, locations similar if not to the circular launch pads favored by the operational garrisons, then certainly to those employed by the Chinese 2nd Artillery Division in association with certain missile types. As Chinese technicians are reported to have aided in the construction of Saudi Arabia's DF-3A facilities, it is possible that various launch pads were incorporated for evaluation. The numerous underground facilities suggest that while Rawdah may have a DF-3A support function, it likely serves other purposes as well. Precisely what is contained inside of the facilities is again not conclusively known, but some educated guesses may be made. As with the drive-through UGF to the southeast, no evidence of significant air circulation or ventilation is visible, suggesting that the various bunkers and UGFs are not intended for continued occupation. This suggests that the facilities are primarily intended for storage.
An image of the storage complex at Rawdah can be seen below:
What precisely is stored in such an isolated and expansive facility is a matter of speculation. The answer may be tied to the location itself. The Rawdah complex is located in the southwestern quadrant of Saudi Arabia, the furthest distance from past and present potential aggressors such as Iran, Iraq, and Israel. This would make the Rawdah complex ideally suited to serve as a large-scale ammunition storage facility. Dispersal of the ammunition would likely be performed by air out of the Bisha airport 120 km to the south. Transportation via road is also possible, but unlikely given the distances involved and potential security concerns. It is likely that DF-3A components stored in the facility have already been dispersed. The facility was imaged in 2004, when the Al Joffer facility may not have been fully operational as described above. The Rawdah facility's DF-3A support function may have already been terminated with the dispersal of components to Al Joffer. It is possible that DF-3A missiles may still be stored at Rawdah, and that the launch facilities may serve as the training complex for Saudi ******* missile crews.
Western Garrison
One final location has been identified that may potentially house DF-3A related facilities. This location is only visible in low resolution imagery but does share two of the identifiable characteristics of Al Sulayyil and Al Joffer: it is contained within significant terrain, and it is isolated from major population centers. This facility is also located much closer to Israel, a potential target for the Saudi DF-3A force.
The possible western DF-3A garrison can be seen in the image below:
TARGETING OPTIONS
From their garrisons at Al Sulayyil and Al Joffer, Saudi ******* DF-3As can range targets as far away as India and western Europe when employed to their maximum range of 4000 km. Much of Africa falls within range as well.
The image below depicts the coverage of the DF-3A ballistic missile when fired from Saudi ******* garrisons to a range of 4000 km:
Despite the extended range capability it is likely that the weapons are only employed to their typical range of 2800 km. Extending the range requires a reduction in payload and also results in decreased accuracy. Given that the DF-3A is already a relatively inaccurate weapon, decreasing the payload would only serve to seriously diminish the combat potential of the weapon system. As seen in the image below, the Middle East, portions of Africa and eastern Europe, and western India are still within range at the standard range of 2800 km:
The most likely potential target for the Saudi ******* DF-3A force is Iran. Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi'a Iran are not the closest of nations due to religious differences and the Saudi's close relationship with the United States, to cite a few brief reasons. Saudi ******* DF-3As are believed to be targeted on Iranian cities due to their inaccuracy and therefore their inherent unsuitability for strikes on military facilities or strategic targets.
Israel is also a potential target for Saudi ******* ballistic missiles. The likely scenario for a launch against Israel would be to employ the DF-3A in its depressed-angle launch mode, which confers a range of 1550 km. Targeting of Israel may be the reason behind the presence of the potential launch facility in western Saudi Arabia. As seen in the image below, launching from this facility allows the DF-3A to reach Israel with ease, even when fired using a depressed angle trajectory, a likely scenario given that this would increase the chances that the weapons would be able to avoid intercept by Israeli anti-missile defenses.
NUCLEAR POTENTIAL
The inaccuracy of the DF-3A, combined with its 2,000 kg throw weight, has raised speculation as to the true Saudi ******* intentions for the missile. Saudi Arabia is well aware of the inaccuracy of the weapon, claiming that they were not fired at Iraq in 1990/1991 to avoid civillian casualties. "King Fahd ruled out that option because of the fact that you cannot control it accurately. Our problem is that our war was not with the Iraqi people, it was with Saddam Hussein and his clique," stated Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan. This is in contrast to the alleged targeting of Iranian population centers.
Saudi Arabia has been known to have had an interest in nuclear weapons for some time, dating back to the construction of a potential nuclear research center in 1975. Evidence suggests that Saudi Arabia was financially and perhaps technologically involved in the nuclear weapons programs of both Iraq and Pakistan. The Iraqi capability to develop nuclear weapons was removed in the 1980s during the Iranian and Israeli air raids on the Tammuz reactor complex southeast of Baghdad. Pakistan presents an interesting option. It has been suggested that Saudi Arabia would be provided with Pakistani nuclear weapons should Iran achieve the capability to produce nuclear weapons of its own. Pakistani warheads on Saudi ******* weapons would not only represent a significant threat to Iran, but also to India. Saudi ******* DF-3A garrisons are well defended and would be much more difficult for India to strike during a time of conflict, potentially providing Pakistan with an added nuclear deterrent capability due to close relations with the Kingdom.
At the end of the day, Saudi Arabia does not currently possess a nuclear warhead for the DF-3A. The nation signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1988, and has stated that it would not arm the DF-3A with either nuclear or chemical warheads. Evidence of Saudi Arabia's nuclear ambitions cannot be ignored, however, and a nuclear-armed Iran could be the impetus needed for Saudi Arabia to finally acquire a nuclear capability for its ballistic missile force. It should be noted, however, that past Saudi ******* assurances that chemical or nuclear warheads would not be acquired are ominously significant. Saudi Arabia did not unequivocally state that weapons of mass destruction would not be used to arm the DF-3A, raising significant questions.
If the Kingdom, being aware of the DF-3As inaccuracy, is not pursuing a nuclear or chemical warhead capability, is there a covert biological warfare program underway in Saudi Arabia? Moreover, given that Saudi Arabia is reportedly not concerned with firing the weapons at Iranian civillians, has such a program existed since before 1990? This would potentially explain the Kingdom's real reasons for not wishing to fire their weapons into Iraq, unless they view Iraqi civillians with more regard than those of Iran, reasons reinforced by the alleged nuclear partnership between Iraq and Saudi Arabia.
CONCLUSION
The Saudi ******* ballistic missile arsenal is one of the most interesting and important military aspects of the developing Middle Eastern political and military landscape. As Iran moves forward towards its alleged nuclear weapons program, Saudi Arabia may well attempt to acquire a similar capability for its missiles to serve as a deterrent. The potentially destabilizing effects of such a move, given the Kingdom's position regarding Israel, could ignite a new arms race, and even military conflict. The fact that this significant development may be related to a military capability that few individuals realize exists highlights the need for closer military analysis of potential adversarial situations worldwide.
GOOGLE EARTH PLACEMARK DATA
A Google Earth file containing the placemarks and range rings used in the generation of this article can be downloaded here.
ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION
Feel free to discuss the content of this article at the IMINT & Analysis Forum in the discussion thread found here.
ليس لديك تصريح لمشاهدة الرابط، فضلا قم ب تسجيل الدخول او تسجيل
Saudi Arabia's Ballistic Missile Force
INTRODUCTION
One of the most overlooked military arsenals in the Middle East is the Saudi ******* ballistic missile force. The presence of this capability, in context with the specific weapon system employed, raises a number of significant questions about the potential nuclear ambitions of Saudi Arabia. Analysis of currently available imagery also suggests that ballistic missiles are not a capability which Saudi Arabia will be seeking to divest itself of at any point in the near future.
THE SAUDI MISSILE FORCE
At some point in the mid 1980's, Saudi Arabia chose to pursue a ballistic missile force. Friendly Islamic nations such as Pakistan did not possess a significant ballistic missile program at this time, nor did North Korea. The only other nation producing ballistic missiles which would have been amenable to an export was China. Towards the end of the 1980's China agreed to develop a conventionally-armed ballistic missile for export to the Saudis. The weapon chosen for modification was the DF-3A (CSS-2) IRBM, a nuclear-tipped weapon already in service with the Chinese military for well over a decade.
The first weapons were delivered to Saudi Arabia in 1988, and it is not known precisely how many were purchased. Sources provide varying estimates, ranging from between 30 missiles and 9 launchers to 120 missiles and 12 launchers. Identified DF-3A associated facilities inside of Saudi Arabia suggest that the number may well be far closer to the latter estimate; two facilities have been positively identified, each housing two garrisons and various support and storage facilities. These facilities are Al Joffer and Al Sulayyil, approximately 90 and 450 km southwest of Riyadh, respectively. The locations of these facilities, as well as two other facilities which may be related to the Saudi ******* ballistic missile force and will be described later, can be seen in the image below:
THE DF-3A
The DF-3A is a single stage IRBM initially developed for the PLA's 2nd Artillery Division. Entering service in 1971, the initial DF-3 variant was a nuclear-tipped weapon, representing the first Chinese-developed ballistic missile. An improved propulsion system and other refinements were introduced in the 1980's with the DF-3A variant. The initial DF-3 had a range of 2,500 km, increased to 2,800 km in the DF-3A. Maximum range capability with a reduced payload is 4,000 km, and the weapon is credited with the ability to fly a depressed-angle profile to a range of 1,550 km, providing a limited degree of anti-missile defense. The DF-3 series weapons are road mobile, but employ prepared launch sites, allowing them to be dispersed from a garrison. Preparation time for erecting and fueling the missile is approximately two hours, and the storable liquid fuel propellant allows the missile to remain ready to fire for a short period of time.
The weapon is erected on a circular pad approximately 100 meters in diameter. A reinforced pad in the center serves as the panch point for the missile, with the support vehicles being positioned around the launcher on the pad. An example of a Saudi ******* DF-3A launch pad can be seen in the image below:
AL SULAYYIL
The first identified DF-3A facility in Saudi Arabia is at Al Sulayyil, near the southern end of the Jabal Tuwayq escarpment. This geological feature, running approximately 800 kilometers roughly south from a location north of Riyadh, provides a natural method of concealing and protecting Saudi Arabia's ballistic missile infrastructure. The complex consists of an administrative and support facility, and a large missile base contained within a secure perimeter. The Al Sulayyil facility was first described in detail by Ronen Bergman, writing for the Israeli publication Yediot Ahronot in March of 2002.
An overview of the Al Sulayyil DF-3A complex can be seen in the image below:
The missile compound itself is divided into three main areas: two missile garrisons with associated support facilities, and a central compound. Both garrison areas differ in their layout due to terrain constraints, but are nearly identical in terms of the facilities they possess. Each garrison area, accessed by separate entry control points within the overall complex itself, contain a garrison compound for missile launchers and support equipment, three separate bunkers ostensibly for missile and/or warhead storage, a missile handling facility for warhead mating, and a high bay garage where missiles and launchers are joined and erected for calibration before deployment.
An image of the northern missile garrison area can be seen below:
The southern missile garrison is located in close proximity to the compound's central area. The central area contains a former support area likely associated with the construction of the missile complexes, a possible launch control facility, and two bunkers.
An image of the central area and the southern missile garrison area can be seen below:
The missile garrison itself is not as expansive in the southern facility as it is in the northern facility. The reasoning behind this is not clear. Both facilities contain four identical equipment and vehicle garages and a drive through garage likely maintaining the launchers themselves. The northern garrison possesses two additional garages and a high bay garage. As high bay garages are typically employed for launcher or missile support functions, it is possible that the northern facility provides training or maintenance support for the DF-3A unit.
An image depicting the two DF-3A garrisons can be seen in the image below:
Despite reporting to the contrary which suggests that there are numerous launch pads contained within the complex, only two prepared launch sites have been identified within Al Sulayyil. It is possible that weapons may be erected from the reinforced pads or roadways surrounding many of the facilities, but this cannot be confirmed using the available imagery.
AL JOFFER
The second identified DF-3A facility in Saudi Arabia is the Al Joffer facility. As with the Al Sulayyil facility, it is located within the Jabal Tuwayq escarpment. The Al Joffer facility is located closer to the northern end of the escarpment, near Riyadh. The facilities found inside of the Al Joffer facility are virtually identical to those found at the Al Sulayyil facility, consisting of an administrative and support facility, and a secure missile complex consisting of two garrison areas and a central support area. Even the missile garrisons themselves depict the same differences as those described above in the Al Sulayyil facility. Different terrain considerations than those found at the Al Sulayyil facility result in the Al Joffer facility being more expansive, with the two missile garrisons being separated by a greater distance.
An overview of the Al Joffer DF-3A complex can be seen in the image below:
Apart from the distances involved, there are two major differences between the Al Joffer and Al Sulayyil facilities. First, Al Joffer only contains a single fixed launch pad, whereas Al Sulayyil contains two. Secondly, Al Joffer still contains an active support facility inside of the main complex in the central area. Given that the imagery was captured in 2004, this suggests that the Al Joffer facility was not fully operational before that date, providing a potential explanation for the lack of a second prepared launch pad.
In contrast, the Al Sulayyil facility, particularly the northern garrison area, has remained unchanged in imagery between 2003 and 2007, suggesting that it was the first facility to become operational with the DF-3A.
An image comparing the Al Sulayyil northern garrison's appearance in 2003 (top) and 2007 (bottom) can be seen below:
POSSIBLE FACILITIES
There are two potential facilities in Saudi Arabia that may serve the DF-3A force. One is located approximately 280 km west of Al Sulayyil near the settlement of Rawdah, while the other is located in Saudi Arabia's northwestern desert region. As with the previous two facilities, both of these locations are strategically placed inside of terrain features for protection.
Rawdah
The Rawdah complex is a massive facility consisting of numerous underground facilities (UGFs) and hardened bunkers. While the true purpose of this facility is not known, there is evidence to suggest that it supports DF-3A operations in some capacity. The complex is divided into two main areas, an support area and a separate area containing the aforementioned hardened facilities.
An overview of the Rawdah complex can be seen in the iamge below:
The support area consists of an administrative compound with support facilities, an underground drive-through complex, and two potential missile launch pads. The administrative compound is relatively nondescript, but the other facilities are worthy of further inspection. The underground drive-through facility is nearly 600 meters long. In most cases it could be viewed as simply a pass through the terrain allowing for easier travel, but the support area is connected by a two lane paved road with the outside area. The purpose of this large UGF may be for storage or for command functions. The latter is unlikely given the lack of any visible communications-related infrastructure atop the terrain under which the drive-through facility passes. The most logical assumption therefore is that the facility is designed for a storage purpose. The two possible launch pads are the most significant evidence suggesting that the Rawdah facility does support the DF-3A. One pad can be seen with six 20 meter long objects which match the dimensions of DF-3A towed transporter-erectors. This pad is of a circular configuration 90 meters across, matching those found at the Al Sulayyil and Al Joffer DF-3A facilities. The reinforced launch pad in the center is missing, suggesting that this may be a training site. The second possible launch area consists of a concrete pad enclosed by a fence. While this potential launch site differs in configuration from those positively identified at Al Sulayyil and Al Joffer, its dimensions would allow a DF-3A to be erected and fired.
The support area of the Rawdah complex can be seen in the image below:
The remaining facilities at Rawdah are concentrated to the northwest of the support area. This area contains numerous bunkers and UGFs, as well as two potential launch areas. The launch areas consist of a hardened pad and an extension of a roadway, locations similar if not to the circular launch pads favored by the operational garrisons, then certainly to those employed by the Chinese 2nd Artillery Division in association with certain missile types. As Chinese technicians are reported to have aided in the construction of Saudi Arabia's DF-3A facilities, it is possible that various launch pads were incorporated for evaluation. The numerous underground facilities suggest that while Rawdah may have a DF-3A support function, it likely serves other purposes as well. Precisely what is contained inside of the facilities is again not conclusively known, but some educated guesses may be made. As with the drive-through UGF to the southeast, no evidence of significant air circulation or ventilation is visible, suggesting that the various bunkers and UGFs are not intended for continued occupation. This suggests that the facilities are primarily intended for storage.
An image of the storage complex at Rawdah can be seen below:
What precisely is stored in such an isolated and expansive facility is a matter of speculation. The answer may be tied to the location itself. The Rawdah complex is located in the southwestern quadrant of Saudi Arabia, the furthest distance from past and present potential aggressors such as Iran, Iraq, and Israel. This would make the Rawdah complex ideally suited to serve as a large-scale ammunition storage facility. Dispersal of the ammunition would likely be performed by air out of the Bisha airport 120 km to the south. Transportation via road is also possible, but unlikely given the distances involved and potential security concerns. It is likely that DF-3A components stored in the facility have already been dispersed. The facility was imaged in 2004, when the Al Joffer facility may not have been fully operational as described above. The Rawdah facility's DF-3A support function may have already been terminated with the dispersal of components to Al Joffer. It is possible that DF-3A missiles may still be stored at Rawdah, and that the launch facilities may serve as the training complex for Saudi ******* missile crews.
Western Garrison
One final location has been identified that may potentially house DF-3A related facilities. This location is only visible in low resolution imagery but does share two of the identifiable characteristics of Al Sulayyil and Al Joffer: it is contained within significant terrain, and it is isolated from major population centers. This facility is also located much closer to Israel, a potential target for the Saudi DF-3A force.
The possible western DF-3A garrison can be seen in the image below:
TARGETING OPTIONS
From their garrisons at Al Sulayyil and Al Joffer, Saudi ******* DF-3As can range targets as far away as India and western Europe when employed to their maximum range of 4000 km. Much of Africa falls within range as well.
The image below depicts the coverage of the DF-3A ballistic missile when fired from Saudi ******* garrisons to a range of 4000 km:
Despite the extended range capability it is likely that the weapons are only employed to their typical range of 2800 km. Extending the range requires a reduction in payload and also results in decreased accuracy. Given that the DF-3A is already a relatively inaccurate weapon, decreasing the payload would only serve to seriously diminish the combat potential of the weapon system. As seen in the image below, the Middle East, portions of Africa and eastern Europe, and western India are still within range at the standard range of 2800 km:
The most likely potential target for the Saudi ******* DF-3A force is Iran. Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi'a Iran are not the closest of nations due to religious differences and the Saudi's close relationship with the United States, to cite a few brief reasons. Saudi ******* DF-3As are believed to be targeted on Iranian cities due to their inaccuracy and therefore their inherent unsuitability for strikes on military facilities or strategic targets.
Israel is also a potential target for Saudi ******* ballistic missiles. The likely scenario for a launch against Israel would be to employ the DF-3A in its depressed-angle launch mode, which confers a range of 1550 km. Targeting of Israel may be the reason behind the presence of the potential launch facility in western Saudi Arabia. As seen in the image below, launching from this facility allows the DF-3A to reach Israel with ease, even when fired using a depressed angle trajectory, a likely scenario given that this would increase the chances that the weapons would be able to avoid intercept by Israeli anti-missile defenses.
NUCLEAR POTENTIAL
The inaccuracy of the DF-3A, combined with its 2,000 kg throw weight, has raised speculation as to the true Saudi ******* intentions for the missile. Saudi Arabia is well aware of the inaccuracy of the weapon, claiming that they were not fired at Iraq in 1990/1991 to avoid civillian casualties. "King Fahd ruled out that option because of the fact that you cannot control it accurately. Our problem is that our war was not with the Iraqi people, it was with Saddam Hussein and his clique," stated Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan. This is in contrast to the alleged targeting of Iranian population centers.
Saudi Arabia has been known to have had an interest in nuclear weapons for some time, dating back to the construction of a potential nuclear research center in 1975. Evidence suggests that Saudi Arabia was financially and perhaps technologically involved in the nuclear weapons programs of both Iraq and Pakistan. The Iraqi capability to develop nuclear weapons was removed in the 1980s during the Iranian and Israeli air raids on the Tammuz reactor complex southeast of Baghdad. Pakistan presents an interesting option. It has been suggested that Saudi Arabia would be provided with Pakistani nuclear weapons should Iran achieve the capability to produce nuclear weapons of its own. Pakistani warheads on Saudi ******* weapons would not only represent a significant threat to Iran, but also to India. Saudi ******* DF-3A garrisons are well defended and would be much more difficult for India to strike during a time of conflict, potentially providing Pakistan with an added nuclear deterrent capability due to close relations with the Kingdom.
At the end of the day, Saudi Arabia does not currently possess a nuclear warhead for the DF-3A. The nation signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1988, and has stated that it would not arm the DF-3A with either nuclear or chemical warheads. Evidence of Saudi Arabia's nuclear ambitions cannot be ignored, however, and a nuclear-armed Iran could be the impetus needed for Saudi Arabia to finally acquire a nuclear capability for its ballistic missile force. It should be noted, however, that past Saudi ******* assurances that chemical or nuclear warheads would not be acquired are ominously significant. Saudi Arabia did not unequivocally state that weapons of mass destruction would not be used to arm the DF-3A, raising significant questions.
If the Kingdom, being aware of the DF-3As inaccuracy, is not pursuing a nuclear or chemical warhead capability, is there a covert biological warfare program underway in Saudi Arabia? Moreover, given that Saudi Arabia is reportedly not concerned with firing the weapons at Iranian civillians, has such a program existed since before 1990? This would potentially explain the Kingdom's real reasons for not wishing to fire their weapons into Iraq, unless they view Iraqi civillians with more regard than those of Iran, reasons reinforced by the alleged nuclear partnership between Iraq and Saudi Arabia.
CONCLUSION
The Saudi ******* ballistic missile arsenal is one of the most interesting and important military aspects of the developing Middle Eastern political and military landscape. As Iran moves forward towards its alleged nuclear weapons program, Saudi Arabia may well attempt to acquire a similar capability for its missiles to serve as a deterrent. The potentially destabilizing effects of such a move, given the Kingdom's position regarding Israel, could ignite a new arms race, and even military conflict. The fact that this significant development may be related to a military capability that few individuals realize exists highlights the need for closer military analysis of potential adversarial situations worldwide.
GOOGLE EARTH PLACEMARK DATA
A Google Earth file containing the placemarks and range rings used in the generation of this article can be downloaded here.
ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION
Feel free to discuss the content of this article at the IMINT & Analysis Forum in the discussion thread found here.
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اخووي مصراوي اخبارك :ANSmile04[1]:
:50_khlodi-com[1]::50_khlodi-com[1]::76_khlodi-com[1]::76_khlodi-com[1]:
خذلك تقييم يا نمر
ليس لديك تصريح لمشاهدة الرابط، فضلا قم ب تسجيل الدخول او تسجيل
اخووي مصراوي اخبارك :ANSmile04[1]:
:50_khlodi-com[1]::50_khlodi-com[1]::76_khlodi-com[1]::76_khlodi-com[1]:
خذلك تقييم يا نمر
- إنضم
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هذيِ الصوآريخ الصينيــه ^^^
هذيٍ الصوآريــخ تخلــي ليل العدوو نهآر .. ونهآرهـ ليــل .. :ANSmile04[1]:
لا حد يجآكــر مع السعـوديــه .. وصرآحتـاً أيرآن من غبآئها السيآسي جعلــت لنآ القدرهـ على الحصوول عَ مثل هالتقنيآت الفتآكــه .. + .. زيآدة منظوماتنا الدفآعيــه ..
وآقوول لــ أيرن قبل لا تصنع " قـم بطلآء" صواريخ آصنـع " قم بطلآء"مضآدآت لهآ ..:busted_red[1]:
ليس لديك تصريح لمشاهدة الرابط، فضلا قم ب تسجيل الدخول او تسجيل
ليس لديك تصريح لمشاهدة الرابط، فضلا قم ب تسجيل الدخول او تسجيل
ليس لديك تصريح لمشاهدة الرابط، فضلا قم ب تسجيل الدخول او تسجيل
هذيِ الصوآريخ الصينيــه ^^^
هذيٍ الصوآريــخ تخلــي ليل العدوو نهآر .. ونهآرهـ ليــل .. :ANSmile04[1]:
لا حد يجآكــر مع السعـوديــه .. وصرآحتـاً أيرآن من غبآئها السيآسي جعلــت لنآ القدرهـ على الحصوول عَ مثل هالتقنيآت الفتآكــه .. + .. زيآدة منظوماتنا الدفآعيــه ..
وآقوول لــ أيرن قبل لا تصنع " قـم بطلآء" صواريخ آصنـع " قم بطلآء"مضآدآت لهآ ..:busted_red[1]:
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الله يؤفقك مملكتنا الغاليه ويؤفــقك الخليج والعالم العربي
بــحـفـظ الــرحــمــن
نـــؤؤؤافــksa
الله يؤفقك مملكتنا الغاليه ويؤفــقك الخليج والعالم العربي
بــحـفـظ الــرحــمــن
نـــؤؤؤافــksa
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خخخخخخخخخخخخخخخخخخخخخخخخخخخ
هذا صيني ويتكلم عن القدرة النووية السعودية
على الصواريخ الصينية
خخخخخخخخخخخخخخخخخخخخخخخخخخخ
هذا صيني ويتكلم عن القدرة النووية السعودية
على الصواريخ الصينية
ليس لديك تصريح لمشاهدة الرابط، فضلا قم ب تسجيل الدخول او تسجيل
ليس لديك تصريح لمشاهدة الرابط، فضلا قم ب تسجيل الدخول او تسجيل
ليس لديك تصريح لمشاهدة الرابط، فضلا قم ب تسجيل الدخول او تسجيل
- إنضم
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يوجــد تقآريرِ كثيره تتكلم عن العلاقــه السعوديــة الصينيــه من نآحية الصوآريخ المحمله بــ رؤوس نوويه
وهذا التقرير يتكلم عن بدأ تقنيآت يتم عملهآ على مدى عشر سنوآت ويتم تسليمهآ في عآم 2003
> من بآب الفخر أن يكون عندنآ قوة ردع! ، ووجود هذه القوه مع دولـة تتحمل مسؤلية هذه النقله النوعيــه في القوة +وجودك في موقــع الأخطار تحدق بــك من كل أتجآه ! ومن المعلوم ماذا حدثُ منذُ عام 2003 بالمنطقه والسعوديــه !
واللذي من فضل الله وفضل نآيف لكان الوضــع متأزم وتجــد قوآت السعوديــه مقتحمة أكثر من ثلاث دوول !:ANSmile04[1]:
وبمآ أن الوضع شفآف :" أقدر أقول أن هذه الدول " ليبيآ ، سوريآ ـ اليمن ، إيرآن ، العرآق " واللذي ورآء ذلــك كلــه تجدهُ إسرآئيل !
يوجــد تقآريرِ كثيره تتكلم عن العلاقــه السعوديــة الصينيــه من نآحية الصوآريخ المحمله بــ رؤوس نوويه
وهذا التقرير يتكلم عن بدأ تقنيآت يتم عملهآ على مدى عشر سنوآت ويتم تسليمهآ في عآم 2003
ليس لديك تصريح لمشاهدة الرابط، فضلا قم ب تسجيل الدخول او تسجيل
> من بآب الفخر أن يكون عندنآ قوة ردع! ، ووجود هذه القوه مع دولـة تتحمل مسؤلية هذه النقله النوعيــه في القوة +وجودك في موقــع الأخطار تحدق بــك من كل أتجآه ! ومن المعلوم ماذا حدثُ منذُ عام 2003 بالمنطقه والسعوديــه !
واللذي من فضل الله وفضل نآيف لكان الوضــع متأزم وتجــد قوآت السعوديــه مقتحمة أكثر من ثلاث دوول !:ANSmile04[1]:
وبمآ أن الوضع شفآف :" أقدر أقول أن هذه الدول " ليبيآ ، سوريآ ـ اليمن ، إيرآن ، العرآق " واللذي ورآء ذلــك كلــه تجدهُ إسرآئيل !
- إنضم
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وهذه صورة من تقرير :
وهذه صورة من تقرير :
ليس لديك تصريح لمشاهدة الرابط، فضلا قم ب تسجيل الدخول او تسجيل
- إنضم
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I
الظاهر من هذا الخبر ان السعودية فقط تنتظر الضوء الاخضر
لكي تعلن ايران انها نووية
I
الظاهر من هذا الخبر ان السعودية فقط تنتظر الضوء الاخضر
لكي تعلن ايران انها نووية
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ماعد يبغا لها كلام خلاص
ماعد يبغا لها كلام خلاص
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Henderson on Saudi-China-Pakistan Missile Ties
April 23, 2006 :: Analysis
Simon Henderson, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, recently commented on missile ties between Saudi Arabia, China, and Pakistan. The Saudis currently possess an arsenal of aging Chinese-designed CSS-2 missiles, purchased from China in the 1980s. Riyadh hopes to upgrade this arsenal with modern Chinese-designed missiles and perhaps nuclear warheads to create a deterrent against Iran. Henderson speculates that the Saudis will attempt to acquire from Pakistan both Chinese-designed missiles and dual-key Pakistani nuclear warheads. Under such a system, Saudi Arabia would have the key that controls the missiles, while Pakistan would have the key that controls the warheads. The result would technically not breach the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and perhaps evade Chinese international obligations against the transfer of ballistic missiles. However, a nuclear-armed Saudi Arabia would severely undermine U.S. diplomatic efforts to block Iran’s nuclear weapons program, and dramatically alter the regional balance of power.
Henderson notes that Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah visited Pakistan in February 2006, on his way back from China. In addition, Crown Prince Sultan, the Saudi defense minister, was in Pakistan in April. On Sultan’s previous trip to Pakistan in 1999, he toured Pakistan’s Kahuta uranium enrichment and missile production center, where he was escorted by the then director, the nuclear proliferator A.Q. Khan. (Article)
» More stories on: Analysis, China, Pakistan, Proliferation
» Missile details: CSS-2 (DF-3, DF-3A)
ليس لديك تصريح لمشاهدة الرابط، فضلا قم ب تسجيل الدخول او تسجيل
ليس لديك تصريح لمشاهدة الرابط، فضلا قم ب تسجيل الدخول او تسجيل
Henderson on Saudi-China-Pakistan Missile Ties
April 23, 2006 :: Analysis
Simon Henderson, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, recently commented on missile ties between Saudi Arabia, China, and Pakistan. The Saudis currently possess an arsenal of aging Chinese-designed CSS-2 missiles, purchased from China in the 1980s. Riyadh hopes to upgrade this arsenal with modern Chinese-designed missiles and perhaps nuclear warheads to create a deterrent against Iran. Henderson speculates that the Saudis will attempt to acquire from Pakistan both Chinese-designed missiles and dual-key Pakistani nuclear warheads. Under such a system, Saudi Arabia would have the key that controls the missiles, while Pakistan would have the key that controls the warheads. The result would technically not breach the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and perhaps evade Chinese international obligations against the transfer of ballistic missiles. However, a nuclear-armed Saudi Arabia would severely undermine U.S. diplomatic efforts to block Iran’s nuclear weapons program, and dramatically alter the regional balance of power.
Henderson notes that Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah visited Pakistan in February 2006, on his way back from China. In addition, Crown Prince Sultan, the Saudi defense minister, was in Pakistan in April. On Sultan’s previous trip to Pakistan in 1999, he toured Pakistan’s Kahuta uranium enrichment and missile production center, where he was escorted by the then director, the nuclear proliferator A.Q. Khan. (Article)
» More stories on: Analysis, China, Pakistan, Proliferation
» Missile details: CSS-2 (DF-3, DF-3A)
ليس لديك تصريح لمشاهدة الرابط، فضلا قم ب تسجيل الدخول او تسجيل
التعديل الأخير:
- إنضم
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رد: السعودية تطور صواريخ بالستية فتاكة وتشتري راجمات إفريقية
“I believe the People’s Republic of China delivered a turn-key nuclear ballistic missile system to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia over the course of several years beginning no later than December 2003,” writes Jonathan Scherck in a self-published book, “Patriot Lost,” which he provided to SpyTalk on Monday…
“Based on the author’s knowledge of U.S. satellite imagery spanning this time period, along with first-hand accounts of revealing interactions between Cheney’s office and CIA management,” a press release says, “Patriot Lost details how — out of political expediency amidst the war in Iraq — the Bush White House opted not to intervene in an oil-for-nuclear weapons pact between the Chinese government and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This heavily shrouded deal and Washington’s shocking complicity constituted a flagrant violation of the long-standing but crippled Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ratified decades ago under the Richard Nixon administration.”
But his manuscript provides little in the way of detailed evidence for his conclusions…
Over the years there have been constant reports on secret collaboration among China, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in nuclear and ballistic missile development.
This book sounds like a work of fiction by a disgruntled former CIA analyst. If it is not the ramifications are world-changing: a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, Arab nuclear-tipped missiles that could hit Israel, continued flagrant violation by China of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, greater competition with China than previously understood for Saudi Arabia’s oil and “friendship”, to list a few. Such an alleged deal might also help explain why the Chinese do not seem too concerned about Iran’s efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability.
I certainly hope that Mr. Scherck and his story will be quickly and convincingly discredited.
“I believe the People’s Republic of China delivered a turn-key nuclear ballistic missile system to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia over the course of several years beginning no later than December 2003,” writes Jonathan Scherck in a self-published book, “Patriot Lost,” which he provided to SpyTalk on Monday…
“Based on the author’s knowledge of U.S. satellite imagery spanning this time period, along with first-hand accounts of revealing interactions between Cheney’s office and CIA management,” a press release says, “Patriot Lost details how — out of political expediency amidst the war in Iraq — the Bush White House opted not to intervene in an oil-for-nuclear weapons pact between the Chinese government and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This heavily shrouded deal and Washington’s shocking complicity constituted a flagrant violation of the long-standing but crippled Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ratified decades ago under the Richard Nixon administration.”
But his manuscript provides little in the way of detailed evidence for his conclusions…
Over the years there have been constant reports on secret collaboration among China, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in nuclear and ballistic missile development.
This book sounds like a work of fiction by a disgruntled former CIA analyst. If it is not the ramifications are world-changing: a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, Arab nuclear-tipped missiles that could hit Israel, continued flagrant violation by China of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, greater competition with China than previously understood for Saudi Arabia’s oil and “friendship”, to list a few. Such an alleged deal might also help explain why the Chinese do not seem too concerned about Iran’s efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability.
I certainly hope that Mr. Scherck and his story will be quickly and convincingly discredited.
ليس لديك تصريح لمشاهدة الرابط، فضلا قم ب تسجيل الدخول او تسجيل
- إنضم
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4-15-2011
Saudi Arabia and China now more than just ‘good friends’
US National Security Adviser Tom Donilon is the second high-ranking American official to visit Riyadh in less than a week. He landed Tuesday, April 12, just six days after US Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Saudi King Abdullah ended a stormy interview which failed to bridge the widening gap between Washington and Riyadh.
For the second interview, the monarch was attended by three top royal advisers, all hawks and live wires in security and external affairs: Director of General Intelligence Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz, Secretary-General of the National Security Council Prince Bandar bin Sultan, and Saudi Ambassador to the US Adel Jubeir.
The ambassador, who is important enough to the king to spend more time in the royal palace in Riyadh than at his post in Washington, was the only one of the three to be present at the meeting with Gates.
Our Gulf intelligence sources report that by calling in his most influential advisers, Abdullah was telling Washington:
1. That he attaches supreme importance to Saudi relations with the United States;
2. That he will not be moved from the independent foreign and security policies he has set in train – whether or not they meet with American approval. In pursuing them, Princes Muqrin and Bandar and Ambassador Jubeir enjoy his full backing.
According to our sources, the three advisers have been given their assignments: Muqrin is focusing on Iran, Yemen, Libya and Al Qaeda. Bandar deals with Saudi Arabia’s foreign military relations – excepting the US – and is managing the comparison shopping for advanced weapons among multiple suppliers. Ambassador Jubeir’s job is to advise the king and represent Saudi positions on matters of common interest to the US administration.
Saudis buy advanced Chinese nuclear-capable missiles
Bandar recently paid a secret visit to China and clinched terms for CSS-3 DF-3 ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads to replace the hardware Saudi Arabia bought from China in the 1980s.
US intelligence discovered the first transaction in 1988 when those Chinese missiles were installed outside Riyadh and positioned to face Tehran. Our intelligence and military sources reveal the transaction Bandar negotiated provides for the sale of two types of Chinese missiles: the DF-21 (NATO-designated CSS-5), which is a two-stage, solid-propellant, single-warhead medium-range ballistic (MRBM) system developed by China Changfeng Mechanics and Electronis Technology Academy.
The DF-21 is capable of delivering a 500kT nuclear warhead over a distance of 1,800 km. Its purchase underlines the Saudi royal family’s determination to have its own nuclear arms and missiles ready for launch in the face of an approaching nuclear-armed Iran.
The second missile, the DongFeng 15 (Export name M-9; NATO-designation CSS-6) is a solid-fuel, short-range ballistic (SRBM) system developed by CASC China Academy of Rocket Motor Technology ARMT, the 4th Space Academy.
Our information is that the Saudis purchased the improved variants of DongFeng 15 B and DongFeng 15C, recently sighted in service with China’s Popular Liberation Army (PLA). During the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, those variants, which were launched as a warning to Taiwan, won a reputation for accuracy and effectiveness.
4-15-2011
Saudi Arabia and China now more than just ‘good friends’
US National Security Adviser Tom Donilon is the second high-ranking American official to visit Riyadh in less than a week. He landed Tuesday, April 12, just six days after US Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Saudi King Abdullah ended a stormy interview which failed to bridge the widening gap between Washington and Riyadh.
For the second interview, the monarch was attended by three top royal advisers, all hawks and live wires in security and external affairs: Director of General Intelligence Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz, Secretary-General of the National Security Council Prince Bandar bin Sultan, and Saudi Ambassador to the US Adel Jubeir.
ليس لديك تصريح لمشاهدة الرابط، فضلا قم ب تسجيل الدخول او تسجيل
The ambassador, who is important enough to the king to spend more time in the royal palace in Riyadh than at his post in Washington, was the only one of the three to be present at the meeting with Gates.
Our Gulf intelligence sources report that by calling in his most influential advisers, Abdullah was telling Washington:
1. That he attaches supreme importance to Saudi relations with the United States;
2. That he will not be moved from the independent foreign and security policies he has set in train – whether or not they meet with American approval. In pursuing them, Princes Muqrin and Bandar and Ambassador Jubeir enjoy his full backing.
According to our sources, the three advisers have been given their assignments: Muqrin is focusing on Iran, Yemen, Libya and Al Qaeda. Bandar deals with Saudi Arabia’s foreign military relations – excepting the US – and is managing the comparison shopping for advanced weapons among multiple suppliers. Ambassador Jubeir’s job is to advise the king and represent Saudi positions on matters of common interest to the US administration.
Saudis buy advanced Chinese nuclear-capable missiles
Bandar recently paid a secret visit to China and clinched terms for CSS-3 DF-3 ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads to replace the hardware Saudi Arabia bought from China in the 1980s.
US intelligence discovered the first transaction in 1988 when those Chinese missiles were installed outside Riyadh and positioned to face Tehran. Our intelligence and military sources reveal the transaction Bandar negotiated provides for the sale of two types of Chinese missiles: the DF-21 (NATO-designated CSS-5), which is a two-stage, solid-propellant, single-warhead medium-range ballistic (MRBM) system developed by China Changfeng Mechanics and Electronis Technology Academy.
The DF-21 is capable of delivering a 500kT nuclear warhead over a distance of 1,800 km. Its purchase underlines the Saudi royal family’s determination to have its own nuclear arms and missiles ready for launch in the face of an approaching nuclear-armed Iran.
The second missile, the DongFeng 15 (Export name M-9; NATO-designation CSS-6) is a solid-fuel, short-range ballistic (SRBM) system developed by CASC China Academy of Rocket Motor Technology ARMT, the 4th Space Academy.
Our information is that the Saudis purchased the improved variants of DongFeng 15 B and DongFeng 15C, recently sighted in service with China’s Popular Liberation Army (PLA). During the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, those variants, which were launched as a warning to Taiwan, won a reputation for accuracy and effectiveness.
ليس لديك تصريح لمشاهدة الرابط، فضلا قم ب تسجيل الدخول او تسجيل
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رد: السعودية تطور صواريخ بالستية فتاكة وتشتري راجمات إفريقية
اعتقد انو هذه الصاروخ قد صنع حتى يكون مضاد للسفن وتحديدا" ليكون مضاد حاملات الطائرات والجزائر قامت بشراء هذه الصاروخ ولاكن طريقه عمل هذه الصاروخ هو اقرب الى الخيال
اعتقد انو هذه الصاروخ قد صنع حتى يكون مضاد للسفن وتحديدا" ليكون مضاد حاملات الطائرات والجزائر قامت بشراء هذه الصاروخ ولاكن طريقه عمل هذه الصاروخ هو اقرب الى الخيال
المواضيع المشابهة
